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Abstract 
 
Current theories of category-based inductive reasoning can be distinguished by the emphasis 
they place on structured and unstructured knowledge. Theories which draw on unstructured 
knowledge focus on associative strength, or temporal and spatial contiguity between 
categories. In contrast, accounts which draw on structured knowledge make reference to the 
underlying theoretical frameworks which relate categories to one another, such as causal or 
taxonomic relationships. In this thesis, it is argued that this apparent dichotomy can be 
resolved if one ascribes different processing characteristics to these two types of knowledge. 
That is, unstructured knowledge influences inductive reasoning effortlessly and relatively 
automatically, whereas the use of structured knowledge requires effort and the availability of 
cognitive resources.  Understanding these diverging processes illuminates how background 
knowledge is selected during the inference process. 
The thesis demonstrates that structured and unstructured knowledge are dissociable and 
influence reasoning in line with their unique processing characteristics. Using secondary task 
and speeded response paradigms, it shows that unstructured knowledge is most influential 
when people are cognitively burdened or forced to respond fast, whereas they can draw on 
more elaborate structured knowledge if they are not cognitively compromised. This is 
especially evident for the causal asymmetry effect, in which people make stronger inferences 
from cause to effect categories, than vice versa. This Bayesian normative effect disappears 
when people have to contend with a secondary task or respond under time pressure.  
iii 
 
The next experiments demonstrate that this dissociation between structured and 
unstructured knowledge is also evident for a more naturalistic inductive reasoning paradigm 
in which people generate their own inferences.  
In the final experiments, it is shown how the selection of appropriate knowledge ties in 
with more domain-general processes, and especially inhibitory control.  When responses 
based on structured and unstructured knowledge conflict, people‟s ability to reason based on 
appropriate structured knowledge depends upon having relevant background knowledge and 
on their ability to inhibit the lure from inappropriate unstructured knowledge.  
The thesis concludes with a discussion of how the concepts of structured and 
unstructured knowledge illuminate the processes underlying knowledge selection for 
category-based inductive reasoning. It also looks at the implications the findings have for 
different theories of category-based induction, and for our understanding of human reasoning 
processes more generally.  
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1 Chapter I  
 
 
Introduction 
The human ability to generalize from past experience is extraordinary.  Imagine a friend tries 
fresh prawns for the first time, and becomes ill after eating them.  He knows that they were 
fresh, so his conclusion is most likely to be that prawns contain a substance which does not 
agree with him.  Consequently, in future he might avoid meals containing shrimps, lobster or 
crab, reasoning that if prawns made him ill, it is quite likely that other shellfish would have 
the same effect.  In contrast, imagine that the prawns which made him ill had passed their 
expiration date.  In this case, he might avoid eating chicken, beef or vegetables that are past 
their expiration date, but he might be quite willing to eat fresh prawns in future.  Although in 
both cases he ate prawns which made him ill, based on his knowledge about contextual 
factors, the inferences he draws will result in quite different behaviour.  
Such everyday examples illustrate the crucial role knowledge plays in inductive 
reasoning. Yet what is the nature of this background knowledge and which aspects are 
important in influencing inductive reasoning? What cognitive processes are involved in the 
use and selection of background knowledge? In this thesis, we endeavour to provide a 
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comprehensive insight into how background knowledge shapes our category-based 
inferences.  
The thesis proceeds as follows: it begins with a review of early attempts to explain 
inductive inferences in knowledge-rich environments. It then focuses more specifically on 
one class of inductive inferences, category-based induction. It outlines several theories and 
frameworks of category-based inductive reasoning and evaluates how they conceptualize 
knowledge. In doing so, it motivates one of the central proposals, arguing that there is an 
implicit theoretical controversy regarding the emphasis placed on two different types of 
background knowledge. This is followed by an attempt to clearly delineate these two 
contrasting types of knowledge. The thesis then reviews a more general framework of 
reasoning, dual process theories, and explores whether ascribing contrasting processing 
characteristics to different types of knowledge in category-based induction can offer a 
solution to the aforementioned theoretical dichotomy.  The final section outlines the precise 
questions explored throughout the experimental chapters.  
1.1 Early Approaches to the Role of Knowledge in Inductive Reasoning  
Inductive inferences come in many forms.  Inferences can be specific, that is, we use one 
experience to infer something about another particular instance, or general, that is, we 
abstract a general rule about the state of the world following a particular observation.  For 
example, having cut yourself with a sharp knife, you might infer that the other knife in your 
drawer could have similarly hazardous properties and that this is probably true of all sharp 
knives.  Furthermore, inferences can operate bi-directionally.  That is, inferences can be tools 
for making predictions about future events or diagnoses about past incidences.  What all 
inductive inferences have in common though is that they go beyond our immediate 
experience, elaborating our semantic knowledge beyond the directly observable.   
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The simplicity with which we base our actions on inductive inferences conceals the 
importance of our ability to learn from past experience and apply this knowledge to novel 
situations.  In contrast to the ease with which we make inductive inferences, scientific 
enquiry is still struggling to come to a consensus on what inductive reasoning is, how it can 
be logically justified and what mental processes underlie induction. 
This struggle can be traced back to some of the great philosophical thinkers such as 
Hume, who was one of the pioneers in making the “problem” of induction explicit (Howson, 
2000).  In his view, induction is one of the great riddles of thinking because it cannot be 
logically justified (e.g. Hume, 1748 in Enquiry, section 4, part 2).  However, this is also the 
major strength of our ability to reason inductively: it is hugely flexible, allowing us to 
abstract any number of general rules from specific observations.  Whilst we cannot prove a 
conclusion derived inductively to be true, the conclusions we draw greatly reduce the 
uncertainty in our environment, making the world a more predictable and thus controllable 
place. In fact, Bayesian theorists (Chater & Oaksford, 2007; Oaksford & Hahn, 2007) argue 
that most reasoning is inductive in nature, providing a pertinent tool for facilitating adaptive 
behaviour and acquiring new knowledge in an inherently probabilistic world. 
Early philosophical approaches raised many questions about the function and nature of 
knowledge in inductive reasoning.  However, one of the most critical questions is what 
characteristics we are willing to generalize.  Many have noted that some features seem to 
have more inductive potency than others.  For example, when making inferences about the 
characteristics of blackbirds from observing a blackbird in our garden, the property „has an 
orange beak‟ is intuitively more projectable than „has dirt stuck to its beak‟.  According to 
Goodman (1955), projectable properties tend to be those that support law-like hypotheses.  
We are likely to observe many instances of blackbirds which have orange beaks, but many 
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instances of blackbirds that do not have dirt stuck to their beaks.  This makes the former a 
coherent hypothesis, whilst stripping the latter of its law-like essence.  We are far more likely 
to make projections of the first kind, than of the second kind.  In Goodman‟s own words, 
based on such successful past projections, having an orange beak is a far more entrenched 
predicate than having a dirty beak. 
Quine (1977) offered a slightly different answer to the question of which predicates are 
projectable.  In his view, predicates of entities that can be grouped into similar kinds tend to 
be projectable.  This leads to two questions, firstly what aspects of similarity lead to grouping 
into kinds and how well do these subjective kinds match up to the objective structure of the 
world?  Quine (1977) appeals to a Darwinian justification: strategies for grouping cases into 
kinds would be reinforced if the alignment of entities along certain similarity relations 
offered an evolutionary advantage.  Note how this foreshadows the later emergence of two 
apparently dichotomous traditions of explaining induction. One approach places emphasis on 
the actual similarity and association between instances, whereas the other highlights the 
importance of peoples‟ knowledge about the structure that results from grouping similar 
kinds, such as category membership. As we will see later, this divergent emphasis on 
different types of knowledge has been especially apparent in early models of one specific 
type of induction, namely category-based reasoning (Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & 
Shafir, 1990; Sloman, 1993b). This split is also implicit in the majority of later frameworks 
and models dealing with the effects of knowledge on category-based inductions (Kemp & 
Tenenbaum, 2009; Rogers & McClelland, 2004; Shafto, Kemp, Bonawitz, Coley, & 
Tenenbaum, 2008; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004a; Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006). 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
5 
 
1.2 Category-Based Induction 
Category-based inductions cover a class of inferences in which category membership of an 
object supports people‟s inferences about properties shared by other category members. For 
example, classifying an animal as a rabbit allows us to infer that it probably lives in a burrow. 
Furthermore, if we observe that the animal we have classified as a rabbit eats carrots, we are 
likely to infer that other rabbits also eat carrots.  
Rips (1975) was the first to systematically investigate how category membership and 
similarity between entities shaped peoples‟ patterns of inductive reasoning. After establishing 
the dimensions of similarity between various animal categories by using multidimensional 
scaling,  he asked participants to estimate the proportion of different kinds of animals (the 
„target‟ species) on an isolated island that would share a novel contagious disease with a 
specific category of animal (the „premise‟ species). Peoples‟ category-based inductive 
estimations were predicted along two gradients, the similarity between the premise and target 
species and the typicality of the premise species carrying the disease. The higher the 
similarity between the premise and target species, the more members of the target species 
were thought to have the disease. For example, when told that eagles had the contagious 
disease, people thought that more hawks would also have the disease than would geese or 
ducks. Typicality can be quantified by using multidimensional scaling techniques and refers 
to the geometric distance between the category instance (e.g. horse) and its superordinate 
category (e.g. mammal).  For example, people thought that relatively more of the other 
animal species would have the disease if it was present in a typical mammal category such as 
horses, than when it was present in a more atypical species such as mice.  
Following on from this early work, similarity and category membership became the 
hallmark dimensions for explaining patterns of category-based induction. Using the now-
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standard argument evaluation paradigm, people are presented with a premise statement 
informing them that one or more base categories have a certain property. They are then given 
a conclusion which includes a target category. It is the participants‟ task to judge how likely 
it is that this conclusion category shares a property with the category mentioned in the 
premise. To minimize judgements that reflect mere knowledge retrieval about the presence of 
specific properties rather than inductively derived inferences, researchers use so-called 
„blank‟ properties (e.g. has „talio-cells‟). Furthermore, if the conclusion category 
encompasses all the categories presented in the premises, as in examples (1a) and (1b) below, 
the argument is general. In contrast, if the conclusion is an instance from the same category 
level as the premise categories, the argument is said to be specific, as in examples (2a) and 
(2b) below. Consider examples of each type of argument: 
 
Moths have talio-cells 
Butterflies have talio-cells 
--------------------------------------------- 
Therefore, all Insects have talio-cells   (1a) 
 
Moths have talio-cells 
Cockroaches have talio-cells 
--------------------------------------------- 
Therefore, all Insects have talio-cells   (1b) 
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Tigers have talio-cells 
Lions have talio-cells 
-------------------------------------------- 
Therefore, Rabbits have talio-cells   (2a) 
 
Tigers have talio-cells 
Horses have talio-cells 
-------------------------------------------- 
Therefore, Rabbits have talio-cells   (2b) 
 
There are two kinds of tasks participants might be asked to carry out. They may either be 
asked to rate their belief that the target conclusion category does indeed share the property 
with the base premise(s) on a Likert-scale. Alternatively, they may be asked to choose the 
stronger of two arguments which have identical conclusions but include different premise 
categories. In the above examples (1a) and (1b), this would give an indication as to whether a 
property found in “moths and butterflies” or in “moths and cockroaches” offers more support 
that all insects share this property.  
Such tasks give rise to a host of inductive reasoning phenomena (Osherson et al., 1990; 
Sloman, 1993b). Apart from typicality and similarity effects already discovered by Rips 
(1975), arguably the most important one is the diversity effect (Lopez, 1995; Heit, Hahn & 
Feeney, 2005). Diversity captures the finding that a more varied set of premise categories 
lead to stronger inferences than more similar premise categories. To illustrate, arguments (1b) 
and (2b) should be stronger than (1a) and (2a), as the premise categories in the former 
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arguments are more dissimilar to one another and therefore “represent” the conclusion 
categories more exhaustively.  
Whilst these phenomena imply that similarity is fundamental to the process of category-
based induction, evidence suggests that category membership is just as vital. Gelman and 
Markman (1986) gave adults and children pictures of three animals, illustrated in Figure 1.1 
below. The first animal (a flamingo) was from the same superordinate category as the third 
animal (a blackbird), but was perceptually dissimilar. In contrast, the second animal (a bat) 
was perceptually similar to the third animal (the blackbird) but came from a different 
superordinate category. Children were then told about the properties of two of the animals. 
For example, they may learn that the flamingo‟s heart has a right aortic arch only, whereas 
the bat‟s heart has a left aortic arch only. They then had to decide whether the blackbird‟s 
heart had a right aortic arch like the flamingo, or a left aortic arch like the bat. Gelman and 
Markman‟s (1986) results indicated that children tended to believe that the blackbird would 
share a property with the flamingo rather than with the bat, ignoring perceptual similarity in 
favour of category membership. 
 
Figure 1.1: Example of stimuli used in Gelman and Markman‟s (1986) triad task 
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As the above examples illustrate, similarity and category membership are both crucial for 
explaining patterns of category-based induction. However, one of the major theoretical 
controversies to emerge alongside the next generation of models of category-based induction 
was the diverging emphasis placed on each of these components. For example, Osherson and 
colleagues‟ (1990) model emphasises both similarity and knowledge about stable category 
hierarchies, whereas the other early model by Sloman (1993b) explains these phenomena 
entirely in terms of similarity.  
One way of capturing this apparent dichotomy is to divide theoretical approaches with 
reference to the contrasting types of knowledge they emphasize. On the one hand, there are 
approaches which emphasize the role of different types of similarity, such as featural overlap 
(Sloman, 1993b), perceptual similarity (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004a) or semantic association 
(Rogers & McClelland, 2004). We describe such knowledge as being unstructured, in that it 
does not capture higher-order or abstract relations between categories. On the other hand, 
there are apparently contradictory approaches that place theory-based knowledge at the centre 
of the inductive process, such as knowledge about stable category-hierarchies (Osherson et 
al., 1990) and causal relations between categories (Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001). We call 
this structured knowledge, as it describes abstract and underlying relationships between 
categories.  
The following sections provide a precise definition of what we mean by unstructured and 
structured knowledge. It first reviews approaches which emphasize unstructured knowledge, 
before outlining frameworks which highlight the role of structured background knowledge, 
evaluating the extent to which models within each approach can explain aspects of category-
based induction. The thesis argues that the reason this dichotomy has not been addressed is 
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because most researchers have focused on distinctions between domains of knowledge rather 
than types of knowledge (e.g. Carey, 1985, Rehder, 2006, Shafto, Coley & Baldwin, 2007).  
With reference to widely applied dual process theories, we suggest that this apparent conflict 
can be resolved by examining the processing characteristics of these two contrasting types of 
knowledge, exploring the roles of cognitive resources and inhibitory control.   
1.3 The Role of Unstructured Knowledge in Category-Based Induction 
Before proceeding with a review of approaches that put emphasis on unstructured knowledge, 
it is crucial to clarify exactly what we mean by this concept. We treat frameworks and models 
of category-based induction in which background knowledge is not described by higher order 
structure, abstract theories and/or interrelationships as frameworks which draw on 
unstructured knowledge. Hence, this includes approaches which explain inductive inferences 
as a result of relations between entities which are based on contiguity, co-occurrence, 
similarity or associations. Whilst the former two are inherent in the environment, the latter 
two relations describe unstructured knowledge from a psychological aspect. However, a 
precise or single psychological definition of the terms similarity and association are quite 
hard to come by. With regards to similarity, the simplest form is presumably perceptual 
similarity (Estes, 2003; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004). Similarity between two entities (e.g. 
between horses and cows) can be determined by weighing up the number of shared features 
compared to the number of unique features (Tversky, 1977). However, as pointed out by 
Hahn, Chater & Richardson (2003), most entities and objects cannot be fully represented by a 
list of discreet features. According to Estes (2003) and Markman and Gentner (1996), the 
comparison of similarity between two entities occurs by structural alignment, whereby 
conceptually equivalent features of each entity are juxtaposed. For example, the shape of the 
horse is aligned with the shape of the cow, highlighting a commonality, whereas the whinny 
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of the horse is aligned with the moo of the cow, exposing a difference. By tallying up 
differences and commonalities, one can calculate the similarity between two categories or 
concepts.  
A related theory of similarity is Representational Distortion (Hahn, Chater & Richardson, 
2003; Hodgetts, Hahn & Chater, 2009). This framework holds that similarity is inversely 
related to the computational complexity of transformations needed to convert one mental 
representation into another. When two objects can be structurally aligned, it reduces the 
number of steps needed to carry out this transformation process. Note that whilst this account 
emphasizes structured representations of the objects or entities to be compared for similarity, 
no structured knowledge about the relationship between the objects is required. For example, 
one can compare the structured representation of a horse to that of a cow without having to 
know about structured relations between them, such as shared habitat or taxonomic 
relatedness.  
 Wisniewski and Bassok (1999) also identify another kind of similarity based on an 
integration rather than comparison process and which may explain similarity on a more 
semantic level. For example, they found that people rated non-alignable categories, but which 
could be integrated into a thematic scenario, such as “male and tie”, as being more similar 
than categories which did not share such a thematic relation, such as “woman and tie”. Whilst 
the thematic relation between men and ties does not increase the actual perceptual similarity 
between the two concepts, people may be swayed by the strong association between the two. 
This might provide a bridge between the notions of similarity and association, with similarity 
being a specific kind of unstructured knowledge which relies more on a comparison process, 
whereas unstructured knowledge in the form of associations  may be a more overarching 
concept that captures many kinds of relations, ranging from thematic, to causal and 
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functional, etcetera. The reason we call this knowledge unstructured is because people need 
not be aware of the nature of the relation, but that the presence (or absence) of such relations 
increases (or decreases) people‟s perception of psychological “closeness” between entities.  
At a phenomenological level, associations are best described as psychological 
connections, which relate ideas, events, objects or experiences to one another. Thus, if two 
concepts or mental images become associated, for example through temporo-spatial 
contiguity, then activation of one leads to activation of the other (Postman &Keppel, 1969; 
Tulving 1972; Shanks 2007). In this sense, the way we approach the construct of unstructured 
knowledge corresponds largely to the way in which knowledge is represented in 
connectionist network models of semantic cognition (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986)  
The rationale for assuming that associations and similarity must play a crucial role in 
inductive reasoning comes from a vast developmental literature (e.g. Colunga & Smith, 2005; 
French, Mareschal, Mermillod, & Quinn, 2004; Jones & Smith, 2002; Sloutsky & Fisher, 
2004b; Sloutsky, Kloos, & Fisher, 2007). These studies suggest that early category formation 
and induction is driven by the statistical properties inherent in the environment, such as co-
occurrence and statistical distribution of perceptual features. For example, acquisition of 
knowledge about which properties are crucial for generalizing specific category names can be 
explained by associations amongst perceptual properties (Jones & Smith, 2002), forming the 
foundation on which older children can build up richer structural representations of categories 
(French, et al., 2004). Similarly, Sloutsky and Fisher‟s (2004a) model of Similarity, Induction 
and Categorization (SINC) assumes that children perform categorization and inductive 
reasoning on the basis of perceptual similarity, in which the category label is simply treated 
as another feature contributing to increased similarity between different instances. These 
researchers also claim that there is only a gradual and developmentally late transition from 
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exclusive reliance on similarity to the use of category membership as a basis for induction. 
This transition is largely seen as the product of explicit instruction and learning about general 
characteristics of categories (Fisher & Sloutsky, 2005). However, despite category 
representations being supplemented and expanded by top-down knowledge, proponents of 
associative approaches to category-based induction advocate that adult categorization and 
induction is still heavily influenced by  similarity (Sloman, 1993a) and associations in 
semantic memory (Rogers & McClelland, 2004).  
1.3.1 Sloman’s (1993) Feature-Based Induction Model 
One of the early models which explains category-based induction as driven primarily by 
bottom-up associative similarity is Sloman‟s (1993b) Feature-Based Induction Model (FBM). 
The FBM explicates all inductive reasoning phenomena purely in associative terms. 
Argument strength is determined by the degree to which the presentation of premise instances 
activates overlapping features of the conclusion instance. Arguments in which premise and 
conclusion categories share more features are stronger than arguments with little featural 
overlap between premise and conclusion. Consequently, there is no need to assume a stable 
category hierarchy. Consider for example how this model explains the diversity effect 
without making any assumptions about category membership. Thus, blackbirds and penguins 
cover the featural space of birds better than do the more similar categories blackbirds and 
chaffinches. Owing to their high similarity, the second category of the latter pair is largely 
redundant, failing to add additional features over those contributed by the first category, to 
cover the bird category. In contrast, penguins have many additional properties not shared by 
blackbirds, increasing the number of unique feature activations. 
Smith and DeCoster (2000) link this associative view to underlying memory processes. A 
slow-learning system mediated by areas of the neocortex gradually forms stable 
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representations of the environment based on the accumulation of analogous experiences. 
When similar situations or objects are encountered in the future, there is an automatic 
activation of these knowledge representations, which deliver information and shape 
behaviour without the need for deliberate or effortful thought. As such, this kind of reasoning 
predominantly delivers responses which encode statistical properties of the environment.  
1.3.2 Connectionist Models  
Smith and DeCoster‟s (2000) suggestions about the nature of associative induction resonate 
strongly with the characteristics of connectionist networks. Connectionist models are 
abundant across many domains of cognition, ranging from semantic memory (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975), word identification (Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989), acquired reading 
disorders (Hinton & Shallice, 1991; Plaut, McClelland, Seidenberg, & Patterson, 1996) to 
cognitive development (Elman, 1996; Morton & Munakata, 2005). Owing to the breath of 
application to different domains, there seems a certain appeal in being able to implement 
category-based reasoning in a connectionist architecture.  Although the precise architecture 
can differ between connectionist networks
1
, most models represent knowledge in a 
distributed manner. Thus, what defines a phoneme, word or concept is the precise 
configuration of activation across simple “neuron-like” processing units. The same units can 
be used in representations of different concepts. As this invariably encodes statistical 
properties both within and between concepts, it can encode more complex information than 
would be possible if each concept had its unique representation within the overall system.  
The only connectionist model of category-based induction can be found in Rogers and 
McClelland‟s (2004) impressively wide-ranging application of their Parallel Distributed 
Processing (PDP) Model. It assumes that semantic information is processed through the 
                                                          
1
For a  summary of differences between feed-forward, recurrent and interactive network architectures, see 
Hadley (1999, 2000) 
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propagation of activity between neuron-like processing nodes in response to a stimulus input. 
Initially, the connections between nodes are random and weak, but incremental adjustments 
are made to the strength of the connection between different nodes in response to the learning 
input from the environment. Thus, semantic information about an instance is stored as an 
internal representation encoded by the pattern of distributed activation across processing 
units. Knowledge is refined by gradually adjusting the weight of connections between 
concepts (e.g. sparrow) and attributes (e.g. wings, chirp, small) for different kinds of 
relations (e.g. has, can, is). This means that generalizations from one instance to another will 
be strong to the extent that the activated distributed representations of the two instances 
overlap via their shared attributes.  
Several predictions follow from the way in which the connectionist model acquires 
semantic knowledge and makes generalizations. As it acquires knowledge gradually based on 
experiential input, the internal representations should mirror the structure of the learning 
environment. For example, if one repeatedly encounters two species in the same context, the 
internal representations ought to reflect this statistical co-occurrence. Inductive inferences 
between categories should be stronger to the extent that the categories have repeatedly been 
simultaneously activated in semantic memory, forming strong associations.  
1.4 Structured Approaches to Category-Based Induction 
As mentioned above, an opposing approach to explaining inductive reasoning focuses on the 
influence of structured knowledge. The justification for assuming that structured knowledge 
can play an important role in category-based induction arises from several reasoning 
phenomena that cannot be explained exclusively by the use of unstructured or associative 
knowledge, for example the developmental trajectory of the diversity effect (Lopez, Gelman, 
Gutheil, & Smith, 1992; Heit & Hahn, 2001) and causal asymmetry effects, in which 
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inferences are stronger from prey to predator than vice versa (Shafto, et al., 2008). These can 
however be well explained by models that put structured knowledge at the centre of the 
inductive reasoning process. The next section first outlines some of the formal models that 
incorporate structured knowledge, and how these can explain the aforementioned reasoning 
effects. 
1.4.1 Osherson et al’s (1990) Similarity-Coverage Model 
Following Rips (1975), Osherson et al.‟s (1990) Similarity-Coverage Model (SCM) posited 
knowledge about stable taxonomic structure as an important source of information that 
people rely on when evaluating categorical arguments. In contrast to Sloman‟s (1993) 
feature-based notion of similarity, Osherson et al.‟s (1990) conceptualization of similarity 
relies far more on explicit knowledge about similarity relations between category instances. 
Thus, inductive evaluations reflect the weighted sum of two primary parameters, similarity 
and coverage, thus allowing for individual differences to be ascribed to the relative 
importance of these two components. Similarity refers to the maximum average similarity 
between the premise and conclusion categories. Thus, inductions are better supported when 
there is a higher resemblance between the premise and conclusion categories. Coverage 
assumes that people have knowledge about stable category hierarchies and refers to the 
degree to which the premise categories cover the category space of the inclusive 
superordinate category. For one-premise arguments, coverage is analogous to typicality, 
whereby more typical category instances make for stronger inductive inferences than atypical 
category members. For multiple-premise arguments with general conclusions, coverage refers 
to the extent to which the premise categories are representative of a diverse range of 
categories from the superordinate conclusion category.  
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One of the hallmark phenomenon accounted for by the SCM is the diversity effect. 
According to this model, people have to generate the lowest superordinate category which 
includes the premise and conclusion categories. Diverse arguments are stronger because two 
dissimilar category instances cover the superordinate category space better than two similar 
category instances. This explanation relies on people having a structured representation of 
taxonomic relations between species. Although Sloman‟s (1993b) model can account for the 
basic diversity phenomenon, other evidence suggests that certain characteristics of this effect 
are not explicable in terms of associative knowledge, instead requiring reference to structured 
representations. For example, Feeney (2007) showed that only a minority of people manifest 
the diversity effect when reasoning about specific conclusions and that this was related to 
cognitive ability. Similarly, Lopez et al. (1992) showed that several developmental changes 
seem to depend on knowledge about stable category hierarchies. The primary aim of these 
researchers was to identify the separate components which comprise the coverage parameter 
in Osherson et al‟s (1990) SCM model. However, their findings are also consistent with the 
notion that the emergence of computationally more complex inductive reasoning phenomena 
lags behind those that are thought to rely on computationally simpler associative processes. 
For example, in the case of the diversity effect for specific arguments, children first have to 
generate an inclusive superordinate category before calculating coverage, a process that 
requires knowledge about structured taxonomic relations between categories. Lopez et al. 
(1992) showed that 9-year-old children exhibit sensitivity to diversity with general 
arguments, but performed at chance levels with specific arguments. This suggests that in 
order to show adult-like inductive reasoning, there must be a qualitative developmental shift 
in how children use their category knowledge to make inductive inferences.  
Together these findings suggest that generating the superordinate category which 
includes both the premise and conclusion category before being able to assess coverage (e.g. 
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having to generate the inclusive superordinate category mammal when reasoning from the 
premise categories dog and sheep to the conclusion category buffalo) involves a 
computationally demanding processing step that relies on knowledge about stable category 
hierarchies.  In contrast, this superordinate category is already available when reasoning 
about general conclusions (e.g. reasoning from the premise categories dog and sheep to the 
conclusion category mammal). If the diversity effect was exclusively explicable in terms of 
associative knowledge, one would not expect to see differences based on cognitive ability and 
changing developmental trajectories, nor should there be a dissociation between specific and 
general arguments. 
1.4.2 Causal Knowledge and Structured Bayesian Accounts  
Accounts which draw on associative knowledge also have no straightforward means of 
explaining phenomena that arise through considerations of causal structure. Within the 
inductive reasoning literature, the influence of similarity and taxonomic group membership 
has been studied most extensively. In comparison, research on how causal knowledge 
influences category-based inductions is still in its infancy. Nonetheless, causal knowledge has 
some unique characteristics that are relevant to the question of whether induction can be 
explained purely with reference to associative or unstructured knowledge or if it is necessary 
to draw on structured knowledge. 
There is evidence that causal knowledge plays a crucial role in children‟s category-based 
inductions early on. Hayes and Thompson (2007) taught five and eight-year old children and 
adults about features of two artificial base creatures. Figure 1.2 below illustrates Hayes and 
Thompson‟s (2007) task. The causal base contained two properties which were causally 
linked, whereas the attribute base contained three causally unrelated properties. This was 
followed by a target, which was more similar to the attribute base (two shared properties, no 
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causal link), but shared the antecedent causal property with the causal base. Participants had 
to infer whether the target was more likely to match the attribute or the causal base on a 
fourth property, thus creating a choice conflict between featural similarity and causal 
knowledge. Results indicated that when the causal link was explicit, all age groups preferred 
to make causal rather than similarity-based inductions. When the causal relation was implicit, 
5-year-olds did not yet show a preference for choosing the causally related items, unlike the 
older children and adults who made predominantly causal choices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Task structure in Hayes and Thompson‟s (2007) experiment 
 
Attribute Base Hoxney 
 has long fur 
 has claw feet 
 eats leaves 
 
Causal Base Waddo 
 has muscular 
legs 
 jumps high 
 
  
 explicit causal 
explanation: it can 
jump high because 
of its muscular legs 
Target Category 
 has long fur 
 has claw feet 
 has muscular legs 
 
Induction test 
Do you think the target 
animal can jump high like a 
Waddo or eats leaves like a 
Hoxney? 
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In a similar vein, a recent study by Opfer and Bulloch (2007) demonstrated that 5-year-olds 
are capable of ignoring perceptual similarity in favour of relational similarity when the latter 
had a causal antecedent but not when it was non-causal. As well as demonstrating that 
children can flexibly choose between different knowledge structures, the above studies 
challenge the contention that young children‟s inferences are primarily based on perceptual 
similarity (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004b).   
The fact that causal knowledge is inductively potent from such a young age explains why 
it can sometimes supplant some of the most robust similarity effects in adults (Medin, Coley, 
Storms, & Hayes, 2003; Rehder, 2006; Rehder & Burnett, 2005) However, use of causal 
knowledge in inductive reasoning is especially interesting as it has several unique 
characteristics not shared by other kinds of knowledge (Sloman, 2005). Asymmetry is one of 
its most distinguishing features. Thus, causes always precede or at least coincide with their 
effects. Causal structures can also vary in their complexity, ranging from simple cause-effect 
relations, for example unidirectional causal chains, to more elaborate common cause models 
(Pearl, 2000; Sloman, 2005). People seem to make use of these abstract relations to evaluate 
inductive arguments as their inferences are highly sensitive to the direction of the causal 
relation between category features (Rehder, 2009), as well as the direction of the causal link 
between species when making generalizations about novel properties (Medin, et al., 2003) 
and disease transmission (Shafto, et al., 2008). For example, people are more likely to 
endorse the argument that „lions have retinum‟ given that „gazelles have retinum‟ than the 
diagnostic inference that „gazelles have retinum‟ given that „lions have retinum‟ (Medin, et 
al., 2003).  
Such effects are easily explained by frameworks which draw on domain-specific 
structured knowledge. Kemp and Tenenbaum (2009) and Shafto et al. (2008) provide 
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Bayesian accounts of taxonomic and causal induction in which a domain-general Bayesian 
inference engine operates over a domain-specific theoretical model. The Bayesian inference 
machine is domain-general, and as discussed in Oaksford and Chater‟s (2007) work, provides 
a tool for updating people‟s subjective degree of beliefs in a hypothesis or similar 
proposition.  These approaches tend to be based on Bayes‟ theorem, which is expressed 
mathematically as the conditional probability of A given B, i.e. the posterior probability: 
       
          
    
 
P (A) is the prior of A, P (B) is the prior of B and P (B|A) is the conditional probability of B 
given A, also known as the likelihood. 
In the case of category-based inductive reasoning, the Bayesian inference machine tries 
to compute the probability that a property observed in one or several example categories can 
be found in one or several other categories. To illustrate the derivation of the posterior 
probability, take four categories, giraffes, antelopes, lions and tigers. The first step is to 
generate a hypothesis space of all possible extensions of a novel property X,
 
resulting in 16 
distinct hypotheses h.   
 
h1    h2    h3   h4    h5    h6   h7    h8   h9   h10   h11 h12  h13  h14  h15  h16 Prediction 
Giraffes                                                         
Antelopes                                                     
Tigers                                                         
Lions                                                      
p(h)     0.2  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05 0.08  0.01  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.08  0.05  0.05   0.05   0.05  0.2 
Figure 1.3: Hypothesis space and prior distributions as displayed by Kemp and Tenenbaum (2009). All possible 
extensions of novel property X. Black circles signify the presence of the property in a given category.  
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Each hypothesis provides a unique combination of categories that have the property. For 
example, hypothesis 2 specifies that only giraffes have the property. The model makes the 
assumption that the prior probability of each hypothesis is known. In our example, the priors 
broadly capture the belief that carnivorous African mammals are similar to each other, as are 
herbivorous African mammals. The greyscale vector on the far right indicates that the 
probability that one of the categories has the novel property is 0.5, derived by summing the 
probabilities of the individual hypotheses in which the property is present. Thus, based on 
these priors alone, the probability that giraffes have the property is 0.05 + 0.08 + 0.01 + 0.01 
+0.05 + 0.05 + 0.05 + 0.2 = 0.5. 
Assume now that we obtain data indicating that giraffes have the property but lions do 
not. This can be denoted with X = [giraffe, lions] and the label vector lx = [1, 0].  Based on 
this data, Bayes‟ theorem stipulates how the prior distribution p(h) can be updated, resulting 
in a posterior probability distribution for the hypothesis space h: 
        
           
              
 
Based on the generic assumptions that X is randomly sampled and the labels lx are generated 
without noise, the likelihood term         is 1 if hi= lx and zero otherwise. This simply means 
that hypotheses which are inconsistent with the observed data (i.e. lx) are assigned a posterior 
probability value of zero, as these hypotheses are no longer possible given the data. This 
Bayesian property induction is exemplified in Figure 1.4 below. 
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                    Data lx          Prediction 
Giraffes                                                     
Antelopes  ?                                               
Tigers   ?                                                  
Lions                                                 
p(h | lx)   0    0.26     0      0       0    0.42 0.06     0       0       0      0     0.26   0       0       0       0 
Figure 1.4: Hypothesis space and posterior distributions. Based on the observation that giraffes have the 
property but lions do not (lx), 12 hypotheses are inconsistent with the observed data and have been greyed out. 
The posterior probability distribution p(h| lx) can be calculated by renormalizing the prior probability 
distribution p(h) on the 4 remaining hypotheses in the hypothesis space. The prediction vector at the far right 
shows that Giraffes definitely have the property, Lions definitely do not have the property, and Antelopes (p= 
.68) are more likely to have the property than Tigers (p=.32). 
 
The posterior probability of a specific hypothesis is hence equal to the proportion of 
hypotheses that are consistent with the data, weighted by their prior probability.  For 
example, the posterior probability that antelopes have the property given that giraffes have it 
but that lions do not is:    
0.08   0.05
0.5   0.8   0.1  0.5
 = 0.68.  
However, a point not touched on is how the prior probability distribution p(h) was 
generated. The suggestion of current models is that they reflect people‟s expectations about a 
relevant property which can be represented by structured models.  Such models might pertain 
to the hierarchical taxonomic relations or causal links between species. However, what all 
domain-specific models have in common is that they capture people‟s beliefs about the prior 
distribution of properties. Thus, inferences are generated by combining current observations 
with prior beliefs about which and how properties might be shared amongst categories within 
a domain. For example, inferences about diseases are often informed by causal knowledge 
about disease transmission. In this case, the underlying causal model consists of a structured 
representation describing people‟s domain-specific knowledge about the causal relations 
between the categories. Prior probabilities for the categories represented in the structure are 
generated through a stochastic process. In the case of disease transmission, the stochastic 
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process that generates the priors includes two background knowledge parameters, 
background rate and transmission probability. This assumes that diseases can potentially be 
caused by a source external to the food web and that diseases are more likely to be passed 
from prey to predator. Such Bayesian models hence provide a knowledge-based probabilistic 
justification as to why predictive inductive inferences from prey to predator ought to be 
stronger than the reversed diagnostic inference from predator to prey. 
Kemp and Tenenbaum (2003), Tenenbaum and Kemp (2009) as well as Shafto et al. 
(2008) also demonstrated that inductive reasoning patterns about causal transmission (for 
example when reasoning about a novel disease) can be dissociated from inductive inferences 
about physiological properties (e.g. when reasoning about novel genes or cells). Whilst the 
Bayesian inference machine is identical in both cases, knowledge about the distribution of 
physiological properties is captured by a theory-based model incorporating taxonomic 
interrelationships between species. Thus, such dissociations suggest that the context or 
property people are reasoning about prompts them to draw on different and most relevant 
sources of structured knowledge. It should be noted however that despite their strengths in 
predicting the output of people‟s inferences and their capability to explain why such 
inferences are made, Bayesian approaches are silent with regards to how such inferences are 
achieved.  
To summarize thus far, the review suggests that explanations of inductive reasoning can 
be grouped into two contrasting clusters: on the one hand, there are approaches which try to 
model inductive inferences with reference to unstructured sources of knowledge based on 
associations, contiguity, co-occurrence and/or similarity. These approaches assume no 
higher-order underlying rules or structures that describe the interrelations between different 
categories. On the other hand there are approaches which emphasize the role of structured 
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knowledge. These approaches assume that people use the most relevant knowledge structure 
to support their inductive inferences. Examples include taxonomic hierarchies when 
reasoning about physiological properties and food chain relations when reasoning about 
disease transmission.  
Whilst we have been focusing on how knowledge can be dissociated by type, i.e. 
associative or unstructured versus structured knowledge, the Bayesian models themselves 
focus more on the distinction between different domains of knowledge, such as ecological or 
taxonomic. In fact, the majority of work on knowledge effects in category-based induction 
has been focused on domains rather than types of knowledge, owing in part to the success of 
this approach in explaining induction in non-standard populations, patterns of category-based 
inductions in experts and inductions that are tailored to different reasoning contexts. The next 
section describes the scope of this work and highlights how a shift in focus towards types 
rather than domains of knowledge can shed light on the processes underlying induction, thus 
resolving the apparent theoretical dichotomy between accounts of inductive reasoning which 
assume unstructured knowledge on the one hand, and accounts which assume highly 
structured knowledge on the other.  
1.5 Domain Distinctions in Category-Based Induction 
Knowledge in inductive reasoning comes in many guises. On the one hand, there is domain-
general knowledge that relates to normative considerations about making sound inductive 
inferences, such as sample size, variability of premise and conclusion categories (Nisbett, 
Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983). On the other hand, there is more domain-specific 
knowledge concerning the relations between the premise categories themselves and/or the 
premise and conclusion categories, as well as knowledge about the mechanisms by which 
properties come to be shared. A full account of how structured knowledge influences 
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inductive reasoning needs to consider what kinds of knowledge people have about the 
categories themselves, the relations between categories and the nature of the property, and 
how this knowledge combines or interacts to influence inductive responses.  We turn to the 
role of such domain-specific knowledge in induction next.  
1.5.1 Acquiring Domain-Specific Knowledge   
From earliest development, patterns of inductive inferences are strongly shaped by what we 
know about a domain. Thus, changes in children‟s underlying domain knowledge leads to 
qualitative changes in their category-based inductive patterns (Carey, 1985; Hatano & 
Inagaki, 1997, 2000; Inagaki & Hatano, 1993, 1996; Simons & Keil, 1995). For example, 
Carey (1985) showed that young children living in urban USA tended to see humans as the 
prototype on which to base their reasoning. They made stronger inferences from humans to 
bugs than from bees to bugs, violating the principle of similarity. They also tended to make 
asymmetrical inferences, such that inferences from humans to animals were stronger than 
from animals to humans. Medin and Waxman (2007) provide support for the idea that such 
non-normative asymmetries in reasoning about natural kinds arise due to lack of domain-
specific knowledge.  
Atran et al. (2001) further explored the question of how knowledge within a domain 
influences patterns of inductive reasoning with young 4 and 5-year old Yukatek Mayan 
children who have a close affiliation with their natural environment. These children did not 
show the tendency to see humans as the best prototype from which to make their inferences, 
nor did they show any asymmetry or violation of similarity effects. Coley, Medin and James 
(1999) and Ross et al. (2003) have obtained similar findings with children growing up in a 
rural Native American clan (Menominee Indians). Such cultural differences suggest that 
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developing expertise within a domain, in this case familiarity and increased knowledge about 
the biological world, enables children to make more accurate inductions.  
1.5.2 Expertise Effects 
Differences in knowledge about how categories are related also leads to distinctive 
differences in adults‟ patterns of inductive inferences. Thus, salient relations between 
categories often support stronger inferences than mere similarity-based measures would 
predict (Coley, Shafto, Stepanova, & Barraff, 2005). For example, Lopez, Atran, Coley, 
Medin and Smith (1997) asked Itza Mayan people and US undergraduates to make category-
based inferences about local mammals. After establishing the unique taxonomies for their 
various respective local mammal species, Lopez et al. (1997) compared three hallmark effects 
predicted by Osherson et al.‟s (1990) similarity-coverage model, namely typicality, similarity 
and diversity effects. To illustrate, American participants might be told that wolves and deer 
have a certain disease and that wolves and coyotes have another disease. Their task was then 
to evaluate whether it was more likely that all mammals had the disease shared by wolves and 
deer or whether they were more likely to have the other disease shared by wolves and 
coyotes. According to the similarity-coverage model, the former argument should be chosen 
more frequently, as the premise categories are more diverse, thus providing better coverage 
of the superordinate mammal category. Results indicated that both cultures showed typicality 
and similarity effects, but the diversity phenomenon was only present in American 
Undergraduate students. Itza Mayan people‟s justifications in contrast frequently alluded to 
ecological or causal justifications for why less diverse species pairs provide more support for 
inferring that a disease could be present in all mammals. Whilst this suggests that domain-
specific knowledge might account for the qualitatively different patterns of reasoning across 
the two groups, it cannot be ruled out that such differences simply have a cultural origin.  
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To address this issue, Proffitt, Coley and Medin (2000) compared inductive inferences 
about novel diseases affecting trees across three American tree expert groups (taxonomists, 
landscapers and park maintenance workers). When generalizing from a single premise 
instance, none of the expert groups showed typicality effects and only the taxonomists 
displayed diversity effects when making generalizations about shared diseases from multiple 
premises. This suggests that each expert group had specialist knowledge relevant to the goals 
of their occupations, and that this knowledge had a unique influence on the pattern of 
inferences they made about disease distribution across tree species. They tended to use a vast 
array of reasoning strategies ranging from ecological and causal strategies, to local coverage, 
depending upon the context and features of the trees deemed most relevant to making 
accurate inductions.  
More elaborate knowledge possessed by experts may enable them to draw on different 
reasoning strategies depending upon context. For example, Shafto and Coley (2003a) 
compared commercial fishermen‟s inductive inferences about marine life to those of US 
undergraduates. When reasoning about completely blank properties, both groups relied on 
taxonomic similarity between two premise pairs as a basis for making property projections to 
a third target category. In contrast, when reasoning about novel diseases, fishermen‟s but not 
undergraduates‟ reasoning drew on causal/ecological relations between the premise pairs and 
target categories. Thus, when reasoning about diseases, experts tended to show asymmetrical 
patterns of reasoning, making more projections to species higher up the food chain than to 
species lower in the feeding hierarchy.  
1.5.3 Property Effects  
As already hinted at by Shafto and Coley‟s (2003a) study of commercial fishermen, context 
constrains which domain of knowledge is most relevant. Thus, when reasoning „in a vacuum‟ 
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about blank properties, both experienced fishermen and novice undergraduates used default 
taxonomic relationships between categories to guide their inferences about marine life. 
However, when reasoning about diseases, commercial fishermen‟s patterns of inductive 
inferences changed dramatically. They tended to draw on extensive background causal and 
ecological knowledge, maximizing the potency of their inferences with reference to a 
particular contextual domain.  
However, even average college students will tailor their inferences to different reasoning 
contexts if doing so does not require expert knowledge. For example, Ross and Murphy 
(1999) showed that people generally relied on taxonomic category relations between different 
foods as a guide to inductive strength when making generalizations about the biochemical 
composition of food. However, when they made inferences about situational properties (such 
as effort to prepare, when and where something is eaten etc.), participants relied on less 
available thematic category relations as a basis for making their inferences. 
Even young children are to some extent capable of tailoring their inferences to different 
contexts. For example, children were shown triad pictures in which the two animals from 
different categories looked alike (e.g. blackbird and bat) whereas the instances from the same 
category were perceptually dissimilar (e.g. blackbird and flamingo). Children had to choose 
whether the target (blackbird) was more likely to share a property with the perceptually 
dissimilar instance from the same category (flamingo) or with the perceptually similar 
instance from a different biological category (bat).  With these natural kinds, children as 
young as 4 years of age tended to ignore perceptual similarity in favour of categorical 
membership as a basis for imputing properties such as feeding or behavioural habits (Carey, 
1985; Gelman & Markman, 1986). However, when the nature of the property was varied so 
that category membership no longer provided good grounds for making accurate 
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generalizations (for example reasoning about weight), reasoning patterns were strikingly 
altered. Overall, there was less reliance on category membership and some 4-year-olds started 
to exhibit selective induction, basing their reasoning exclusively on perceptual similarity. 
Similarly, Springer (1992) found that children were more willing to use kinship (e.g. parent-
offspring relations) than perceptual similarity or social ties (e.g. friendship) as a basis for 
making inductions about biological characteristics. However, this did not extend to more 
idiosyncratic, non-biological properties, such as transient physical or mental states.  
However, whilst these studies suggest that some properties are in general more projectable 
than others, they do not address whether identical properties can be differentially projectable 
depending upon contextual factors.  
The seminal study by Heit and Rubinstein (1994) sought to explore whether dynamic 
conceptions of similarity based on weighting features according to context (Tversky, 1977) 
would predict selective category-based induction in adults. That is, they hypothesized that the 
degree to which people would be willing to make a strong inference about a specific property 
would be a function of the degree of concordance between the nature of the property (such as 
a behavioural or anatomical property) and the nature of the similarity relation between the 
base and target categories (such as being behaviourally or anatomically similar). They found 
a reliable interaction between type of property and type of relation, with people making 
stronger inferences for anatomical properties when the premise and conclusion categories 
were aligned along taxonomic dimensions than for categories matched along the behavioural 
dimension, whereas this ordering was reversed when reasoning about behavioural properties. 
When they took people‟s background beliefs about anatomical and behavioural similarity into 
account, they found that inferences about behaviour were predicted by both behavioural as 
well as anatomical similarity ratings, whereas inductive inferences concerning anatomical 
properties were exclusively predicted by ratings of anatomical similarity between the two 
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categories. This strongly suggests that people recruit structured knowledge that is relevant to 
how two categories might come to share a specific property.  The precise domain of 
knowledge that is deemed relevant thus seems to differ depending upon the nature of the 
property itself.  
1.5.4 Competing Knowledge  
Whilst the above and further studies (Bailenson, Shum, Atran, Medin, & Coley, 2002; 
Stepanova & Coley, 2003) illustrate that expertise and contextual knowledge can change 
qualitative patterns of inductive reasoning by making some domain-specific knowledge 
structures richer or more salient, they do not address potential differences in the underlying 
processes that mediate use of knowledge in experts and novices in different contexts, nor do 
they say anything about cases in which knowledge structures from two domains might stand 
in opposition to one another. Consider a case in which you want to make an inference about 
the likelihood that horses have a disease given that zebras have it. On the one hand, you 
might use causal or ecological knowledge to reason that these two species live in very 
different geographic regions and have little immediate contact, thus concluding that it is 
unlikely that the two species share the disease. On the other hand, if you know that horses 
and zebras are taxonomically very closely related, you might conclude that they could be 
genetically susceptible to the same kinds of diseases and therefore believe that it is quite 
likely that they share a disease.  So when knowledge competes, what is the relative status of 
different knowledge structures? The findings to date are less than clear, with different 
paradigms often delivering orthogonal results regarding the relative status of different types 
and domains of knowledge.  
From a developmental perspective, causal knowledge seems to supplant similarity-based 
inductive reasoning from around 5 years of age when the causal relations are explicit (Hayes 
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& Thompson, 2007). When the causal relations between a category member and its features 
are implicit, only 8-year-olds and adults reliably use causal relations instead of similarity as a 
basis for feature induction. Rehder (2006), who takes the position that causal knowledge 
supplants similarity effects when it is available, drew similar conclusions from his paradigm. 
He asked participants to reason about shared properties of fictitious creatures. When people 
based their inferences on the causal explanation for the occurrence of a property, some of the 
classic similarity effects, such as diversity, typicality and similarity, no longer emerged. 
However, there were two equally sized subgroups, one of which continued to display 
similarity effects even when causal knowledge was available. This and the fact that both 
experiments used artificial stimuli question the generalization that causal knowledge always 
supplants other knowledge structures. 
1.5.5 Processing Differences  
Shafto, Coley and Baldwin (2007) addressed the issue of which domain-specific knowledge 
might be most dominant by looking at processing differences underlying the use of 
knowledge from different domains. Using real-world categories which were ecologically 
related, taxonomically related or unrelated, they asked their participants to make 
generalizations about diseases or genes. Some of their participants were asked to respond as 
fast as possible, whereas others were forced to delay their responses and were asked to 
consider their answers carefully before responding. Whereas people‟s inferences about 
taxonomically related categories were unaffected by the timing manipulation, they found that 
people gave lower inductive strength ratings to ecologically related categories when they 
were under time pressure. This selective restriction of access to different knowledge 
structures led them to suggest that taxonomic knowledge is the default primary source of 
knowledge. However, they did not control for level of association between their category 
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pairs.  An alternative explanation for their results might be that their taxonomically related 
categories (e.g. tiger and lion) were more strongly associated than the ecologically related 
items (e.g. tiger and parrot). Rather than arising because of chronic differences in 
accessibility to knowledge structures per se, apparent differences between ecological and 
taxonomic inferences might instead be due to the strength of association between categories 
(Rogers & McClelland, 2004). In this case there would be no need to appeal to differences in 
the processing effort associated with knowledge from different domains.  
It was argued in the first half of the review that an important distinction exists between 
types of knowledge. Distinguishing between types of knowledge in this way might be more 
fruitful than the distinction between domains of knowledge for explaining processing 
differences in category-based induction. Shafto and colleagues‟ (2007) results would be 
consistent with this alternative explanation. Hence, people might have been unable to access 
structured ecological knowledge when under time pressure, whereas inferences based on 
unstructured associative knowledge would be unaffected by timing manipulations. Similarly, 
in his recent work, Rehder (2009) taught participants about the causal links between category 
features of artificial categories. In line with the assumption that people draw on extensive 
causal knowledge, he demonstrated various phenomena, such as a causal asymmetry effect. 
However, he also found that there was a substantial minority of people whose patterns of 
inductions did not adhere to those predicted by his causal-based generalization model. 
Instead, they seemed to rely more on nondirectional associations between the category 
features. In Rehder‟s (2009) experiments, there appears to be one source of structured 
knowledge about causal relations and another source of unstructured knowledge based on the 
simple co-occurrence of features.  
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1.6  A Resource Account of Category-Based Inductive Reasoning 
If people can be influenced either by unstructured knowledge such as associative strength, or 
structured knowledge such as information about causal links or taxonomic relatedness, it is 
important to demonstrate that these two types of knowledge can be dissociated. Rehder 
(2009) explicitly suggests that the use of causal knowledge relies on an elaborate, analytical 
thought processes, whereas associative or unstructured knowledge influences inductive 
reasoning fairly automatically and without much cognitive effort. Thus, if the use of 
unstructured knowledge is indeed mediated by effortless processing, whereas the use of 
structured knowledge requires more elaborate reasoning, then one way of dissociating these 
two types of knowledge is by exploiting these apparent processing differences. For example, 
a study looking at reasoning about music in experts (composers and musicians) and novices 
(Baraff & Coley, 2003; Coley & Barraff, 2003) suggests that whereas both experts and 
novices have access to associative knowledge, only experts are able to draw on more 
structured knowledge as a basis for reasoning. These researchers created an index of 
taxonomic distance by asking participants to sort composers from an array of genres 
according to similarity of music composition style. They then presented participants with 
inductive arguments consisting of two premise categories and a conclusion category. They 
varied the taxonomic strength of the arguments, so that they were either strong (e.g. 
Beethoven and Bach→ Mozart) or weak (e.g. Bob Marley and John Lennon→ Mozart). 
Participants rated the strength of the argument that the three composers in the premises and 
conclusion “use technique X in music writing”. Whereas novices rated taxonomically strong 
arguments as more plausible than taxonomically weak arguments, experts showed no 
difference between the two types of problems, suggesting that they were using more elaborate 
context-dependent relational knowledge. However, when the induction task was carried out 
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under time pressure, thus decreasing available cognitive processing time, experts‟ reasoning 
was indistinguishable from novice reasoning. According to the researchers, their results 
highlight the primacy of taxonomic similarity, which is only supplanted by relational 
information when experts have enough time to engage in more complex processing. 
However, the findings are also consistent with our distinction between structured and 
unstructured/associative knowledge: The change in expert reasoning suggests that their use of 
structured relational knowledge, when they have time and resources to do so, is cognitively 
demanding. Under time pressure, they had to rely more on associative similarity. In contrast, 
novices simply did not have an alternative source of structured knowledge, forcing them to 
rely on associative similarity under both speeded and delayed conditions. Thus, such 
experimental findings would support Rehder‟s (2009) and our own contention about the role 
of cognitive resources in category-based inductive reasoning, whereby the use of structured 
knowledge is cognitively demanding, whereas relying on unstructured knowledge is less 
effortful.  
Medin et al‟s (2003) relevance theory is the only framework within the category-based 
induction literature to consider the role of cognitive resources during the reasoning process. 
Based on work by Sperber and Wilson (1995), this framework assumes that when the 
cognitive system processes new information, relevance is determined by the cognitive effects 
this processing has, as well as the degree of cognitive effort it took to achieve these effects. 
Applied to category-based induction, the relevance framework further posits that people 
formulate hypotheses about relevant relations between premise categories. Consider the 
following two arguments:  
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Magpies have property X                                  
Pandas have property X 
Zebras have property X 
_______________________     
All animals have property X.   (Consistent argument) 
 
Brown bears have property X                                  
Pandas have property X 
Zebras have property X 
_________________________     
All animals have property X.   (“Garden path” argument) 
 
In the consistent argument, all three premises suggest that the property to be projected has to 
do with black-and-white colouring. In contrast, the first two premises of the “garden-path” 
argument suggest that being a member of the superordinate category bear might be relevant. 
However, this hypothesis is refuted by the third premise. As this should have large cognitive 
effects by forcing the reasoner to change his or her beliefs, people should be willing to 
expend considerable cognitive effort in processing this input. Feeney, Coley and Crisp (2010) 
showed that when the category in the third premise was inconsistent with a person‟s likely 
first hypothesis, reading times for this third premise sentence were significantly longer. In 
contrast, when the category was consistent with a person‟s likely hypothesis, reading times 
for the identical third premise sentence were significantly shorter.  
The notion of effort in the relevance framework suggests that the cognitive system cannot 
process all input homogeneously. As in the above example, formulating certain hypotheses 
might be more effortful than others. Thus, some input seems to be processed relatively 
automatically, for example the fact that carrots and rabbits are causally related, whereas 
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other input may require the deployment of more mental resources in order to impact on the 
reasoning output, for example noting the fact that carrots and bamboo are taxonomically 
related. Note that the reverse is also true. Thus, recognizing that zebras and horses are 
taxonomically related does not require much elaborate reasoning. In contrast, identifying a 
causal relationship between flies and herons might require the construction of a causal link 
and the assignment of causal roles in which frogs act as the food chain link between the two 
categories. This assignment of causal roles is likely to be a more effortful and less automatic 
process. However, whilst this model highlights that differences in how knowledge is 
processed crucially influence the final reasoning output, it has no means of predicting or 
explaining which types of knowledge are likely to involve more or less processing resources, 
nor does it offer an instantiation of the processes that mediate use of different types of 
knowledge. Auspiciously though, the different processing characteristics we have ascribed to 
unstructured or associative versus structured knowledge resonate with distinctions made by 
dual-process models popular in other reasoning domains.  
1.6.1 Dual Process Theories 
The idea that reasoning is driven by an interplay between effortless and more elaborate 
reasoning processes is well established across an array of thinking and reasoning disciplines, 
such as deductive reasoning (Evans, 2006, 2007; Evans & Over, 1996), judgement and 
decision-making (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005), individual differences (Stanovich & West, 
1998), social cognition (Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 1999; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) and 
cognitive development (Klaczynski, 2004). Such accounts are variants of dual-process 
theories (for a full review see Evans, 2008). The basic tenet of this approach is that the 
human mind runs at least two distinctive processes. We will follow Evans‟ (2006) 
classification and define one process as being heuristic and the other as being analytical. Each 
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of these is in turn associated with different characteristics.  In a recent review, Evans (2008) 
groups these characteristics into 4 major clusters, covering Consciousness, Age of Evolution, 
Functional Attributes and Individual Differences.  We focus predominantly on the latter 
three, as these are most relevant when considering how to apply a dual process account to 
selective category-based induction and conversely, what phenomena in category-based 
induction can tell us about the nature of the mental processes purported to underlie reasoning. 
Dual process theories all agree that there are two separate and competing processes. 
Heuristic processing often produces biased output, whereas analytical thinking is more likely 
to result in normatively sound responses. There are several functional attributes that have 
been assigned to the two processes, some of which are more robust than others. Table 1.1 
below summarizes the most important opposing features ascribed to the two processes.  
 
Table 1.1: Functional Characteristics of Dual Process Theories 
Heuristic Process Analytical Process 
Fast Slow 
Automatic Controlled 
Effortless Resource-Demanding 
Contextualized Largely Abstract and 
Decontextualized 
 
To be evolutionary viable and assist cognitive economy, heuristic reasoning should 
approximate the response that would follow from more effortful processing. Consequently, 
the two processes usually deliver congruent output. However, there are instances in which 
responses from each process stand in opposition to one another, for example in  response-
incongruent tasks such as Wason‟s selection task (Wason, 1966), syllogistic reasoning under 
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belief-bias (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005) and the conjunction fallacy (Crisp & Feeney, 
2009; De Neys, 2006a; Stanovich & West, 1998).  
The fact that analytical reasoning is cognitively costly, with restrictions imposed by 
available time, cognitive ability and working memory resources has enabled researchers to 
dissociate the two processes. For example, Stanovich and West (1998) have demonstrated 
that people higher in IQ are less likely to succumb to the conjunction fallacy. Similarly, 
studies have shown that forcing people to carry out a secondary task increases the rate of 
fallacious responses to the classic Linda problem (De Neys, 2006a), and increases erroneous 
reasoning on other deductive inference tasks (Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick, & Wynn, 1993). 
Finally, forcing people to respond quickly leads to belief-based rather than logic-based 
responding in syllogistic reasoning (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). The fact that time 
pressure and cognitive load decreases people‟s ability to recruit effortful analytical processes 
supports the argument that incorrect responses are based on an effortless, heuristic process. 
Applying this to our hypothesis about the role of knowledge in category-based induction, it 
might be the case that the use of different types of knowledge is mediated either by heuristic 
or analytical processing.  If the use of structured knowledge is subject to timing and cognitive 
resource constraints then this would be akin to analytical processing. In contrast, responses 
based on unstructured knowledge might be mediated by heuristic processing, and would 
hence not be affected by timing or resource manipulations. 
Apart from the nature of the two processes themselves, an important question is how the 
two processes interact with one another. Although the precise nature of the relationship 
between the two processes has not been fully resolved (Evans, 2007), one suggestion is that 
heuristic responses have to be inhibited if analytical reasoning is to dominate the response 
output (Evans, 2008). For example, theories of deductive reasoning posit that people must 
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inhibit strong background beliefs and knowledge if the answer generated by this conflicts 
with the logically correct response (De Neys, in press). De Neys and Van Gelder (2009) 
showed that the ability to resist belief bias on a syllogistic reasoning task exhibits a 
curvilinear developmental trend, which is in line with the hypothesized developmental pattern 
of inhibitory control. In line with this, neuro-imaging studies suggest that successful 
reasoning is related to activation in brain areas known to be involved in inhibitory functions. 
Thus, areas in the left prefrontal cortex are active when people manage to resist a belief-based 
incorrect prepotent response in favour of a logical correct answer. In contrast, no such 
activation is found when the prepotent response does not conflict with the correct answer and 
thus does not have to be inhibited (De Neys & Van Gelder, 2009; De Neys, Vartanian, & 
Goel, 2008; Goel & Dolan, 2003).  Similarly, Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis and Evans 
(2004) looked at 10-year-old children‟s ability to reason logically when the logical answer 
conflicted with the answer suggested by background knowledge. They found that whereas the 
ability to reason logically in the absence of conflicting beliefs was predicted by working 
memory only, logical reasoning skills on conflict problems was additionally  related to 
children‟s level of inhibitory control as measured by the stop signal task. Thus, those children 
who were more able to withhold a prepotent response were more likely to resist a belief-
based answer in favour of an unbelievable but logically correct response. This suggests that 
inhibitory control determines whether a response will be based on effortless heuristic 
processing, or will be based on effortful, analytical processing. 
Whilst the distinction between the two processes based on their processing characteristics 
is very robust, the distinction between the two processes based on their representational 
characteristics is less convincing (Evans, 2006; Verschueren, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 
2005). The suggestion that heuristic processes are concrete, contextualized and domain-
specific, whereas analytical processes would have the orthogonal features of being abstract, 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
41 
 
decontextualized and domain-general (Klaczynski & Lavallee, 2005) is especially 
questionable when considering how a dual process account might apply to category-based 
inductive reasoning, which is so heavily based on background knowledge. Recent evidence 
(Feeney & Crisp, 2010) from a category-based induction paradigm suggests that analytical 
processes can operate on contextualized knowledge representations.  We gave participants the 
following arguments: 
 
Soil has property X. 
How likely is it that Grass has property X?    (1) 
 
Soil has property X. 
How likely is it that Cows have property X?    (2) 
 
Soil has property X. 
How likely is it that Grass and Cows have property X?   (3) 
 
As originally demonstrated by Medin et al. (2003), people frequently evaluated the 
conjunctive category conclusion (3) higher than the single causally distant category 
conclusion (2). This violates a fundamental law of probability, asserting that the conjunctive 
occurrence of two events can never exceed the lone occurrence of each event. In contrast, 
only a minority of people tended to rate the conjunctive category conclusion (3) higher than 
the single causally near category conclusion (1). We showed that a secondary task designed 
to interfere with analytical processing led to an increase of the conjunction fallacy for 
causally distant conclusions, whereas it did not increase the fallacy rate for causally near 
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conclusions. This suggests that people were using some effortful process to reconstruct the 
causal link between the premise and causally distant conclusion category, allowing them to 
avoid the fallacy when enough mental resources are available. This finding is consistent with 
the idea that analytical processes can operate on knowledge-rich representations and make 
structured knowledge available to the reasoning process.  
It is conceivable that similar principles might operate in inductive reasoning when there 
is conflict between different types of knowledge. If this is the case, then in order for one type 
of knowledge to dominate the response, it might be necessary to inhibit competing 
knowledge if it is not relevant. Thus, the notion of effort in Medin et al‟s (2003) relevance 
theory might reflect a) the ease with which a heuristic process makes relevant knowledge 
available and b) the extent to which mental resources are required to inhibit irrelevant 
knowledge. The first point a) is likely to be the result of factors such as expertise, frequency 
of co-occurrence between categories and other over-learnt category relations. To reiterate a 
point made earlier, knowledge we have described as unstructured in the above review might 
influence category-based induction in a heuristic manner. In contrast, the latter point b) is 
more likely linked to domain-general executive processes, such as working memory and 
inhibitory control.  
This analysis maps onto Toates‟ (2006) distinction between stimulus-bound and higher-
order processing. Toates‟ (2006) framework assumes that stimulus-bound processes are 
evolutionary older processes characterized by prescriptive, yet rapid and often automatic 
responses to environmental or internal memory-based stimuli. In contrast, higher-order 
processing refers to evolutionarily more recent processes, which exert inhibitory control over 
stimulus-bound processes.  In order to be evolutionarily viable, the juxtaposition of different 
modes of processing and reliance on different knowledge has to offer an adaptive advantage. 
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The evolutionary rationale for such dual processing is especially salient for selective 
category-based inductive reasoning. Thus, environmental regularities and co-occurrences 
create stable mental associations between objects, events and situations that offer an 
economical and rapid source of information for reducing uncertainty, informing behaviour 
and making predictions about likely outcomes. However, given the probabilistic nature of our 
environments, there will be occasions where inductive potency can be maximized by 
carefully monitoring and if necessary inhibiting inappropriate application of associative 
knowledge in favour of more effortful reasoning. For example, imagine a fatty chip pan goes 
up in flames in the kitchen. Our first intuitive reaction is to rush and throw a bucket of water 
over the burning chip pan. However, in this case, actually acting on this strong association we 
have between water and putting out fire would worsen the situation. The water sinks beneath 
the burning fat and turns into high-pressure steam which rapidly expands upwards. This 
causes the burning oil to explode up out of the pan, engulfing us and the kitchen in a flash 
fire. Thus, one has to inhibit this inappropriate associative knowledge in favour of more 
complex causal knowledge about the relationship between fat, fire and water. In this case, we 
might act by throwing a fire blanket over the fat fire, extinguishing it by starving the fire of 
oxygen.  
To summarize the role of mental processes involved in category-based induction, we 
suggest that different types of knowledge are subject to divergent processing constraints. Use 
of unstructured knowledge might be based on a fast and effortless heuristic process. In 
contrast, if the use of structured knowledge is indeed mediated by analytical processes, then 
its influence should be constrained by the availability of mental resources and the efficiency 
of executive functions. The role of executive functions, which include the ability to engage in 
complex and goal-directed behaviour e.g. (Rabbitt, 1997) has received almost no attention in 
the category-based induction literature (for exceptions see Feeney, 2007; Feeney, Crisp, & 
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Wilburn, 2008; Heit & Feeney, 2005). Empirical studies have either been concerned with 
predicting and explaining output patterns rather than psychological processes that result from 
the use of structured knowledge (Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Osherson, et al., 1990; Shafto, 
et al., 2008; Tenenbaum, et al., 2006), or have emphasized the automaticity of inductive 
reasoning (Rogers & McClelland, 2004) with no need to refer to effortful or executive 
processing. However, it is unlikely that a process theory of category-based induction would 
be complete without considering the role of executive functions such as inhibitory control. 
This mechanism seems especially interesting, as it is likely to be in operation when people 
have to choose selectively between different domains of background knowledge in inductive 
reasoning, as well as when there is competition between structured and unstructured or 
associative knowledge. Thus, one might have to inhibit a response based on unstructured 
associative knowledge if one wants to consider possible implications of the underlying 
structure by which categories are related, for example which category is hierarchically higher 
in a food web. 
1.7 Summary of Outstanding Questions and Thesis Overview 
There are several issues arising from the above review. One of the fundamental questions 
concerns the processes that make human thought economical and adaptive yet hugely flexible 
in the light of an ever-changing environment. This is especially important for category-based 
inductive reasoning, where maximization of inductive potency depends on interplay between 
contextual factors and various distinctions to do with background knowledge. The thesis will 
attempt to resolve several theoretical issues specific to the field of category-based inductive 
reasoning, whilst also contributing to more fundamental enquiries about the architecture and 
resulting nature of the processes mediating human thought. 
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Current theoretical positions about the nature of knowledge that drives category-based 
inductive reasoning appear to form a dichotomy.  At one end of the theoretical scale, one can 
place models that operate purely on featural similarity (Sloman, 1993b) and associative 
learning processes (Rogers & McClelland, 2004; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004a, 2008). We 
subsume these under models which draw on unstructured knowledge. At the other end of the 
scale are models which call for structured knowledge representations, such as stable category 
hierarchies (Osherson, et al., 1990) and domain-specific theories of conceptual structure 
(Gopnik & Tenenbaum, 2007; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005; Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2003, 
2009; Shafto, et al., 2008) and hypotheses about relevant relations between categories (Medin 
et al., 2003). By distinguishing knowledge by type (i.e. structured or unstructured) rather than 
by domain (i.e. causal versus taxonomic) we will attempt to demonstrate how it is possible to 
reconcile the longstanding theoretical conflict between these contrasting frameworks. With 
reference to dual process theories we argue that these two types of knowledge differ in their 
processing characteristics, with the use of structured knowledge mediated by an effortful, 
analytical process, and unstructured knowledge based on effortless heuristic reasoning. This 
enables us to describe the contextual factors that determine the use of contrasting types of 
knowledge and explore the nature of the executive processes involved in the use of elaborate 
structured knowledge.  
First Key Objective 
The first goal is to demonstrate that structured and unstructured types of knowledge influence 
category-based induction in line with their unique processing characteristics. In doing so, the 
thesis will answer the following more specific questions: 
 Are unstructured and structured knowledge dissociable, and if so, do they have 
differential impact on the reasoning output? 
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 Are apparent differences regarding the importance and availability of knowledge 
from different domains (Rehder, 2006; Shafto, Coley, et al., 2007) still evident when 
level of association between the categories has been controlled for? 
Second Key Objective 
The second goal of the thesis is to show how the characteristics of these two types of 
knowledge tie in with more domain-general processing capacities and can thus be linked to 
more general theories of reasoning. With reference to the widely applied dual-process 
framework we will demonstrate how use of different types of knowledge in category-based 
induction is tied to the availability of mental resources and to the ability to inhibit prepotent 
responses. The specific questions we focus on are: 
 Do people have to inhibit one type of knowledge in order for the other to dominate 
the inference process? 
 Does the ability to withhold a response based on unstructured knowledge correlate 
with general measures of inhibitory control? If so, are there differences depending 
upon the level at which an instrument measures the construct of inhibition?  
The thesis is organized into a series of experimental chapters. Chapter 2 begins with an 
extensive pre-testing of stimulus materials in order to remedy shortcomings of previous 
research regarding the selection of appropriate stimuli, as well as to operationalize our notion 
of unstructured knowledge. The chapter describes the rationale and theory behind the way we 
generated these stimulus materials. By using both a subjective and objective measures of 
association, we created a database of stimulus materials from which we could pick category 
pairs from different domains that were equated for level of association.  
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Chapter 3 reports three experiments which used timing manipulations and secondary task 
paradigms. These examine in more detail the differential effect unstructured and structured 
knowledge have on category-based induction with reference to causal asymmetry effects.   
Chapter 4 describes two experiments that used a more naturalistic paradigm to explore 
the effects of different types of knowledge in category-based induction. Using a novel 
methodology, participants generated their own inferences either under loaded or unloaded 
conditions rather than being asked to evaluate pre-determined category pairings. It explored 
whether people‟s inductive strength ratings were better predicted by strength of association or 
an index of structural relations between category pairs. 
Chapter 5 includes three experiments in which unstructured associative knowledge was 
put into immediate conflict with structured knowledge. It explores whether and how the 
ability to inhibit unstructured knowledge in favour of more appropriate structured knowledge 
is related to measures of inhibitory control.  
The final Chapter 6 provides answers to the specific questions posed above. It summarises 
how this thesis is thought to contribute to our understanding of the mental processes 
mediating the use of background knowledge in selective category-based induction in 
particular, and inductive reasoning more generally. The thesis concludes by pointing towards 
exciting opportunities for future research.  
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2 Chapter II  
 
 
Pretesting for Strength of Association 
 
Addressing the role that knowledge plays in category-based induction necessitates an 
understanding of what is meant by the construct of knowledge. We conceptualize knowledge 
as the psychological result of perception, learning and reasoning. Within learning paradigms, 
it has been demonstrated that acquisition of knowledge is driven by two mechanisms which 
differ in their temporal characteristics. People‟s generalizations are influenced not only by 
featural or associative similarity, but also by rule-based processing (Shanks & Darby, 1998). 
Whereas similarity appears to be most influential early on during the learning process, rule-
based processing has more impact at a later stage.  
Similarly, the notion that retrieval of information from memory can be dissociated into 
automatic activation of knowledge and more strategic, effortful search processes is popular in 
the memory literature (Moscovitch, 1995). Thus, some memories are retrieved automatically 
upon processing a cue, for example retrieving the name of a neighbour‟s dog upon hearing its 
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familiar bark. In contrast, some memories might require strategic retrieval, for example trying 
to remember the names of all James Bond movies in order of their year of appearance. This 
dissociation is supported by the fact that strategic retrieval is related to individual differences 
in working memory. Thus, Rosen and Engle (1997) found that people who scored high on the 
operation span task, an index of working memory capacity, showed superior performance on 
a test thought to reflect strategic retrieval, the verbal fluency task, in which people have to 
generate as many instances of a category (e.g. mammal → antelope, lion,....etc.) as possible 
in a limited period of time. Similarly, Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge and Thompson (1984) 
showed that whereas a concurrent secondary load during the retrieval process decreased 
people‟s performance on the verbal fluency task, it appeared to have no impact on tasks 
tapping automatic retrieval processes, such as paired-associate learning, free recall and 
sentence verification tasks. 
The notion that knowledge might be dissociable with regard to its processing 
characteristics has thus far not been incorporated into models of category-based induction. 
However, a recent study by Rehder (2009) suggests that category-based induction can be 
shaped either by more elaborate causal knowledge or simple associative knowledge. In this 
study, participants learnt about the features of different of fictitious creatures. He found that 
when there was a causal explanation for the occurrence of these features, the majority of his 
participants used this relation as a guide to their inductive reasoning, showing directional 
asymmetry effects. However, a substantial minority appeared to treat such causal links as 
nondirectional associations. Whilst he focuses solely on the role of causal structure, the idea 
that general elaborate structured knowledge, such as causal networks or taxonomic 
hierarchies, provides an important constraint on inductive reasoning is implicit in several 
other models. Thus, charting people‟s structured knowledge can accurately predict people‟s 
patterns of inductive inferences (Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2003, 2009; Osherson, et al., 1990; 
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Shafto, et al., 2008). However, as the review in the previous chapter suggests, another type of 
knowledge which we refer to as unstructured or associative knowledge (Rogers & 
McClelland, 2004; Sloman, 1993b; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004a) appears to have an equally 
crucial influence on people‟s category-based inductions.  
Using real-world categories in inductive reasoning to examine the roles of different kinds 
of category relations and different types of knowledge has some potential pitfalls. One of the 
major shortcomings of previous research is the failure to generate stringently pre-tested 
materials. It is insufficient to generate categories which share different kinds of relations 
based exclusively on scientific taxonomies and ecologically supported facts without verifying 
their psychological reality. To claim that category relations are causal or taxonomic, it is 
necessary to demonstrate that people do perceive the type of connection we are anticipating. 
Similarly, if claims are to be upheld about the relative availability of one type of knowledge 
above another, or to posit the primacy of certain domains of knowledge we have to be certain 
that this is driven by the domain-specificity of that knowledge rather than by confounding 
factors such as level of association. So for example, to predict that inferences from tigers to 
lions should be stronger than from tigers to parrots when people are under time pressure 
because the former pair is related taxonomically and the latter ecologically (Shafto, Coley, et 
al., 2007) is to ignore the possibility that strength of association rather than domain-specific 
attributes of knowledge is driving inductive strength ratings. In this case, the associative link 
between tigers and lions may be stronger than between tigers and parrots, explaining the 
difference without reference to the domain-specific nature of the relation between the pairs. 
This example illustrates that processing differences attributed to domain-specific relations 
between categories may be confounded by associative strength between those same category 
pairs. In order to ascribe processing differences to domain-specific knowledge it is necessary 
to equate strength of association between category pairs from different domains. Only if 
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processing differences still emerge under such stringent conditions can it be said that 
knowledge from one domain (e.g. taxonomic) is more available than knowledge from another 
domain (e.g. ecological). Consider an inference from mice to owls or from mice to 
porcupines. Intuitively, given the strong association between the former ecologically related 
category pair it seems unlikely that inferences would be unanimously higher for the latter 
taxonomically related category pair, as the categories are only weakly associated.    
To address these concerns, the aim of the current pre-test study is to check that people 
perceive the purported relation between two categories (e.g. a causal relation between frogs 
and herons) and to cross-validate two novel approaches for indexing the strength of 
associations between categories. As already described, we take the stance that associations 
are psychological connections between concepts that mirror the statistical co-occurrence of 
categories within the environment. Thus, if two concepts or mental images become 
associated, then activation of one leads to activation of the other (Shanks, 2007; Tulving & 
Donaldson, 1972). As temporo-spatial contiguity is vitally important for the formation, 
maintenance and adjustment of associations, they are subject to gradual changes over time 
rather than rapid modifications. Changes in one‟s personal environment can lead to 
adjustments in associative strength between two concepts. For example, if one works in a 
flower shop, roses might become strongly associated with other bouquet flowers such as lilies 
or peonies. However, for someone who is a garden maintenance worker, roses might become 
more strongly associated with pests such as greenflies or red spider mites.  
However, apart from such specialist associations, most people within a certain culture 
will be exposed to similar co-occurrences between categories. For example, children tend to 
have a strong association between cats and mice owing to television programmes such as 
„Tom and Jerry‟. Consequently, words that frequently co-occur in natural language should 
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also have a stronger associative relationship (Spence & Owens, 1990). This has some striking 
effects on tasks that involve the retrieval or activation of lexical semantic representations or 
in which contextual knowledge influences responses. For example, people are faster at 
making a lexical decision about the word doctor if it is preceded by the associated word nurse 
than when it is preceded by an unrelated word such as garden (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; 
for further examples see De Groot, 1989; McNamara, 1992a, 1992b; Neely, 1991; 
Seidenberg, Waters, Sanders, & Langer, 1984).  
Given the potential confounding effects resulting from associative relations between 
words or concepts across a host of psychological domains, there is a pressing need to have an 
index of strength of association between different words. We cannot distinguish whether 
inductions are stronger from tiger to camel than from tiger to parrot due to the domain-
specific nature of the relation between the two categories or because one pair is simply more 
strongly associated than the other if we have not controlled for strength of association 
between them from the outset. The most commonly used method of generating association 
norms are so-called free associations, whereby people are asked to generate the first word 
that comes to mind upon encountering a specific category (Brown, 1976; Cramer, 1968; 
Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998). For example, Palermo & Jenkins (1964) asked for free 
associations for 200 words from several thousand participants. To illustrate, participants 
generated over 70 different words upon encountering doctor, however it was most commonly 
associated with nurse followed by sick, health, medicine, hospital, man, sickness and lawyer 
etc. The strength of association between two words was then indexed by the proportion of 
people who spontaneously named one upon encountering the other.  
Apart from somewhat clouding our understanding of the psychological meaning of 
association, this methodology has several other conceptual and practical shortcomings. 
Chapter 2  Strength of Association 
 
53 
 
Conceptually, Nelson, McEvoy & Dennis (2000) raise concerns about reliability and validity 
of free association indices. Although the response probabilities form a useful numerical 
hierarchy from strongly to weakly associated, the measurement does not include error 
estimations. This questions the reliability and objectivity of these association norms 
(Landauer & Dumais, 1997).  Regarding validity, it is not entirely clear what psychological 
construct is supposed to be reflected by associative strength in free association paradigms. 
One interpretation is that association strength reflects the absolute strength of the memory 
trace between the two categories (Rosen & Russell, 1957). However, as noted by Nelson et 
al. (2000), the procedure by which the response probabilities are obtained is relative rather 
than absolute, as the more people produce the primary associate, the fewer people can 
produce one of the more weakly associated categories. So a weak associative strength rating 
could either be the result of a truly weak association between the target and a free associate, 
but could also be the result of one word having many strongly associated words. In the latter 
case, the richness of the network of associates would necessarily be inversely proportionate to 
the strength ratings, thus masking absolute associative strength. 
Furthermore, the procedure only allows the indexing of a finite number of associations 
for any one category, based on the answers given by participants. Consequently, we only 
have association indices for relatively strongly associated word pairs, neglecting the lower 
end of the association scale. Thus, if the free association procedure did not result in the 
naming of one upon encountering the other, we have no means of estimating the strength of 
association between two concepts. For example, the primary free associate of elephant in the 
Birkbeck Word Association Norm Corpus (Moss & Older, 1996) is trunk. As none of their 
participants named antelope in response to elephant, there is no reference to the strength of 
association between these two categories, yet most people will agree that there is a definite 
and probably quite strong association between these two categories. 
Chapter 2  Strength of Association 
 
54 
 
The above weakness also has some more serious conceptual shortcomings, such as 
clouding our understanding about whether it is possible to distinguish between semantic 
relations and associative relations. When free association methods fail to establish an 
association between two categories, several researchers (Foss & Ross, 1983; Lupker, 1984; 
Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, 1995) would define such word pairs as being purely 
semantically related but non-associated. They justify this with reference to the finding that 
non-associated word pairs as defined by free association norms, such as the category pair pig 
and horse, do not have priming effects. Thus, the majority of researchers in the priming field 
would agree that word pairs such as pigs and horses are exclusively semantically related 
(category coordinates of „mammal‟) but would not be associatively related. However, again 
this seems to be largely a result of how „association‟ is traditionally measured. People almost 
never spontaneously name horse in response to pig, leading to the conclusion that pigs and 
horses are not associated. However, intuitively it seems that pigs and horses would at least be 
weakly associated.  
Also, more recent research has shown that there do not seem to be any variations in the 
magnitude of priming effects depending on free associative strength norms. For example, 
Anaki and Henik (2003) compared priming effects for strong primary associates (word pairs 
in which the target word was the primary response given with a mean frequency of 42%), 
weak primary associates (word pairs in which the target word was the primary response but 
with the lower frequency of 10%) and non-primary associates (word pairs in which the target 
word was not the most frequent response with a mean frequency of 10%). They found that 
the priming effect was of equivalent magnitude for the strong and weak primary associate 
word pairs (31 ms), but there was no priming effect at all for the weakly associated non-
primary associates. This casts doubts on the claim that category relations can be strictly 
separated into either semantic or associative relations based on their priming properties. 
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Rather, it appears that the dominant free association method used to derived association 
norms has led to an unfortunately narrow definition of what „association‟ means.  
Summarizing, apart from the aforementioned direct and indirect theoretical issues arising 
from the use of the free association methodology, for our current purposes the practical 
shortcomings are more problematic. Thus, it does not enable us to index the extensive 
network of associations between categories
2
, nor does it provide us with an estimate of the 
absolute strength of these links.  
This problem can be addressed by approaches which incorporate measures of objective 
linguistic criteria, as associations between words tend to be reflected in how we use language.  
Going back to the definition of association in terms of temporo-spatial contiguity, one 
strategy of deriving an index of degree of association is to look at the frequency of co-
occurrence between two words in a text or sentence. For example, Spence & Owens (1990) 
looked at the relationship between co-occurrence of 47 word pairs in the Brown corpus, 
which consists of diverse fiction and non-fiction from different areas and genres, and 
correlated this with strength of association ratings obtained from free association norms. 
Whilst they did find a significant correlation between strength of association and frequency 
of co-occurrence the study suffers from several fundamental shortcomings, ranging from the 
methodology by which the relationships were established, to the adequacy of the studied 
word corpuses.  Firstly, simply counting the number of times two words co-occur does not 
address the fact that co-occurrence could be contaminated with the frequency of each 
individual word in the pair.  For example, the word dog appears 7846 times in the British 
National Corpus, whereas meerkat only appears four times in the same corpus.  A more 
adequate measure of associative co-occurrence is to calculate the „conditional probability‟ 
                                                          
2
 For an example of the extent to which free association methodology can provide a reliable yet limited index of 
set size, see Nelson & Schreiber (1992) 
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that the word w1 is followed by the word w2. Heylighen (2001) suggests the following 
formula: 
Aw1&w2= P (w1│w2) = 
        
     
 = 
        
     
 
In this equation,          represents the probability that a text contains both words w1 and 
w2,       represents the probability that it contains w1 on its own. To calculate the 
conditional probability, one can simply count the number of times w1 and w2 co-occur and 
divide this by the number of times w1 occurs by chance in the same text sample. This is 
similar to Church and Hanks (1990) measure of „mutual information‟ given by the following 
formula: 
A‟w1&w2= log 
        
            
 
One drawback of this version is that the conditional probability is equal from w1 to w2 and 
vice versa, masking potential asymmetries. 
The second problem with studies like those carried out by Spence and Owens (1990) 
concerns the adequacy of the actual text sample itself, which often suffer from data 
sparseness. Ide and Veronis (1998) have claimed that corpuses like the Brown corpus 
(Kucera & Francis, 1967), which contains around 1 million words, are grossly insufficient for 
reliably measuring co-occurrence. Thus, Rapp and Wettler (1991) suggest that 10 million 
words is the absolute minimum for gaining a robust index of association from co-occurrence 
data.  With the recent explosion in the availability of online media, prose, and non-fiction 
amongst many other types of genres, the World Wide Web provides an almost infinite source 
of written language. Alongside computer algorithms used by search engines such as Google, 
there is an enormous potential for exploiting these two tools for psycholinguistic research. To 
generate a thoroughly controlled set of stimuli for use in our psychological tasks we  
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a) checked that people did perceive the purported structural relations between categories  
b) indexed the strength of association between category pairs irrespective of the nature 
of the relation.    
For generating association indices, we adopted a dual-approach strategy, using both 
subjective association ratings from participants and the objective co-occurrence measure 
outlined above. As the common free association norms only index the association for a 
handful of the most commonly associated word pairs, we gave people two categories and 
asked them to provide a rating of associative strength. We then also obtained web-based 
associative strength indices. The degree to which the two measures correlate provides support 
for our claim that we are indeed measuring a construct of associative strength, in which the 
activation of one leads to activation of the other, irrespective of the nature of relation between 
the two.  
2.1 Causal Beliefs Pre-Test 
We catalogued people‟s beliefs about the nature and strength of relations between categories. 
Firstly, we generated 51 pairs of categories thought to have a causal connection, such as 
“salmon and grizzly bear”, “cabbage and snail” or “steel and cook”.  
Participants were told that we were interested in their beliefs about how strong the causal 
link between these two categories was. Instructions stated that this could include any kind of 
causal connection between the categories. They were given two explicit examples:   
Properties of “acorns”, such as enzymes or any pollutants it may 
contain, might be transmitted to “squirrels” because the latter 
category feeds on the former category.  
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Similarly, “clay” and “vases” may be related because “vases” can 
be made of “clay”.  
10 Durham University students rated the strength of the possible causal link between two 
categories on a scale from 1 (unrelated) to 9 (very strong causal relation). They were 
instructed to give a rating closer to 1 if they thought that the causal link was very weak, and a 
rating closer to 9 if they thought that the causal link was very strong. The order in which the 
words were presented was counterbalanced across participants.  
2.1.1 Results Causal Pre-test 
The overall mean rating for the causally related category pairs was 4.9. A mixed-model 
ANOVA with item as the repeated-measures variable and direction (predictive or diagnostic 
order of presentation) as the between-subjects variable showed that there were significant 
differences for the different items, F(50, 400) = 11.36, p < .0005. 
There was no main effect of order F (1, 8) = 2.86, p = .13. Thus, categories presented in a 
predictive direction (e.g. carrot → rabbit) received a causal strength rating of 4.6 (SE = .33) 
whereas when the order was reversed and diagnostic (e.g. rabbit → carrot) people gave a 
mean causal strength rating of 5.3 (SE = .33). 
However, there was a significant interaction between direction and item, F(50, 400) = 1.98, 
p < .0005, so to be sure that we selected items in which people did perceive a causal 
connection and to ensure that there were no directional differences, we looked at each 
individual item by comparing the ratings in both orders with independent-samples t-tests and 
also carried out one-sample t-tests with a test value of 1 (equivalent to a rating on the scale of 
no causal link).  
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The independent-samples t-test showed that direction only had a significant effect for 2 
items, tree → book, and mercury → fisherman. Similarly, causal strength ratings did not 
differ significantly from 1 for two pairs, acorn → cat and grass → sweater. For the 
remaining category pairs, people perceived a causal link between all category pairs, albeit of 
varying strengths. The mean causal strength ratings for all pairs are shown in Appendix 1A. 
2.2 Strength of Association 
2.2.1 Subjective Association Ratings  
Next we assessed people‟s beliefs about how strongly category pairs were associated. Given 
that we suggest that associative knowledge exerts its influence relatively automatically 
without the need for explicit reasoning or activation of a declarative knowledge system 
(Dienes & Berry, 1997), asking people to provide explicit association ratings has some 
obvious pitfalls. Thus, people may base their responses on a thorough analysis of potential 
relations between the categories, thus drawing on structured rather than automatic associative 
knowledge. However, several precautions were taken to try and counter these weaknesses. 
Firstly, research has shown that putting people under time pressure increases their reliance on 
automatic beliefs (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005), as do instructions to respond intuitively 
(De Neys & Franssens, 2009). Thus, we told participants that the experiment was timed and 
that they should provide the first intuitive answer that came to mind, responding as fast as 
possible.  
 Method 
Participants and Design 
18 participants from Durham University were given a list with 270 category pairs and asked 
to rate the strength of association between the pairs. The order in which the two categories 
were presented was counterbalanced across participants.  
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Materials and Procedure 
Firstly, we generated 49 pairs of categories thought to have a causal connection, such as 
“salmon and grizzly bear”, “cabbage and snail” or “steel and cook” and for which we had 
verified that people did perceive a causal link (see previous section). For each of these causal 
pairs, we generated a control pair thought to have no immediate discernable relationship, for 
example “carrot and fox” or “swallow and flower”. We also generated 3 or more alternative 
taxonomically related category pairs for each causal pair, for example “salmon and goldfish”, 
“salmon and herring”, “grizzly bear and wolf”, “cabbage and cauliflower”, snail and squid” 
etc. In total, participants were asked to rate 270 word pairs. 
We told participants that we were interested in their beliefs about how strongly 
associated these two categories were. They were asked to think about all kinds of possible 
associations and although they were given examples which included structured relations, we 
emphasized that we wanted them to give their first intuitive response: 
Please think about all kinds of possible associations, such as causal, 
functional, categorical, etcetera. Please do not think in detail about the 
mechanism by which they are related, just give your intuitive response. For 
example, if you believe that ladybirds and butterflies are strongly associated 
please give a rating closer to 9. In contrast, if you think cars and ladybirds 
are unrelated, please give a rating closer to 1. Please give the answer that 
first comes to mind, as fast as possible.  
Participants were asked to rate how strongly the category pairs were associated on a scale 
from 1 (unrelated) to 9 (very strongly associated).  The order in which the two categories 
were presented was counterbalanced across participants.  
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2.2.2 World Wide Web Conditional Co-Occurrence 
Given the aforementioned potential pitfalls of asking people for explicit ratings, and the fact 
that the instructions made some reference to structured relations, we wanted to compare our 
subjective ratings to a more objective association criterion. Thus, for all the category pairs for 
which we had obtained participant association ratings, we examined their co-occurrence 
frequencies in natural language. To this end, we conducted a proximity search on two 
different search engines, the World‟s largest and most popular search engine Google, as well 
as the less well-known Exalead, which explicitly supports co-occurrence search queries
3
. We 
specified that the categories must co-occur in any order within a window of 6 consecutive 
words. This fairly stringent window was adopted to maximize the likelihood that the two 
words would co-occur within the same sentence and also to reflect the fact that we were 
primarily interested in associations that are activated automatically in psychological tasks. 
Priming studies (Canas, 1990) have shown that priming between associated words occurs 
mainly at short stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs), suggesting that potentiation decays with 
increasing time or distance between the word pairs. Our narrow window can also be justified 
by assuming that words which co-occur more frequently within close proximity to one 
another are more likely to be more strongly associated than words which co-occur over a 
larger distance. Strong association ratings derived from our subjective measure are hence 
more likely to reflect associations between words which co-occur in fairly close proximity.   
Once we derived the co-occurrence measure, we recorded the Google and Exalead word 
frequency of each individual category. Using Heylighen‟s (2001) formula, we calculated the 
conditional co-occurrence. As we were not interested in potential asymmetries, we calculated 
the mean conditional co-occurrence for each word pair and correlated this measure with the 
                                                          
3
 For further details about the two search engines, as well as the precise search queries entered, please refer to 
Appendix 1C 
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mean associative strength ratings.  The standardized co-occurrence Z-scores for the 270 
categories can be found in Appendix 1B. 
2.2.3 Results: Strength of Association  
The mean association ratings for the 270 category pairs can be found in Appendix 1B. Mean 
ratings ranged from 1.3 (SD = .62) for the pair “carrot and fox” to 8.3 (SD = .83) for the 
category pair “rabbit and hare”. 
Co-occurrence ranged from once for the pair “acorn and lychee” to 12500000 times for 
the category pair “paper and book”. 
 
Table 2.1: Correlations between Mean Association Ratings and Co-
Occurrence Indices 
 
Z-score Google Co-
Occurrence 
Z-score Exalead 
Co-Occurrence 
Mean Association 
Rating 
Spearman‟s rho .56** .66** 
N 270 270 
Z-score Google Co-
Occurrence 
Spearman‟s rho  .74** 
N  270 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.0005 level (2-tailed). 
 
As can be seen from Table 2.1, the correlations between the mean conditional co-occurrence 
measures and peoples‟ subjective associative strength ratings were highly significant. We 
attributed our construct of psychological association as arising from the spatial and temporal 
contiguity of categories within the environment.  As the web-based data gives us a more 
objective indication of the actual co-occurrence, these strong correlations between the 
objective measures and subjective ratings seem to validate our method for estimating 
people‟s psychological perception of associative strength between categories. It suggests that 
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we were successful in tapping one type of unstructured knowledge construct, i.e. that of 
strength of association between categories.  
2.3 Discussion  
The goal of the current studies was to create a database of stimulus materials by indexing 
properties such as causal strength and strength of association. To date, most stimulus 
materials used in studies investigating the role of knowledge in reasoning have relied on 
normative structures governing relations between categories from a specific domain, such as 
scientific taxonomies, or have simply used idiosyncratic criteria for selecting categories, such 
as living in the same habitat or similar causal relations. However, whilst it is impossible to 
ensure that all participants will have the same degree of knowledge about the various 
interrelationships between categories, it is still feasible to create materials that have been 
equated along certain dimensions, such as degree of association or causal strength. This is 
especially important when claiming that knowledge from one domain is superior or more 
easily available than other domain-specific knowledge. As our review makes clear, probably 
the most important but thus far wholly neglected dimension along which stimulus materials 
ought to be equated is strength of association between the category pairs from different 
domains. For example, if people assign a higher inductive strength rating to the inference 
from carrots to potatoes (taxonomically related category pair) than from carrots to rabbits 
(causally related category pair), one cannot claim that this reflects the superiority of 
taxonomic knowledge compared to ecological or causal knowledge, as the former pair are 
more strongly associated (mean association rating of 7.28) than the latter pair (mean 
association rating of 6.06). Thus, the higher inference rating could simply reflect the stronger 
association people have between the taxonomically related pair, rather than being due to 
status or availability differences in knowledge structures between the two category pairs. Had 
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the researcher instead asked participants to make the taxonomic inference from carrots to 
fennel, which has a lower mean association rating of 4.64, the results might well have been 
reversed, with higher inductive strength ratings attached to the causally related category pair.   
Obtaining association norms for an array of category instances is not a trivial task, 
especially from a methodological point of view. The first problem is that current databases 
only index a finite number of usually fairly strongly associated words for each target. This is 
a by-product of using the free association method (Brown, 1976; Cramer, 1968; Moss & 
Older, 1996; Nelson, et al., 1998; Palermo & Jenkins, 1964), in which participants name the 
first word that comes to mind upon presentation of a base word. Similarly, it provides only a 
relative rather than an absolute rating of associative strength (Nelson, et al., 2000). Although 
some advances have been made by using a continuous rather than discrete free association 
methodology, in which people are asked to generate more than one associated word (De 
Deyne & Storms, 2008a, 2008b)
4
, it cannot index word pairs which lack an obvious 
association. Thus, there is still a restriction of range when it comes to selecting stimuli that 
cover the complete associative continuum from unrelated to highly associated.  
However, one clear advantage of the discrete free association method is that the first-
named category is most likely to reflect the operation of automatic associative retrieval 
processes from long-term memory rather than a more controlled and effortful strategic 
retrieval processes that might necessitate recruitment of more structured knowledge (Rosen & 
Engle, 1997). The risk of asking participants for additional associates, as in the continuous 
free association method, or asking for explicit association ratings, as in our study, is that 
responses might shift progressively towards reflecting structured rather than associative 
knowledge activation. However, we circumvented this by using experimental strategies that 
                                                          
4
 For potential pitfalls of using this methodology, see McEvoy & Nelson (1982) 
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interfere with or dissuade the use of effortful processing, such as putting people under time 
pressure (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Roberts & Newton, 2001; Shafto, Coley, et al., 
2007) and encouraging them to respond intuitively (De Neys & Franssens, 2009). In addition, 
we tried to verify our subjective association measure against an external and more objective 
measure, such as co-occurrence of concepts in natural language. The fact that there were 
highly significant correlations between the co-occurrence measures themselves and between 
the co-occurrence measures and subjective association ratings suggests that our rating tasks 
tap a construct that is associative and automatic in nature, rather than reflecting a carefully 
deliberated assessment of a structured relation between category pairs.  
In addition, in all experiments reported in subsequent chapters, we ensured that we could 
dissociate people‟s structured knowledge from their unstructured associative knowledge for 
the category pairs used in the inductive tasks by assessing people‟s structured knowledge in a 
post-test. Participants were asked to explicitly state whether they thought that the category 
pairs were taxonomically and/or causally related. We then calculated taxonomic and causal 
endorsement proportions across the category pairs. If this measure of structured knowledge 
correlates with associative strength ratings (i.e. the more people believe that a category pair is 
taxonomically and/or causally related, the higher the association ratings for this pair) then we 
cannot claim to be measuring two types of knowledge that each contribute independently to 
inductive reasoning. Rather, in this case associative knowledge might merely reflect 
structured knowledge that has become so well learnt that it no longer requires effort to recall. 
In contrast, if associative strength ratings do not correlate with the measure of structured 
knowledge, we can be more confident that we are measuring dissociable sources of 
knowledge which might have differential effects on category-based inductive reasoning. 
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The notion that there are different types of knowledge underpinned by contrasting 
processes was suggested by Moscovitch (1995) in the context of information retrieval from 
long-term memory. On the one hand, associative memory, mediated by hippocampal brain 
region, allows people to retrieve information automatically. On the other hand, retrieval of 
information from semantic memory can be strategic, in which a cue serves as input to a 
thorough, effortful process akin to problem-solving. Such strategic memory retrieval is 
mediated by prefrontal regions of the brain and semantic memory in areas of the Lateral 
Anterior Temporal Lobe (Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007). As Sloman (1998) has already 
suggested, it is feasible that factors such as available time, mental resources and 
intentions/motivation will influence the extent to which people will engage in more effortful 
retrieval of knowledge or rely on simple, cognitively economic associations to guide their 
category-based inductions. The next chapter will use the pre-tested stimulus materials to 
explore whether unstructured and structured knowledge sources can have dissociable effects 
on category-based inductive inferences, in line with their purported unique processing 
characteristics.
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3 Chapter III  
 
 
Two Types of Knowledge in  
Category-Based Induction  
Inductive inferences do not occur in isolation, but are made in a complex and uncertain 
world. Whereas their similarity to a social stereotype might support inferences about a new 
acquaintance, inferences about possible health hazards rely much more on knowledge about 
the causal relations between disease agents and organisms. However, as argued in the first 
two chapters, focusing predominantly on domain-specific category relations has masked the 
importance of another distinction, namely the distinction between structured and unstructured 
types of knowledge. For example, people may make the automatic inference that the new 
Muslim doctor is threatening, owing to the association between acts of terrorism and radical 
Muslim groups repeatedly highlighted in the media. On the other hand, applying more 
elaborate structured knowledge, such as the fact that doctors tend to be highly educated and 
intelligent, might lead to a positive revision of the initially biased inference.  
The cognitive processes that underpin our ability to use different kinds of knowledge 
flexibly depending on context are poorly understood. Furthermore, work to date has 
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predominantly focused on differences between domain-specific category relations. For 
example, the study by Shafto, Coley and Baldwin (2007) suggests that context selectively 
primes the use of knowledge from different domains. Thus, reasoning about diseases seems 
to prime the use of ecological knowledge, whereas reasoning about genes should activate 
taxonomic knowledge. Shafto et al. (2007) also contend that different domains of knowledge 
may vary in their relative accessibility and thus the likelihood that this knowledge will come 
to bear on the final inference. In their study, they showed that taxonomic knowledge was 
unaffected by manipulating the time people had to make their inferences, whereas access to 
ecological knowledge seemed to be restricted when participants were put under time 
pressure. They therefore concluded that people selectively use knowledge from different 
domains when they have sufficient time to do so, but fall back onto using privileged 
taxonomic knowledge when under time pressure.  
Shafto et al.‟s (2007) paradigm can also be used to test our alternative framework which 
emphasizes the processing differences between structured and unstructured knowledge.  As 
described in the two previous chapters, we define structured knowledge as the theoretical 
framework that explains how two categories are related, for example taxonomic knowledge 
(e.g. the relation between carrots and bamboo → both are species of plants) or causal 
knowledge (e.g. the relation between carrots and rabbits → part of the same food chain). 
Unstructured knowledge on the other hand is defined as the degree to which the two 
categories are associated, co-occur or are similar to one another regardless of the nature of 
this relationship.  
We hypothesize that when people have plenty of time and cognitive resources, they are 
able to effortfully process the structural relations between the categories. In contrast, people 
would be more likely to rely on unstructured knowledge, such as strength of association, as a 
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useful heuristic cue to inductive strength when they are under time pressure or have to 
contend with a cognitive load. Thus, the major goal of the first experiment was to use 
resource manipulations to demonstrate that structured and unstructured knowledge can have 
dissociable effects on people‟s category-based inferences. 
A promising avenue for generating evidence that the effects of structured and 
unstructured knowledge can be dissociated is to look at reasoning phenomena that arise from 
assessing the underlying structural relations between categories. Thus, such phenomena 
should only arise when people use structured knowledge, but should be absent when people 
rely on unstructured knowledge. Looking at the role of causal knowledge in inductive 
reasoning is a prime candidate due to its complex and directional structure (Sloman, 2005), 
affecting people‟s inductive evaluations of category-based arguments. For example, causal 
transmission of properties is more likely to occur from prey to predator than vice versa (for a 
Bayesian justification and specification of prior probabilities, see Shafto et al., 2008). People 
tend to make stronger inferences when the relation is ecologically consistent and predictive 
than when the causal direction is reversed and diagnostic (Medin, et al., 2003; Tenenbaum, 
Kemp, & Shafto, 2007).  
For causal knowledge to be maximally inductively potent, and manifest itself in 
phenomena such as the aforementioned causal asymmetry effect, each object or concept has 
to be assigned an appropriate relational role, suggesting that semantic processing under such 
conditions may involve more than mere spreading activation within a semantic network 
(Spellman, Holyoak, & Morrison, 2001) or strength of nondirectional associations (Rehder, 
2009). Rather, taking causal structure into account is likely to be based on a more effortful, 
analytical process which takes time and available mental resources to accomplish.  
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To test this hypothesis, the following experiment adopts the same time-manipulation 
paradigm used by Shafto et al. (2007), but some changes were made to both material 
selection and experimental design. Firstly, we always used the same base categories to form 
causal and taxonomic pairs. Secondly, based on the pre-test results reported in Chapter 2, we 
selected category pairs for which we had stringently assessed the strength of association to 
ensure that causally and taxonomically related category pairs did not differ in their level of 
association. Finally, we manipulated property within rather between subjects. This should 
encourage participants to use their knowledge flexibly and remain attentive rather than 
implementing an automatic overall strategic set (Markman & Gentner, 1993), potentially 
amplifying selectivity and accessibility effects.   
3.1 Experiment 1 
The first goal was to test our hypothesis that structured and unstructured knowledge have 
different effects on category-based induction depending upon available mental resources. 
Experiment 1 included three types of relations between categories, causal predictive, causal 
diagnostic and taxonomic, covering the whole range of association levels. People were asked 
to reason either under time pressure or were forced to delay their responses. The arguments 
included two different properties, cells and infections. We predicted a causal asymmetry 
effect, that is, causal inferences should be stronger for categories with a predictive causal link 
than for those with a diagnostic causal link. However, if the retrieval of a causal knowledge 
structure and assignment of causal roles is indeed mediated by an effortful process, one might 
expect this causal asymmetry effect to be weakened when people are under time pressure, in 
which case they should fall back on unstructured knowledge in the form of non-directional 
strength of association between the two categories.  
Chapter 3  Two Types of Knowledge 
 
71 
 
Furthermore, we used our measure of unstructured knowledge (strength of association) as 
well as indices of structured knowledge (beliefs about taxonomic and causal relatedness) to 
predict people‟s inferences under contrasting timing conditions.  As we believe that access to 
structured knowledge requires slower and more elaborate processing, it was expected that 
people would rely more on unstructured knowledge when under time pressure. Thus, 
unstructured knowledge, i.e. associative strength, ought to predict people‟s inductive strength 
ratings for both cells and infections when they were under time pressure. In contrast, under 
delayed conditions, structured taxonomic knowledge should also be predictive of people‟s 
inferences about cells, whereas structured causal beliefs ought to predict people‟s inferences 
about infections.  
Finally, our causally related categories are analogous to what Shafto et al. (2007) call 
ecologically related categories. By collapsing across our two types of causal relations 
(predictive and diagnostic), our design also allowed us to follow-up Shafto et al‟s (2007) 
claim that there is a difference in accessibility of knowledge from different domains once we 
have controlled for level of association between causally and taxonomically related category 
pairs.   
3.1.1 Method 
Design  
The experiment had a 3 (relation: causal predictive, causal diagnostic, taxonomic) by 2 
(timing: speeded or delayed) by 2 (property: cells or infection) by 4 (list) mixed design, with 
list and timing as between-subjects manipulations.  
Participants 
Participants were 60 Durham University students (mean age = 20.7 years, SD = 4.0 years, 42 
females and 18 males) who took part in the experiment in return for course credit.  
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Materials and Procedure Inference Task 
In total there were 16 items. For each item, we created four induction problems: A causal 
predictive argument and its taxonomic counterpart, as well as a causal diagnostic argument 
and its taxonomic counterpart.  
In predictive causal induction problems people were told that the base category 
(prey/plant) had either a novel infection or novel cells, such as infection 9Tye4, or blank cells, 
such as Lo78-cells. They then evaluated the likelihood that this property was also present in 
the conclusion category (predator/consumer). The taxonomic counterpart was created by 
keeping the same prey/plant base category but replacing the conclusion category with a 
taxonomically related category of equivalent associative strength.  
As a variation of causal structure, for each of these items we then reversed the order of 
the categories for the predictive causal problems (base category: predator/consumer → 
conclusion category: prey/plant), resulting in a diagnostic causal induction problem. This was 
matched again with a taxonomic induction problem by keeping the predator/consumer base 
category but substituting the conclusion category for a taxonomically related alternative. 
Thus, there were a total of 64 problems. For example, participants might be presented with 
one of the following induction problems: 
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Mice have infection 9TT7.    (causal predictive/ infection) 
How likely is it that Eagles have infection 9TT7? 
 
Mice have infection 7rR4.    (taxonomic / infection) 
How likely is it that Squirrels have infection 7rR4? 
 
Eagles have 45T-cells.     (causal diagnostic/ cells) 
How likely is it that Mice have 45T-cells? 
 
Eagles have e2T-cells.     (taxonomic / cells) 
How likely is it that Parrots have e2T-cells? 
 
Causally related targets were always from different superordinate categories, for example, 
plants and animals, or mammals and reptiles. In contrast, taxonomically related pairs were 
always from the same superordinate taxonomic category. There were two exceptions in 
which the causally related categories were both mammals but belonged to different orders. In 
these cases, the taxonomic alternative was from the same order as the base category.  
All our stimulus materials had been extensively pre-tested to ensure that people did 
perceive a causal link between the causally related category pairs. Similarly, based on the 
pre-test ratings of strength of association between category pairs (full details and procedure 
are described in Chapter 2), we ensured that the strength of association was identical for the 
predictive category pairs and their taxonomic counterparts, as well as for the diagnostic 
category pairs and their taxonomic alternatives. Across the 64 unique category pairs, the 
magnitude of the correlation between the subjective measure of associative strength and the 
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Google web-based measure of conditional co-occurrence was significant, Spearman‟s rho = 
.55, p < .0005.  
Participants rated the likelihood that the target category shared the infection or cells on a 
9-point scale. A different infection/cell was used for each problem. For each problem, 
participants reasoned either about the predictive or diagnostic causal category pairs and the 
taxonomically matched category pairs. This meant that each participant rated 32 inductive 
arguments. The items for which participants reasoned about cells or infections in a predictive 
or diagnostic direction was counterbalanced in an incomplete Latin square design, resulting 
in four lists. We tried to ensure that there were an equal number of strongly and weakly 
associated items in both the cell and infection condition. This design is shown in Table 3.1 
below. 
Table 3.1: Design Stimulus Materials for Experiments 1 and 2 
 List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 
Items 1-4 
 
Causal Predictive 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Cells 
Causal Diagnostic 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments  
Cells 
Causal Predictive 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Infections 
Causal Diagnostic 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments  
Infections 
Items 5-8 Causal Diagnostic 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments  
Cells 
Causal Predictive 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Cells 
Causal Diagnostic 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments  
Infections 
Causal Predictive 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Infections 
Items 9-12 Causal Predictive 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Infections 
Causal Diagnostic 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments  
Infections 
Causal Predictive 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Cells 
Causal Diagnostic 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments  
Cells 
Items 13-16 Causal Diagnostic 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments  
Infections 
Causal Predictive 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Infections 
Causal Diagnostic 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments  
Cells 
Causal Predictive 
and Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Cells 
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The inductive arguments were presented on a laptop in red font. Responses were only 
accepted once the font turned green. In the delayed condition, the font turned to green after 
10 seconds, whereas in the speeded condition, participants were encouraged to respond after 
1 second. They entered their response on the keyboard by pressing any number between 1 
(highly unlikely) and 9 (very likely). 
Post-test 
The post-test assessed people‟s beliefs about taxonomic and causal relatedness. For each of 
the 32 category pairs (8 predictive, 8 diagnostic, 16 taxonomic) about which people had made 
inferences in the main task, they were asked two questions, resulting in a total of 64 
questions. One question asked them whether they believed that the two categories were from 
the same biological class. The second question prompted them to state whether the two 
categories were part of the same food chain. Participants could respond with YES, NO or 
DON‟T KNOW, but were instructed to use the third option sparingly, as the emphasis was on 
their intuitions and beliefs rather than on factual correctness.   
We calculated the mean proportion of positive responses to the two post-test questions 
about biological group membership and food chain relations across the two timing conditions 
and correlated these with both our web-based measures of co-occurrence (Spearman rho 
correlation coefficients ranged from -.1 to .06 all p‟s > .66), and our subjective measure of 
associative strength (Spearman rho correlation coefficients ranged from -.008 to .17 all p‟s > 
.17). With one exception (correlation between food chain beliefs in the speeded condition and 
subjective strength of association rating, r = .3, p = .016), none of the other correlations were 
significant, supporting the idea that the post-test is not measuring associative strength but 
beliefs based on more structured knowledge. However, results will be interpreted with this 
significant correlation in mind.  
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Procedure 
Participants were told that we were interested in their beliefs about shared infections and 
cells.  They received written instructions which included an example and enabled them to 
give informed consent. Apart from the response-input constraints, the experiment was self-
paced. The order in which the problems were presented was completely randomized. 
Participants read the problems and once the font had changed from red to green, participants 
entered their response on the keyboard by pressing any number between 1 and 9.  
Following the main experiment, participants read instructions for the post-test. The order 
in which participants received the post-test questions was completely randomized and there 
were no response-time constraints. 
3.1.2 Results  
ANOVA 
For each participant, we calculated 6 mean inductive strength ratings, reflecting the 6 
conditions created by having 3 types of relation for which people reasoned about cells and 
infections. Mean inductive strength ratings were analysed with a 3 (relation: predictive, 
diagnostic or taxonomic) by 2 (property: cells or infection) by 2 (timing: speeded or delayed) 
by 4 (list) mixed-design ANOVA, with timing and list as between-subjects variables. For the 
item analysis, inductive strength ratings were averaged across subjects rather than items and 
were analysed with a 2 (property) by 2 (timing) by 3 (relation) mixed-design ANOVA, with 
relation as a between-items variable. The continuous measure of strength of association 
between category pairs was included as a covariate in all the item analyses.  
There was no significant main effect of list, F (3, 52) = .63, p = .6, effect size d = .38. It did 
interact with property and relation, F (6, 104) = 3.11, p = .008, effect size d = .85, so this will be 
commented upon later.  The covariate of strength of association in the item analysis was 
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highly significant, FI (1, 60) = 77.91, p < .0005, effect size d = 2.28, but it did not interact with 
any of the other variables. 
There was a significant main effect of relation, FS (2, 104) = 3.67, p = .029, effect size d = 
.54, FI (2, 60) = 7.13, p = .002, effect size d = .98.  Post-hoc comparisons showed that there was 
no difference in inductive strength ratings for causal predictive (M = 4.27, SE = .16) and 
diagnostic inferences (M = 4.12, SE = .15, p = .66), nor was there a significant difference 
between causal predictive and taxonomic inductive strength ratings (M = 4.59, SE = .14, p = 
.39). The difference between diagnostic and taxonomic inferences was marginally significant 
(p = .051).  
There was a significant main effect of property, FS (1, 52) = 5.73, p = .02, effect size d = 
.66, such that inferences about infections (M = 4.50, SE = .12) were rated stronger than 
inferences about cells (M = 4.15, SE = .14). However, this was not significant across items, FI 
(1, 60) = 1.08, p = .3, effect size d = .27. 
Inferences drawn under speeded conditions (M = 4.36, SE = .15) were virtually identical 
to inferences made under delayed conditions (M = 4.29, SE = .15), FS (1, 52) = .11, p = .74, 
effect size d = .04, FI (1, 60) = .49, p = .49, effect size d = .18.  
There was a significant interaction between property and relation, FS (2, 104) = 8.15, p= 
.001, effect size d= .79, FI (2, 60) = 15.87, p < .0005, effect size d = 1.46. Illustrated in Table 
3.2 below and confirmed by Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons, taxonomic inferences about 
cells were rated significantly stronger than both causal predictive inferences (p = .012) and 
causal diagnostic inferences, (p < .0005), whereas there was no difference between the latter 
two types of relation (p = 1). In contrast, when reasoning about infections, there were no 
differences between the three types of inferences (all p‟s > .93).  
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Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, there was a significant interaction between list, 
property and relation, however, this seemed to be driven predominantly by differences in the 
magnitude of the interaction. Across all lists, for inferences about cells, taxonomic inferences 
were higher than both causal predictive and causal diagnostic inferences, although many of 
the pairwise comparisons did not quite reach statistical significance. For inferences about 
infections, the differences between the three types of relations were fairly variable across the 
four lists, but none of the differences reached significance (p‟s > .1). As the interaction effect 
between property and relations was very robust across items, the significant three-way 
interaction between property, relation and list across participants is probably due to 
differences in people‟s knowledge about category relations across the different lists.  
 
Table 3.2: Inductive Strength Ratings broken down by Property and Relation in 
Experiment 1 
Property Relation Mean Std. Error 
Cell predictive 3.93 .22 
diagnostic 3.81 .19 
taxonomic 4.72 .16 
Infection predictive 4.62 .20 
diagnostic 4.43 .15 
taxonomic 4.47 .16 
 
None of the other higher-order interactions were significant (all p‟s > .11). 
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Causal Asymmetry Effect 
We had made the a-priori prediction that context-sensitive reasoning might be compromised 
when people do not have sufficient time to recruit relevant structured knowledge. This ought 
to be especially evident when the application of such structured knowledge leads to reasoning 
phenomena such as the causal asymmetry effect, whereby people rate causal predictive 
inferences (from prey to predator or plant to consumer) stronger than causal diagnostic 
inferences (from predator to prey or consumer to plant). Thus, we explored how causal 
inferences were affected by timing manipulations with a 2 (causal relation: predictive versus 
diagnostic) by 2 (timing) mixed-design ANOVA. As the causal asymmetry effect should only 
hold in a relevant context, such as when reasoning about infections or diseases, we conducted 
separate ANOVAs for infections and cells.  
Causal Asymmetry Infections 
The covariate of strength of association in the item analysis was again highly significant, FI (1, 
29) = 47.87, p <.0005, effect size d = 2.52, but it did not interact with any of the other 
variables. 
When reasoning about infections, there was no main effect of relation FS(1,58) = .87, p = 
.46, effect size d = .25,  FI(1, 29) = 1.86 , p = .18, effect size d = .5,  nor a main effect of timing, 
FS(1,58) = .31, p = .58, effect size d = .14, FI(1, 29) = .08 , p = .87, effect size d = .06.  
However, the crucial result was a significant interaction between timing and relation, FS 
(1, 58) = 6.88, p = .011, effect size d = .69, FI (1, 29) = 4.97, p = .034, effect size d = .82. Further 
Bonferroni post-hoc analysis confirmed that in a relevant context, i.e. when reasoning about 
infections, people who were not under any time pressure showed a robust causal asymmetry 
effect. Thus, people made significantly stronger inferences about categories with a causal 
predictive relation (M = 4.78, SE = .27) than for categories with a diagnostic causal link (M = 
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4.10, SE = .22, p= .015, effect size d = .47). In contrast, the causal asymmetry effect when 
reasoning about infections completely vanished when people were under time pressure. Thus, 
their causal predictive inferences (M = 4.44, SE = .27) were the same as their causal 
diagnostic inferences (M = 4.77, SE = .22, p = .24, effect size d = .21). This interaction is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 below. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Causal Asymmetry Effect across Timing Conditions when reasoning about 
Infections 
 
Causal Asymmetry Cells  
As before, the covariate of strength of association in the item analysis was significant, FI (1, 29) 
= 5.96, p =. 021, effect size d = .91, but it did not interact with any of the other variables. 
When reasoning about cells, causal relation had no effect on people‟s inductive strength 
ratings, FS(1,58) = .63, p = .43, effect size d = .21,  FI(1, 29) = .43 , p = .52, effect size d = .24,  
nor did timing, FS(1,58) = .69, p = .41, effect size d = .22, FI(1, 29) = .007 , p = .94, effect size d = 
.001. There was also no significant interaction between timing and causal relation, FS (1, 58) = 
.41, p = .52, effect size d = .16, FI (1, 29) = .84, p = .37, effect size d = .34.  
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The fact that we observed a substantial causal asymmetry effect when reasoning about 
infections but not about cells confirms that people draw selectively on relevant knowledge. 
More importantly though, the absence of the causal asymmetry effect for inferences about 
infections when people were under time pressure strongly supports our hypothesis that 
drawing on structured causal knowledge as a guide to inductive strength appears to be a 
slower, more deliberate and analytic process.  Under time pressure, people may simply rely 
on the existence of a causal association between the two categories, regardless of the 
directional nature of this link. 
Regression Analyses 
To explore how structured and unstructured types of knowledge influence category-based 
inductions under different timing conditions, we calculated mean inductive strength ratings 
for each item separately for the two types of property and timing conditions, resulting in 4 
inductive strength scores for each item. Similarly, for each item we calculated the mean 
proportion of positive responses to the two post-test questions about biological group 
membership and food chain relations across the two timing conditions.  
Unfortunately, beliefs about food chain relations in the speeded condition was 
significantly correlated with our strength of association measure (r = .30, p = .016), so this 
particular result needs to be interpreted with care. All 11 remaining correlations between our 
measures of structured knowledge and the measures of unstructured knowledge, i.e. 
associative strength and the two objective conditional co-occurrence indices, were non-
significant (r‟s between -.008 and .17, all p‟s > .17).  
Hierarchical regression analyses were carried out on the mean inductive strength scores. 
As Shafto et al (2007) demonstrated that different knowledge is relevant in different contexts, 
we carried out the analyses separately for cells and infections. However, we make the 
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theoretical assumption that people will be influenced by strength of association regardless of 
timing manipulations and property. Hence, we entered the associative strength variable in 
block 1. In a second block, we added proportion of positive responses to the biological group 
question and food chain question as the independent predictor variables. This enabled us to 
evaluate the degree to which adding variables reflecting structured knowledge accounted for 
additional variance above and beyond strength of association, our measure of unstructured 
knowledge.  
Inductions about Infections 
Reasoning about infections under no time pressure (R = .69) was significantly predicted by 
strength of association (beta = .53, t = 5.04, p <.0005). Of the structured knowledge variables 
entered in the second block, both knowledge about relevant causal food chain relations (beta 
= .45, t = 2.31, p = .025) and taxonomic beliefs (beta = .52, t = 2.69, p = .009) were 
significant predictors. Together, adding these two structured knowledge variables accounted 
for a significant amount of additional variance above strength of association alone (R 
2
Change: 6.3%, F (2, 60) = 3.62, p = .033). 
Reasoning about infections under speeded conditions (R = .71) was also significantly 
predicted by associative strength (beta = .58, t = 5.29, p <.0005). The structured knowledge 
variables were not statistically significant predictors of inductive strength under speeded 
conditions (biological relatedness: beta = .33 t = 1.72, p = .091; relevant knowledge about 
food chain relations: beta = .33, t = 1.65, p = .10). Furthermore, these two structured 
knowledge predictors did not account for any additional variance compared to strength of 
association on its own (R 
2
Change: 2.6%, F (2, 60) = 1.52, p = .23). The beta coefficients for the 
two timing conditions are illustrated in Figure 3.2 below.  
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Figure 3.2: Standardized Regression Coefficients for Predictive Relations between Strength of 
Association, Taxonomic and Causal Beliefs and Inductive Strength Ratings for Infections 
 
 
Inductions about Cells 
A different pattern of variables predicted reasoning about cells, shown below in Figure 3.3. 
When people were forced to delay their responses, the multiple R was .82, meaning that 
67.2% of the variance was accounted for by the three variables entered into the predictive 
equation. Strength of association (beta = .37, t = 4.43, p <.0005) and beliefs about biological 
relatedness (beta = .88, t = 2.69, p < .0005) were both significant predictors of inductive 
strength ratings across items, whereas the food chain belief variable was not a significant 
predictor (beta = .23, t = 1.49, p = .14). Adding the two structured knowledge variables added 
significant predictive power to the equation, accounting for an additional 48.2% of variance 
above strength of association on its own (F (2, 60) = 44.03, p < .0005). 
Inductions about cells when people had to give their responses under time pressure (R= 
.70) was predicted by all three variables. The most important predictor was taxonomic beliefs 
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(beta = .93, t = 4.89, p < .0005), followed by beliefs about causal relatedness (beta = .6, t = 
2.99, p = .004) and strength of association (beta = .28, t = 2.54, p = .014).  
However, the simple correlation between causal beliefs and inferences about cells under 
speeded conditions was actually negative, r = -.1, p = .47. Given that each category in a 
causally related pair had been intentionally chosen from different taxonomic groups, this is 
not a surprising result. It also suggests that the reason the structured causal knowledge 
variable was a significant predictor above association on its own is via its correlation with 
strength of association (r = .3, p = .016) mentioned above. This would explain why 
knowledge that is not really relevant to reasoning about cells is a significant predictor under 
time pressure.    
Although adding the structured knowledge variables accounted for additional variance 
above strength of association on its own (R 
2
Change: 26.4%, F (2, 60) = 15.5, p < .0005), this 
change in R
2
 was not as substantial as when people were forced to delay their response (R 
2
Change: 48.2%).  
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Figure 3.3: Standardized Regression Coefficients for Predictive Relations between Strength of 
Association, Taxonomic and Causal Beliefs and Inductive Strength Ratings for Cells 
 
 
Availability of Domain-Specific Knowledge 
To further scrutinize Shafto et al.‟s (2007) claim that the taxonomic knowledge domain is 
fundamentally more accessible than ecological or causal knowledge domains, we looked at 
the effect of timing separately for taxonomically related categories and causally related 
categories, ignoring causal directionality. This enables a direct comparison with Shafto and 
colleagues‟ (2007) analysis, whilst controlling for strength of association. 
Taxonomic Inferences 
We carried out a 2 (property: cells versus infections) by 2 (timing: speeded or delayed) mixed 
design ANOVA, with timing as the between-subjects manipulation. For the item analysis, we 
included strength of association as a covariate and analyzed the data with a 2 (property) by 2 
(timing) within-items ANOVA. The covariate of strength of association in the item analysis 
was highly significant, FI (1, 30) = 65.23, p < .0005, effect size d = 2.95, but it did not interact 
with any of the other variables. 
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In line with Shafto et al.‟s (2007) data, there was a main effect of property across 
participants, FS (1, 58) = 4.32, p = .042, effect size d = .54. People tended to rate taxonomic 
inferences slightly higher when they were reasoning about cells (M = 4.73, SE = .16) than 
when they were reasoning about infections (M = 4.39, SE = .16). However, this effect was 
nonsignificant across items, FI (1, 30) = .01, p = .92, effect size d = .001. 
There was no effect of timing, FS (1, 58) = .13, p = .73, effect size d = .09, FI (1, 30) = .61, p = 
.44, effect size d = .28. Inferences were of similar strength in the speeded (M = 4.51, SE = 
.20) and unspeeded condition (M = 4.61, SE = .20). 
Finally, there was no significant interaction between timing and property, FS (1, 58) = .85, p 
= .36, effect size d = .24, FI (1, 30) = .017, p = .9, effect size d = .06. 
Causal Inferences 
As for the taxonomic items, we performed a 2 (property: cells versus infections) by 2 (timing: 
speeded or delayed) mixed-design ANOVA, with timing as the between-subjects 
manipulation. The covariate of strength of association in the item analysis was again highly 
significant, FI (1, 14) = 12.71, p = .003, effect size d = 1.91. 
Unlike Shafto et al. (2007), who found that the availability of ecological knowledge was 
compromised when people were speeded up, we did not find an effect of timing, FS(1,58) = .78, 
p = .38, effect size d = .22,  FI(1, 14)= .62 , p = .45, effect size d = .42. Inferences were of 
similar strength in the speeded (M = 4.32, SE = .18) and unspeeded condition (M = 4.09, SE 
=.18).  
There was also no interaction effect between timing and property, FS (1, 58) = .11, p = .74, 
effect size d = .08, FI (1, 14) = .081, p = .78, effect size d = .16. 
There was however a main effect of property, FS (1, 58) = 10.61, p = .002, effect size d = 
.48, FI (1, 14) = 5.32, p = .037, effect size d = 1.23. Thus, people tended to rate inferences about 
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causally related categories higher when they were reasoning about infections (M = 4.52, SE = 
.15) than when they were reasoning about cells (M = 3.89, SE = .18). These results suggest 
that strength of association, a measure of unstructured knowledge, has a pervasive influence, 
and once level of association is controlled for, no knowledge domain has fundamental 
superiority in its ability to inform category-based generalizations. 
3.1.3 Discussion 
The main goal of this first experiment was to show that knowledge effects in category-based 
reasoning can be distinguished with regards to two contrasting types of knowledge. On the 
one hand, inductive inferences can be influenced by effortlessly computable, unstructured 
knowledge such as strength of association (Rogers & McClelland, 2004) or similarity 
(Sloman, 1993b; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004a). On the other hand, there are effects that can be 
ascribed to structured knowledge (Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Osherson, et al., 1990; 
Rehder, 2009; Shafto, et al., 2008) which requires time and processing effort. Our results 
regarding the use of causal knowledge support this distinction. They suggest that the causal 
asymmetry effect depends upon considering the underlying causal structure and what 
implications it might have for the probability of sharing relevant properties such as infections 
or diseases (Shafto, et al., 2008). Thus, when people were not under any time pressure, they 
rated predictively-related categories as more likely to share an infection than diagnostically-
related categories, whereas this causal asymmetry effect vanished when people had to 
respond rapidly.  
Furthermore, the results showed that strength of association was a significant predictor of 
inductive strength ratings in both the speeded and unspeeded conditions, suggesting that 
unstructured knowledge influenced people‟s inferences regardless of timing manipulations. In 
contrast, causal and biological beliefs accounted for more additional variance above strength 
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of association on its own in the delayed condition compared to the speeded condition, 
suggesting that structured knowledge became more important when people had plenty of time 
to consider their responses. Thus, this supports our contention that drawing on structured 
knowledge is mediated by an effortful, time-consuming process, unlike the use of 
unstructured associative knowledge, which influences the reasoning process relatively 
automatically. For reasoning to be maximally effective, it is necessary to consider the deep 
structure of the domain with more scrutiny, which appears to be a slower, more elaborate and 
cognitively costly process.  
Although the regression analyses broadly support this contention, as more additional 
variance was accounted for by the structured knowledge variables when people delayed their 
responses compared to when they had to respond rapidly, it is less clear how we should 
interpret some of the individual beta-weights. 
To further substantiate our claim that the use structured knowledge is effortful, whereas 
the influence of unstructured knowledge is relatively automatic and hence have dissociable 
effects on category-based inferences, we carried out another experiment with the same 
design. Instead of a timing manipulation, we used a secondary task paradigm as a direct 
manipulation of available mental resources.  
3.2 Experiment 2 
The previous study suggests that certain qualitative phenomena which arise in category-based 
induction in knowledge-rich environments are a consequence of the recruitment of structured 
knowledge. This was especially clear when considering the causal asymmetry effect, in 
which inferences are stronger when they are predictive and go from prey to predator or from 
plant to consumer compared to diagnostic inferences in which the direction of the causal link 
is reversed. If our hypothesis is correct, and recruiting structured knowledge during inductive 
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reasoning is a slower, more effortful process, which is separable from relying on unstructured 
knowledge such as strength of association between the two categories, then the former should 
be susceptible to manipulations of mental resources. Thus, if people do not have the available 
time or resources available, and fall back onto associative strength as a basis for making their 
inductive judgements, then causal asymmetry effects should not emerge.  
Within the category-based induction literature, there is only one study (Feeney & Crisp, 
2010) that has used manipulations of mental resources to assess whether some processes 
underlying category-based induction may require more effort than others. In that study, 
people rated arguments such as:  
 
Grain has property X. 
How likely is it that Mice have property X?     (1) 
 
Grain has property X. 
How likely is it that Owls have property X?     (2) 
 
Grain has property X. 
How likely is it that Mice and Owls have property X?    (3) 
 
People tended to rate the conjunctive category conclusion (3) higher than the single causally 
distant category conclusion (2), which is a violation of the conjunction law of probability. In 
contrast, only a minority of people tended to rate the conjunctive category conclusion (3) 
higher than the single causally near category conclusion (1). This tendency to commit the 
conjunction fallacy for causally distant conclusions was higher when people were under 
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memory load, whereas it did not increase the fallacy rate for causally near conclusions. We 
attributed this to the fact that the causal relationship was effortlessly retrieved when the two 
categories were closely related, but that it took more mental resources to reconstruct the 
causal link between the premise and causally distant conclusion category. Thus, under 
memory load, people could not make use of more structured causal knowledge in order to 
overcome the fallacy.   
We expected similar effects on people‟s ability to recruit structured knowledge for the 
current inductive evaluation task. This should be especially apparent for causally related 
categories, in which considerations of the mechanisms that relate categories to one another in 
the causal network seem to give rise to qualitative phenomena such as the causal asymmetry 
effect. Thus, based on the previous experiment, we expected that the emergence of the causal 
asymmetry effect would be tied to the availability of mental resources.  
3.2.1 Overview Experiment 2 
We used a secondary task paradigm in which people had to remember simple or complex dot 
patterns (de Neys, 2006a) whilst making their inductive strength evaluations. Remembering 
the simple patterns should only minimally affect working memory resources, whereas 
remembering the complex patterns places a much heavier burden on people‟s mental 
resources. In general, we expected people to exhibit a causal asymmetry effect when under 
minimal cognitive burden, rating predictive causal inferences (from prey to predator) higher 
than diagnostic causal inferences (from predator to prey). In contrast, this asymmetry effect 
should be attenuated or absent when people were burdened with a resource-engaging 
secondary task, in this case remembering complex dot configurations.  
Furthermore, we hoped to replicate the findings from the two previous experiments, 
showing that associative strength, our measure of unstructured knowledge,  predicts people‟s 
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inductive strength ratings regardless of resource manipulations, whereas structured causal and 
taxonomic knowledge should account for more additional variance in the unloaded compared 
to the loaded condition.  
Finally, we wanted to further substantiate our conclusion that Shafto et al‟s (2007) claim 
about an accessibility advantage for taxonomic knowledge cannot be fully upheld once level 
of association is controlled for. Thus, we expected the secondary task load to have a similar 
effect on taxonomic and causal inferences once the direction of the causal link is disregarded.  
3.2.2 Method 
Design 
The experiment had a 2 (load: heavy or light) by 2 (property: cells or infections) by 3 
(relation: taxonomic, causal predictive or causal diagnostic) by 4 (list) mixed-design, with list 
and load as between-subjects variables. Based on our findings from Experiment 1, we 
predicted an inductive selectivity effect, manifested as an interaction between property and 
relation. Furthermore, we predicted an effect of relation, and specifically, we expected a 
causal asymmetry effect manifested by causal predictive inferences being rated higher than 
causal diagnostic inferences. However, we expected this to be modulated by an interaction 
between load and relation, so that this causal asymmetry effect should be attenuated when 
people were under heavy memory load.   
Materials 
Inductive Reasoning Task and Load Manipulation 
The inductive reasoning problems were the same ones used in Experiment 1. Before rating 
each inductive argument, participants were shown a 4 by 4 grid with 4 dots. In the heavy load 
condition, the dots were displayed in a random order with the constraint that they could never 
form a straight line or diagonal. In contrast, in the light load condition, the dots always 
formed a straight line or diagonal, placing minimal burden on working memory. The dot 
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matrix was displayed for 2 seconds followed by the reasoning problem. Participants entered 
their response to the induction arguments on the keyboard by pressing any number between 1 
(highly unlikely) and 9 (very likely). Once they had given their rating, an empty dot matrix 
appeared and participants tried to recall the location of the 4 dots by pressing the appropriate 
box with the mouse cursor. 
Post-test 
As in the previous experiments, we checked people‟s beliefs about category relations in a 
computerized post-test. We calculated the mean proportion of positive responses to the two 
post-test questions about biological group membership and food chain relations across the 
two timing conditions and correlated this with both our web-based measures of co-occurrence 
(Spearman rho correlation coefficients ranged from -.03 to .19, all p‟s > .13), and our 
subjective measure of associative strength (Spearman rho correlation coefficients ranged 
from -.2 to .19, all p‟s > .14).  As none of the correlations were significant, we were confident 
that this test was assessing beliefs based on more structured knowledge.  
Participants 
40 participants took part in the study. They were volunteers from Queen‟s University Belfast 
and Durham University, who received either course credit for their participation or were paid 
£5 for their time. The mean age was 23.3 years (SD = 6.2 years). 
Procedure 
Participants were told that we were interested in their beliefs about shared infections and 
cells.  They received written instructions which included an example. After giving informed 
consent, they began the self-paced experiment and completed two practice trials to 
familiarize themselves with the procedure. 
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For each trial, the dot matrix was presented on the computer screen for 2 seconds, 
followed by the inductive reasoning problem. Once participants had read the induction 
question, they entered their response on the keyboard by pressing a number between 1 and 9. 
They then saw an empty matrix and had to try and recall the location of the four dots by 
pressing on an appropriate box with the mouse cursor. Participants received no feedback on 
their recall performance. After the main experiment, participants completed the self-paced 
post-test. They were instructed to press key C if their response was YES, key M if their 
response was NO and key B if they didn‟t know.  
3.2.3 Results  
ANOVA  
As in Experiment 1, we calculated 6 mean inductive strength ratings for each participant and 
analyzed these with a 3 (relation: predictive, diagnostic or taxonomic) by 2 (property: cells or 
infection) by 2 (memory load: heavy or light) by 4 (list) mixed-design ANOVA, with timing 
and list as between-subjects variables. For the analysis by items we used a 2 (property) by 2 
(timing) by 3 (relation) mixed-design ANOVA, with relation as a between-items variable and 
strength of association as a covariate. 
There was no significant main effect of list, F (3, 32) = .92, p = .44, effect size d = .58, and 
none of its interactions with other variables were significant (all p‟s > .33), so further analysis 
proceeded without this counterbalancing variable. For the item analysis, the covariate of 
strength of association was highly significant, FI (1, 60) = 44.5, p < .0005, effect size d = 1.72, 
but it did not interact with any of the other variables. 
There was no significant main effect of property, FS (1, 33) = .79, p = .38, effect size d = 
.31, FI (1, 60) = 1.5, p = .23, effect size d = .34.  Inferences about infections (M = 3.93, SE = 
.21) were rated as strong as inferences about cells (M = 3.75, SE = .19). 
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Inferences made under heavy memory load (M = 3.7, SE = .25) were similar to inferences 
made under minimal memory load (M = 4.0, SE = .25), such that there was no significant 
effect of load FS (1, 38) = .75, p = .39, effect size d = .3, FI (1, 60) = 1.3, p = .26, effect size d = 
.29. 
There was a significant main effect of relation, FS (1.66, 53.03
5
) = 3.0, p = .007, effect size d = 
.87, FI (2, 60) = 12.83, p < .0005, effect size d = 1.38. Post-hoc comparisons showed that there 
was a difference in inductive strength ratings for causal predictive (M = 3.90, SE = .24) and 
diagnostic inferences (M = 3.33, SE = .23, p = .013, effect size d = .44), but no significant 
difference between causal predictive and taxonomic inductive strength ratings (M = 4.30, SE 
= .25, p = .23 effect size d = .2). The difference between diagnostic and taxonomic inferences 
was significant (p = .002, effect size d = .59).  
As in the previous experiment, there was a significant interaction between property and 
relation, FS (2, 76) = 5.48, p = .006, effect size d = .83, FI (2, 60) = 11.3, p < .0005, effect size d = 
1.22. As is shown below in Table 3.3, when people made inferences about cells, taxonomic 
inferences were significantly stronger than both causal predictive inferences (p =.01, effect 
size d = .62) and causal diagnostic inferences (p = .001, effect size d = .73), whereas there 
was no difference between the latter two types of relation (p = .93, effect size d = .15). 
When reasoning about infections, people rated causal predictive inferences significantly 
higher than causal diagnostic inferences (p = .01, effect size d = .46). However, there was no 
difference between causal predictive and taxonomic inductive strength ratings (p = .99, effect 
size d = .1). Although taxonomic inferences were slightly higher than causal diagnostic 
inferences, this comparison did not meet statistical significance (p = .12, effect size d = .41). 
 
                                                          
5
 df adjusted for  Non-Sphericity using Greenhouse-Geisser corrections 
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Table 3.3: Inductive Strength Ratings broken down by Property and Relation in 
Experiment 2 
Property Relation Mean Std. Error 
Cell predictive 3.50 .24 
diagnostic 3.26 .27 
taxonomic 4.50 .27 
Infection predictive 4.30 .33 
diagnostic 3.39 .30 
taxonomic 4.11 .25 
 
None of the other two-way interactions was significant, however, there was a significant 
three-way interaction between property, load and relation, FS (2, 76) = 3.22, p = .047, effect size 
d = .64; FI (2, 60) = 3.91, p = .025, effect size d = .72. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 below show the mean 
inductive strength ratings for the three types of relations for each memory load condition in 
the two different property contexts.  
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Figure 3.4: Mean Inductive Strength Ratings for Cells 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Mean Inductive Strength Ratings for Infections 
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As we had made a-priori predictions about the effect of memory load on the emergence of the 
causal asymmetry effect, we carried out two separate 2 (causal relation: predictive versus 
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diagnostic) by 2 (load: heavy versus light) mixed-model ANOVAs, one for cells and the 
other for infections.  
Causal Asymmetry Infections 
As in the previous experiment, strength of association was a highly significant covariate in 
the item analysis, FI (1, 29) = 11.49, p = .002, effect size d = 1.26. 
Evaluating inferences about infections, there was a main effect of causal relation, FS (1, 38) 
= 8.99, p = .005, effect size d = .98, FI (1, 29) = 10.24, p = .003, effect size d = 1.18. Thus, 
across all conditions, there was a substantial causal asymmetry effect, with people rating 
inferences about category pairs with a predictive causal relation (M = 4.30, SE =.31) as 
significantly stronger than when the relation between the two categories was diagnostic (M = 
3.39, SE = .29).  
The main effect of load was nonsignificant, FS (1, 38) = 2.41, p = .13, effect size d = .5, FI (1, 
29) = 3.5, p = .07, effect size d = .69. 
Most importantly however, as in Experiment 1, the main effect of causal relation was 
modulated by the significant interaction between load and causal relation, FS (1, 38) = 4.04, p = 
.051, effect size d = .65, FI (1, 29) = 7.76, p = .009, effect size d = 1.04, pictured below in 
Figure 3.6. Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that people who were not burdened by a heavy 
secondary memory load were able to take causal structure into account to maximize inductive 
potency.  Indicative of a significant causal asymmetry effect, inferences with a causal 
predictive relation (M = 5.01, SE = .44) were rated much stronger than categories with a 
diagnostic causal link (M = 3.49, SE = .41, p = .001, effect size d = .73).  
In contrast, the causal asymmetry effect whilst reasoning about infections was absent 
when people had to contend with a heavy secondary memory load. Thus, inductive strength 
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ratings were almost identical for causal diagnostic inferences (M = 3.29, SE = .41) and causal 
predictive inferences (M = 3.49, SE = .41, p = .49, effect size d = .17).  
This finding again suggests that the causal asymmetry effect arises because people 
consider how the underlying causal structure might influence the probability distribution of 
properties such as infections or diseases. When people are cognitively burdened, they may 
not be able to take the underlying causal structure into account, instead forcing them to rely 
on the existence of a non-directional association between the categories.  
 
Figure 3.6: Causal Asymmetry Effect across Load Conditions 
 
Causal Asymmetry Cells 
As expected, for inferences about cells, there was no effect of causal relation, FS (1, 38) = 1.05, 
p = .31, effect size d = .34, FI (1, 29) = 1.06, p = .31, effect size d = .38. People rated inferences 
about category pairs with a predictive causal relation (M = 3.5, SE = .24) the same as when 
the relation between the two categories was diagnostic (M = 3.26, SE = .27). 
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The main effect of load was non-significant, FS (1, 38) = .007, p = .93, effect size d = .001, 
FI (1, 29) = .55, p = .46, effect size d = .28, as was the interaction between load and causal 
relation, FS (1, 38) = 1.29, p = .26, effect size d = .36, FI (1, 29) = .97, p = .33, effect size d = .36.  
Surprisingly, the covariate of strength of association did not quite reach significance in 
the item analysis, FI (1, 29) = 3.65, p = .066, effect size d = .71. However, the pattern of the 
other effects in the item analysis was identical whether or not this covariate was included. 
Results Regression Analyses 
As in the previous experiment, we ran hierarchical regression analyses to see how 
unstructured knowledge, represented by strength of association between categories, as well as 
how relevant domains of structured knowledge influence category-based inferences 
depending upon the availability of mental resources. For each item we averaged inductive 
strength scores across participants separately for the two types of property in the two memory 
load conditions. This meant that we had 4 inductive strength scores for each item. 
Furthermore, for each category pair, the mean proportions of positive responses to the two 
post-test questions about biological group membership and causal food chain relationships 
were calculated separately for the two load conditions. As there was neither a correlation 
between the structured knowledge variables and strength of association, nor between the 
structured knowledge variables and the objective conditional co-occurrence indices, we were 
confident that the structured knowledge variables were measuring a different type of 
knowledge than that assessed by our measure of unstructured knowledge, strength of 
association. 
As before, strength of association was entered in the first block of the regression analysis, 
followed by taxonomic and causal beliefs in the second block. All four regression analyses 
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were significant, but different predictors were of different importance across the two load 
conditions and across the two different properties. 
Inferences about Infections 
Illustrated in Figure 3.7, reasoning about infections when people were under minimal 
cognitive load (R = .69) was significantly predicted by strength of association (beta = .48, t = 
4.62, p < .0005). However, the structured knowledge variables were far more important. 
Thus, in the second block, knowledge about relevant causal food chain relations was also a 
significant predictor (beta = .63, t = 2.65, p = .01), as was taxonomic knowledge (beta = .78, t 
= 3.39, p = .001). Together, adding these two structured knowledge variables accounted for a 
significant amount of additional variance above strength of association alone (R
2 
Change: 
11.1%, F (2, 60) = 6.35, p = .003). 
Reasoning about infections when people were burdened with a heavy cognitive load (R = 
.48) was also significantly predicted by association (beta = .31, t = 2.58, p = .012). 
Surprisingly, whereas biological relatedness was a significant predictor of inductive strength 
(beta = .36 t = 2.45, p = .017), relevant knowledge about food chain relations (beta = .27, t = 
1.77, p = .082) did not reach significance. Adding these two  structured knowledge predictors 
in a second block accounted for a marginally significant amount of additional  variance 
compared to strength of association on its own ( R
2 
Change: 7.8%, F (2, 60) = 3.02, p = .056). 
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Figure 3.7: Standardized Regression Coefficients for Inductive Ratings about Infections in 
Experiment 2 
 
Inferences about Cells 
Reasoning about cells was predicted by a different constellation of variables, as shown in 
Figure 3.8 below. Overall, when people were not under a heavy memory load, 42.9% of the 
variance was accounted for by the 3 variables entered into the regression analysis (R = .66). 
Strength of association, which was forced into the regression equation in the first block, 
accounted for a significant amount of variance in inductive strength ratings (beta = .33, t = 
3.07, p = .003). 
Of the structured knowledge variables entered in the second block of the regression 
analysis, the most important predictor of inductive strength ratings were taxonomic beliefs 
(beta = .72, t = 2.99, p = .004), whereas causal beliefs were not predictive of people‟s 
inductive strength ratings about cells (beta = .21, t = .85, p = .4). 
In summary, when people were not under time pressure, adding the structured knowledge 
predictors in a second block accounted for significantly more variance in inductive strength 
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ratings about cells than strength of association on its own ( R
2 
Change: 29.1 %, F (2, 60) = 
15.28, p < .0005).  
Inductions about cells when people were cognitively burdened (R = .64) was predicted by 
strength of association (beta = .31, t = 2.95, p = .005). Of the structured knowledge variables 
entered in the second block, taxonomic beliefs were highly predictive of inductive strength 
ratings (beta = .51, t = 3.97, p < .0005), whereas structured knowledge about causal 
relatedness was not a significant predictor (beta = -.06, t = -.46, p = .65). Overall, as in the 
light load condition, adding the structured knowledge variables accounted for additional 
variance above strength of association on its own (R
2 
Change: 30.4%, F (2, 60) = 15.51, p < 
.0005). 
 
Figure 3.8: Standardized Regression Coefficients for Inductive Ratings for Cells in Experiment 2 
 
Availability of Different Domain-Specific Knowledge 
As in Experiment 1, we wanted to look at whether  there was any evidence to support the 
claim made by other researchers (Shafto, Vitkin, & Coley, 2007) that access to ecological or 
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access to taxonomic knowledge is independent of domain-general cognitive factors. The 
evidence from the regression analyses in the first two experiments is somewhat ambivalent. 
For example, the fact that causal beliefs did not appear to predict people‟s inductive 
inferences about infections when they had to contend with a cognitive load could be used to 
support Shafto et al‟s (2008) position. However, once strength of association was controlled 
for, our first experiment suggested that timing manipulations did not have a dissociable effect 
upon people‟s causal and taxonomic inductive strength ratings. Thus, we repeated this 
analysis to explore how memory load affected the strength of people‟s inferences separately 
for taxonomically related categories and causally related categories, ignoring the directional 
nature of the causal link. As explained in the methods section, we controlled for strength of 
association and entered this variable as a covariate in the item analyses, providing an 
indication of the importance of unstructured knowledge. 
Taxonomic Inferences 
As expected, the item analyses indicated that the covariate of strength of association was 
highly significant FI (1, 30) = 44.28, p < .0005, effect size d = 2.42. 
The 2 (property: cells versus infections) by 2 (load: heavy versus light) mixed-design 
ANOVA, with load as the between-subjects manipulation showed that across participants, 
there was a main effect of property, FS(1, 38) = 5.34, p = .026, effect size d = .75,  People rated 
taxonomic inferences higher when they were reasoning about cells (M = 4.50, SE = .26) 
compared to the inferences they made about infections (M = 4.10, SE = .26). However, this 
effect was not significant across items, FI (1, 30) = .83, p = .37, effect size d = .33. 
There was no effect of load, FS (1, 38) = .013 p = .91, effect size d = .001, FI (1, 30) = .03, p = 
.86, effect size d = .06. Inferences made under heavy load (M = 4.33, SE = .35) were almost 
identical to inferences drawn under light load (M = 4.28, SE = .35). 
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Finally, there was no significant interaction between load and property, FS (1, 38) = .94, p 
= .34, effect size d = .31, FI (1, 30) = .97, p = .33, effect size d = .36. 
Causal Inferences 
We then carried out the same analysis for causal inferences. Again, the covariate of strength 
of association in the item analyses was highly significant FI (1, 14) = 10.47, p = .006, effect size 
d = 1.73. 
In line with our previous findings, and somewhat refuting the conclusions drawn by 
Shafto et al. (2007) about an accessibility disadvantage for ecological knowledge , we did not 
find any effect of load, FS(1,38) = 1.11, p = .3, effect size d = .34, FI(1,14) = 4.0, p = .07, effect 
size d = 1.06. Causal inferences received similar ratings under both loaded (M = 3.40, SE = 
.29) and unloaded conditions (M = 3.82, SE = .29).  
Finally, there was no evidence that the effect of load on causal inferences might only arise 
in a relevant context. Thus, there was no interaction between load and property, FS (1, 38) = 
1.95, p = .17, effect size d = .44, FI (1, 14) = 1.91, p = .19, effect size d = .74. 
Analogous to Experiment 1, causal inferences were somewhat stronger when people 
reasoned about infections (M = 3.84, SE = .26) than when they reasoned about cells (M = 
3.38, SE = .23), although this effect was not statistically significant, FS (1, 38) = 2.78, p = .1, 
effect size d = .54, FI (1, 14) = 1.46, p = .25, effect size d = .64. 
Secondary Task Analysis 
In a dual task paradigm, dissociable effects of the secondary task can reflect strategic trade-
offs between primary and secondary tasks (Hegarty, Shah, & Miyake, 2000). To guard 
against the possibility that the dissociable effect of memory load on causal inferences 
reflected such a strategic trade-off, we calculated the number of dots correctly recalled 
separately for the trials preceding each of the unique property by load by relation conditions. 
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A 2 (relation: causal predictive, causal diagnostic or taxonomic) by 2 (property: cell of 
infection) by 2 (load: heavy versus light) by 4 (list) mixed-design ANOVA, with list and load 
as between-subjects variables showed that the only significant difference in the number of 
dots recalled was between the two load conditions, F (1, 31) = 17.71, p < .0005, effect size d = 
1.5. In the heavy load condition, participants recalled a mean of 3.2 dots (SE = .1), whereas 
they recalled on average 3.8 dots (SE = .1) when they were only under a light memory 
burden. This suggests that people were consistent in how they allocated their mental 
resources to the primary and secondary tasks across all problems and verified that the more 
complex patterns were harder to remember and more burdensome than the simple dot 
patterns.  
3.2.4 Discussion 
Experiment 2 corroborated the findings from the previous experiment. People‟s inductive 
strength ratings were sensitive to context, with inferences about cells being stronger when 
there was a taxonomic relationship between the categories than when there was a causal 
relation between them. In contrast, inferences about infections were equally strong when 
there was a taxonomic or causal predictive relation between the categories, but lower when 
the relation was diagnostic. Most importantly, this causal asymmetry effect disappeared when 
people were burdened with a secondary memory task, suggesting that the ability to consider 
how causal structure might modulate assessments of inductive strength is mediated by an 
effortful, analytical process.  
The results from the regression analyses were less clear. Surprisingly, unlike in the 
previous experiment, adding the taxonomic structured knowledge variable when reasoning 
about cells explained similar amounts of additional variance above strength of association 
alone for both the heavy and light load condition. One explanation would be consistent with 
Chapter 3  Two Types of Knowledge 
 
106 
 
Shafto et al.‟s (2007) original suggestion that taxonomic knowledge may be more accessible 
than other knowledge structures.  However, when causal directionality was ignored, load did 
not differentially affect people‟s taxonomic and causal inferences, suggesting that it is 
unlikely to be due to an accessibility advantage for the taxonomic knowledge domain.  This is 
further supported by the finding that taxonomic knowledge explained much more variance 
when reasoning about infections in the light load condition (beta = .48) than in the heavy load 
condition (beta = .36).  
Rather, a possible alternative explanation is that drawing on knowledge when reasoning 
about cells is relatively straightforward, as people only have to consider one relevant 
knowledge structure, taxonomic knowledge. In contrast, both taxonomic and causal 
knowledge is potentially relevant when reasoning about infections. This may make drawing 
on structured knowledge when reasoning about infections a cognitively more demanding 
task, especially given that the causal relations were complex, including directional aspects 
(Cobos, López, Cano, Almaraz, & Shanks, 2002; Fenker, Waldmann, & Holyoak, 2005; 
López, Cobos, & Cano, 2005).  
Thus, in a final experiment we simplified the structure of causally related categories, 
including only causal predictive relations and their taxonomic counterparts. As it had been 
very difficult to find enough items for which strength of association level could be matched 
for causal and taxonomic category pairs, dropping the directional manipulation also allowed 
us to have enough individual causal and taxonomic arguments to manipulate strength of 
association in a factorial design by carrying out a median split on this variable. 
3.3 Experiment 3 
In the final experiment, the effects of putting people under time pressure was compared for 
causal predictive and taxonomically related category pairs which were either strongly or 
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weakly associated. The primary goal was to confirm that depending upon available 
processing time, structured and unstructured knowledge could have dissociable effects upon 
people‟s inductive inferences. Whilst the previous two experiments strongly supported the 
idea that drawing on structured knowledge, such as causal relations, was subject to the 
availability of time and mental resources, the findings from the regression analyses were less 
clear-cut. This might have been because of the contrasting complexity of the knowledge 
structures underlying our causal and taxonomic arguments. We hoped to remedy this by 
dropping the directional manipulation for the causal arguments and looking at the effects of 
timing on weakly and strongly related category pairs in a factorial design.   
The second goal was to advocate between two contrasting explanations for Shafto et al.‟s 
(2007) results, regarding the availability of knowledge from different domains. These 
researchers suggest that knowledge from different domains diverge in their relative 
accessibility and thus the likelihood that this knowledge will come to bear on reasoning 
output. If different knowledge domains do indeed diverge in their accessibility, one would 
expect to find effects of timing on people‟s use of causal knowledge, but not on their use of 
taxonomic knowledge.  
However, it might be that Shafto et al.‟s (2007) findings were confounded by strength of 
association between the different categories. In this case one might expect timing to have 
similar effects on the use of causal and taxonomic knowledge once strength of association 
had been equated between domain-specific category pairs. Thus, highly associated categories 
should receive stronger inductive strength ratings than weakly associated categories 
regardless of whether they are causally or taxonomically related. Shafto et al. (2007) and 
Rehder (2006), make contradictory claims about the superiority of different knowledge 
domains, advocating the supremacy of taxonomic and causal knowledge respectively. 
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Arguing that neither of these positions is correct, we wanted to obtain further evidence that 
no specific knowledge domain was profoundly more privileged once level of association 
between the category pairs from different domains had been equated.  
3.3.1 Method 
Design 
The experiment had a 2 (property: cells or diseases) by 2 (relation: causal or taxonomic) by 2 
(level of association: high or low) by 2 (timing: speeded or delayed) by 4 (list) mixed design, 
with list and timing as between-subjects variables.  
Participants 
The 40 participants were from Durham University, and received course credit for their 
participation. The mean age was 24.2 years (SD = 5.8 years). 
Materials 
There were 20 items in total. Items consisted of a base category, a causally related target 
category and a taxonomically related target category. Causally related targets were always 
from different superordinate categories, for example, plants and animals, or mammals and 
birds. In contrast, taxonomically related pairs were always from the same superordinate 
taxonomic category. For example, the causal target for the base category fly would be frog 
and the taxonomic target would be ant. There were two exceptions in which the causally 
related categories were both mammals but belonged to different orders. For these items, the 
taxonomic alternative was from the same order as the base category. As in the previous two 
experiments, all our stimulus materials had been extensively pre-tested to ensure that people 
knew about the causal connection between the causally related category pairs. Also, it was 
ensured that strength of association between the base and the causal target was identical to 
the strength of association between the base and its taxonomic target.  
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For each of the 20 items, we created a taxonomic and a causal induction problem, 
resulting in a total of 40 inductive arguments. Participants were told that the base category 
had either a blank disease, such as disease 3dfT, or blank cells, such as cells T78. As before, 
the participants‟ task was to evaluate the likelihood that the cells/disease would be present in 
the conclusion category on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 9 (very likely).  
To explore the role that level of association plays in the availability of knowledge from 
different domains, a median split based on level of association was carried out on the selected 
items. Thus, for 10 items the association between the base and its target categories was 
classed as strong and for the remaining 10 items this association was classed as weak. For 
half the strongly and weakly associated items participants made inductive inferences about 
diseases. For the other half, people evaluated inductive conclusions about cells. The 
participants reasoned about different items for cells and diseases, so whilst property was 
manipulated within-subjects, content was counterbalanced across participants in a Latin-
square design, resulting in 4 different stimulus lists shown in Table 3.4 below. 
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Table 3.4: Design Stimulus Materials for Experiment 3 
 List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 
Items 1-5 
Strongly 
associated 
Causal and 
Taxonomic 
Arguments  
Cells 
Causal  
and Taxonomic 
Counterpart  
Disease 
Causal and 
Taxonomic 
Arguments  
Cells 
Causal  
and Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Disease 
Items 6-10 
 Strongly 
associated 
Causal  
and Taxonomic 
Arguments  
Disease 
Causal and 
Taxonomic 
Counterpart 
Cells 
Causal  
and Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Disease 
Causal and 
Taxonomic 
Arguments  
Cells 
Items 11-15 
Weakly 
associated 
Causal and 
Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Cells 
Causal  
and Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Disease 
Causal  
and Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Disease 
Causal and 
Taxonomic 
Arguments  
Cells 
Items 16-20 
Weakly 
associated 
Causal  
and Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Disease 
Causal and 
Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Cells 
Causal and 
Taxonomic 
Arguments  
Cells 
Causal  
and Taxonomic 
Arguments 
Disease 
 
Procedure 
The induction problems were presented on a laptop. The premise and conclusions were 
presented simultaneously and appeared in a red font. Participants could only enter their 
response once the font changed from red to green. In the speeded condition, the font changed 
from red to green after one second and participants were instructed to read the problem and 
respond as fast as possible without sacrificing accuracy. In the delayed condition, the font 
only changed colour after 10 seconds and participants were instructed to carefully consider 
their responses. They entered their response on the key board by giving a rating between 1 
and 9. 
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Post-Test 
The post-test was identical to the one used in Experiments 1 and 2. Participants answered two 
questions about the 40 category pairs, assessing their beliefs about biological group 
membership, as well as their beliefs about causal relatedness.  
The mean proportion of positive responses to the two post-test questions about biological 
group membership and food chain relations across the two timing conditions did not correlate 
with our two web-based measures of co-occurrence (Spearman rho correlation coefficients 
ranged from -.19 to .16, all p‟s > .27), nor did it correlate with our subjective measure of 
associative strength (Spearman rho correlation coefficients ranged from .10 to .22, all p‟s > 
.18) suggesting that this measure does not reflect associative strength but represents beliefs 
based on more structured knowledge.  
 
3.3.2 Results 
ANOVA 
Mean inductive strength scores were calculated for each cluster of 5 inductive arguments 
representing the unique property by association by relation combination, resulting in 8 means 
for each participant. These were subjected to a 2 (property: disease or cell) by 2 (relation: 
causal or taxonomic) by association (high versus low) by 2 (timing: delayed or speeded) by 4 
(list) mixed-design ANOVA, with list and timing as between-subject variables. For the 
analysis by items, inductive strength ratings were averaged across subjects rather than items 
and were analysed with a 2 (property) by 2 (timing) by 2 (relation) by 2 (association) mixed-
design ANOVA, with association and relation as between-items variables. 
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There was no main effect of list, F (3, 32) = .15, p = .93, effect size d = .24, however, as it 
interacted with strength of association and relation, F (3, 32) = 15.55, p < .0005, this will be 
referred back to later on.  
Inferences about diseases (M = 4.10, SE = .17) were weaker than inferences about cells 
(M = 4.40, SE = .17), however, this effect was only significant by items, FI (1, 36) = 4.5, p = 
.041, effect size d = .71, and not by subjects, FS (1, 32) = 1.94, p = .17, effect size d = .49.  
The effect of relation was approaching significance by subjects, FS (1, 32) = 3.44, p = .07, 
effect size d = .66, and was significant by items, FI (1, 36) = 4.12, p = .05, effect size d = .67. 
Causal inferences received a mean strength rating of 4.05 (SE = .20) whereas taxonomic 
inferences were rated slightly higher at 4.45 (SE = .14). 
As expected, there was a significant main effect of association, FS (1, 32) = 33.05, p < 
.0005, effect size d = 2.0, FI (1, 36) = 7.7, p = .009, effect size d = .92. Thus, inferences about 
highly associated categories (M = 4.52, SE = .14) were rated stronger than inferences about 
weakly associated categories (M = 3.98, SE = .14). However, as mentioned above, there was 
a significant interaction between list, association and relation. This showed that in list 2, there 
was no significant difference between strongly (M = 4.33, SE = .31) and weakly associated 
(M = 4.33, SE = .32, p = 1) taxonomically related categories. Similarly, the effect of 
association did not reach significance in list 3 for causally related categories, although the 
difference between weakly (M = 4.13, SE = .38) and strongly associated categories (M = 
4.34, SE = .44, p= .36) was in the predicted direction.  However, given that the effect of 
strength of association was so robust across items, this should not be of too much concern. 
Furthermore, the effect of timing was significant by items FI (1, 36) = 18.1, p < .0005, effect 
size d = 1.42, and was approaching significance for subjects, FS (1, 32) = 2.82, p = .1, effect size 
d = .6. Inferences under speeded conditions (M = 4.03, SE = .19) were somewhat lower than 
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inferences under delayed conditions (M = 4.48, SE = .19). However, timing did not interact 
with any of the other variables.  Thus, once strength of association had been equated between 
knowledge domains, there was no evidence to support Shafto et al.‟s (2007) contention that 
accessing taxonomic and causal knowledge domains are subject to contrasting processing 
constraints.   
The only significant two-way interaction was between property and relation, FS (1, 32) = 
23.17, p < .0005, effect size d = 1.7, FI (1, 36) = 35.68, p < .0005, effect size d = 1.99, 
suggesting that people showed some context-sensitive reasoning. Bonferroni post hoc tests 
showed that when reasoning about cells, people rated taxonomic inferences (M = 5.01, SE 
=.2) significantly stronger than causal inferences (M = 3.79, SE = .22, p < .0005, effect size d 
= .9). When reasoning about diseases, people rated causal inferences slightly higher (M = 
4.32, SE = .26) than taxonomic inferences (M = 3.89, SE = .17) although this difference was 
not significant (p = .16, effect size d = .3). None of the other higher-order interactions were 
significant (all p‟s > .08). 
Regression Analyses 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we ran hierarchical regression analyses to see how different types 
of knowledge influence category-based inferences under different timing conditions. 
Inductive strength scores were averaged across participants for each item, separately for the 
two types of property and the two timing conditions, resulting in 4 inductive strength scores 
for each item. Structured knowledge was indexed by beliefs about taxonomic and causal 
relatedness.  Thus, the mean proportion of positive responses to the two post-test questions 
about biological group membership and causal food chain relationship was calculated for 
each category pair, separately for the two timing conditions. Unstructured knowledge was 
instantiated by the strength of association between the category pairs. We confirmed that the 
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structured knowledge ratings were not correlated with any of our measures of association (see 
Method), suggesting that they were indeed tapping different types of knowledge. 
All four regression analyses were significant, but different relevant knowledge influenced 
inductive strength under different conditions. Firstly, as suggested by the larger multiple 
correlation coefficients in the delayed condition, people used different types of knowledge to 
inform their inferences when they had time to do so, whereas under time pressure, the ability 
to recruit relevant structured knowledge seemed to be attenuated.  
Inferences about Diseases 
As Figure 3.9 below shows, reasoning about diseases under speeded conditions (R= .59) was 
significantly predicted by strength of association (beta = .45, t = 3.13, p = .003). Regarding 
variables entered in the second block of the regression analysis, knowledge about relevant 
causal food chain relations was also a significant predictor (beta = .35, t = 2.04, p = .049), 
whereas taxonomic knowledge was not a significant predictor (beta = .08, t = .44, p = .67). 
Together, adding these two structured knowledge variables accounted for a non-significant 
amount of additional variance (R 
2
Change: 9.6%, F (2, 36) = 2.64, p = .085). 
In contrast, reasoning about diseases under delayed conditions (R= .68) was no longer 
significantly predicted by association (beta = .24, t = 1.8, p = .08). However, inductive 
strength was strongly predicted by relevant knowledge about food chain relations (beta = .61, 
t = 4.34, p < .0005), but also by beliefs about biological relatedness (beta = .34, t = 2.33, p = 
.026). Adding the structured knowledge predictors in a second block did account for 
significantly more variance in inductive strength ratings than strength of association on its 
own (R 
2
Change: 25.8%, F(2, 36) = 9.46, p < .0005). 
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Figure 3.9: Standardized Regression Coefficients for Predictive Relations between Taxonomic and 
Causal Beliefs, Strength of Association and Inductive Strength Ratings for Diseases   
     
 
Inferences about Cells 
Reasoning about cells showed a different pattern, as depicted in Figure 3.10 below. Under 
delayed conditions, strength of association was not a significant predictor of inductive 
strength (beta = .19, t = .15, p = .14). Inductive inferences were however predicted by beliefs 
about biological relatedness (R = .72) (beta = .48, t = 3.48, p = .001), and were negatively 
predicted by beliefs about causal relatedness (beta = -.31, t = -2.29, p = .028). Given that we 
had selected causal targets that were always from different superordinate categories (i.e. 
taxonomically unrelated) it is not surprising that believing in the existence of a causal link 
was a negative predictor of inferences about cells. As when reasoning about diseases, adding 
the structured knowledge predictors in a second block of the regression analysis accounted 
for significantly more variance in inductive strength ratings than strength of association on its 
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own when people were not under time pressure ( R 
2
Change: 44.2%, F(2, 36) = 16.33,  p < 
.0005)  
Inductions about cells under speeded conditions (R = .64) were predicted by strength of 
association (beta = .51, t = 3.76, p = .001) and were negatively predicted by beliefs about 
causal relatedness (beta = -.34, t = -2.5, p = .048). Taxonomic beliefs were not a significant 
predictor of inductive strength under speeded conditions (beta = .11, t = .65, p = .52). 
However, adding the structured knowledge coefficients did explain some additional variance 
above strength of association on its own (R 
2
Change: 16.7%, F (2, 36) = 5.09, p= .011). 
 
Figure 3.10: Standardized Regression Coefficients for Predictive Relations between Strength of 
Association, Taxonomic and Causal Beliefs and Inductive Strength Ratings for Cells 
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
The primary goal of this experiment was to corroborate the finding that structured and 
unstructured types of knowledge, which differ in their respective processing characteristics, 
have dissociable effects on peoples‟ inferences. To this end, we changed our experimental 
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design in order to give us enough items to compare inferences about strongly and weakly 
associated category pairs. As expected, strongly associated category pairs were given higher 
inductive strength ratings than weakly related category pairs, irrespective of the structured 
relation between the categories. Furthermore, whereas our measure of unstructured 
knowledge, strength of association, was a strong predictor of inductive strength ratings when 
people were put under time pressure, structured causal and taxonomic knowledge was more 
influential when people were forced to delay their responses. This suggests that when people 
had enough time, they could appraise the nature of the relationship between the categories, 
and consider what impact this might have on inductive strength ratings.  
The second goal was to examine whether differences in the accessibility of knowledge 
from different domains arise when strength of association was controlled for.  Based on their 
experimental findings, Shafto and colleagues (2007) concluded that taxonomic knowledge is 
privileged. In contrast, ecological knowledge was relatively less accessible and did not come 
to bear on the reasoning process under conditions of time pressure. However, some of Shafto 
et al.‟s (2007) findings seem to be the result of their material selection rather than due to 
differences in accessibility to different knowledge structures per se. As the current 
experiment demonstrates, once level of association was equated between causally and 
taxonomically related category pairs, the advantage for taxonomic knowledge disappeared. 
This suggests that no domain of knowledge is fundamentally more privileged than any other.  
3.4 General Discussion  
We began this series of experiments with the proposition that selective category-based 
induction is influenced by two contrasting types of knowledge, effortlessly computable  
unstructured knowledge, such as strength of association (Rogers & McClelland, 2004; 
Sloutsky & Fisher, 2008) or similarity (Sloman, 1993b; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004a) on the one 
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hand, and on the other hand, structured knowledge  (Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Shafto, 
Coley, et al., 2007; Shafto, et al., 2008; Tenenbaum, et al., 2007), which requires more time 
and processing effort. Overall, our results strongly support the idea that different types of 
knowledge which differ in their processing characteristics can have dissociable effects on 
people‟s category-based inferences. The findings also suggest that when examining the 
effects of knowledge on reasoning output the distinction of knowledge by type is perhaps 
more fruitful than the distinction by domain, as no knowledge domain was consistently more 
available once level of association was controlled for.  
Experiments 1 and 2 used speeded response and secondary task paradigms to show that an 
inductive phenomenon arising from the use of structured knowledge, the causal asymmetry 
effect, was subject to time and mental resource constraints. Thus, when people were forced to 
respond rapidly or were cognitively burdened, they failed to show a causal asymmetry effect. 
This suggests that people could only consider what implications the nature of the causal 
relation had for their inductive inferences when they had sufficient time and cognitive 
capacity, but would fall back onto the use of unstructured knowledge under time pressure or 
cognitive load. 
Despite this important role for structured causal knowledge, the regression analyses from 
these two experiments suggested that there was a pervasive influence of unstructured 
knowledge on people‟s inductive evaluations, as measured by strength of association between 
the categories. This is all the more impressive given that the association ratings were obtained 
from a different set of participants.  
However, whilst the regression results, summarized in Table 3.5 below, suggested that 
structured knowledge accounted for more additional variance above strength of association 
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alone when people had enough time and free cognitive resources, the pattern of beta-weights 
for the structured knowledge variables were less clear.  
Table 3.5: Summary Regression Results Experiments 1 to 3 
  Beta-
weights 
Strength of 
Association 
Causal 
Knowledge 
Taxonomic 
Knowledge 
R
2
 
Change 
Expt 1 
Speeded 
Infection .58
 *
 .33 
ns
 .33 
ns
 2.6%
ns
 
Delayed 
Infection .53
 *
 .45
*
 .52
 *
 6.3%
*
 
Speeded 
Cells .28 
*
 .60 
*
 .91 
*
 26.4%
*
 
Delayed 
Cells .37 
*
 .23 
ns
 .88 
*
 44%
*
 
Expt 2 
Loaded 
Infection .31
*
 .27 
ns
 .36 
*
 7.8%
ns
 
Unloaded 
Infection .48 
*
 .63
*
 .78 
*
 11.1%
*
 
Loaded 
Cells .33 
*
 -.06 
ns
 .51 
*
 30.4%
*
 
Unloaded 
Cells .31 
*
 .21
ns
 .72 
*
 29.1%
*
 
Expt3 
Speeded 
Disease .45 
*
 .35 
*
 .08 
ns
 9.6 %
ns
 
Delayed 
Disease .24 
ns
 .61 
*
 .34 
*
 25.8%
*
 
Speeded 
Cells .51 
*
 -.34 
*
 .11 
ns
 16.7 %
ns
 
Delayed 
Cells .15 
ns
 -.31 
*
 .72 
*
 44.2%
*
 
 
Some of the individual beta weights from the first two experiments might be construed as 
supporting Shafto et al‟s (2007) suggestion that taxonomic knowledge is more accessible than 
causal knowledge. However, this could be attributable to the directional manipulation for our 
causally related categories in Experiments 1 and 2. Thus, people may simply not have spotted 
the causal connection for diagnostically related categories, especially under speeded or 
loaded conditions. This might be analogous to Fenker et al‟s (2005) results which showed 
that people are slower to verify the existence of a diagnostic compared to a predictive causal 
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link. In the third experiment we therefore dropped the directional manipulation and also 
included a manipulation of strength of association. Experiment 3 demonstrated that 
inferences were stronger for strongly associated categories than for weakly associated 
categories, and that this was not affected by time pressure. The regression analyses for this 
experiment were also very clear: strength of association predicted people‟s inferences under 
time pressure, whereas under delayed conditions, they flexibly drew on different knowledge 
structures depending upon the property they were reasoning about.  
We did observe some interesting contextual effects, suggested both by the pattern of beta-
weights across all three experiments when reasoning about infections and diseases, and by the 
robust interaction between property and relation. Thus, across all three experiments, causal 
and taxonomic beliefs predicted people‟s inferences about diseases and infections when they 
had time and available mental resources. However, unlike previous studies (Coley, et al., 
2005; Heit & Rubinstein, 1994; Shafto et al., 2007), we did not find a clear-cut crossover 
interaction between property and category relations. Rather, whereas taxonomic arguments 
were rated stronger when reasoning about cells, taxonomic and causal arguments were of 
similar strength when reasoning about infections. This suggests that people might be thinking 
in detail about possible other mechanisms by which categories come to share a disease or 
infection (Keil, Levin, Richman, & Gutheil, 1999; Springer & Keil, 1989), apart from the 
obvious food chain relation. For example, it is feasible that categories that have a close 
taxonomic connection might share a genetic vulnerability for a disease.  In this case, 
taxonomic relatedness acts as another causal explanation as to why categories might come to 
share a property (Rehder, 2006; Rehder & Hastie, 2001).  
Whilst theories which emphasize unstructured knowledge (e.g. Rogers & McClelland, 
2004) could in principle deal with contextual effects by assuming different contexts 
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selectively „prime‟ different features, they do not have any means of explaining the subtle 
differences in how available time and mental resources affected people‟s use of different 
knowledge structures to inform their inferences. Thus, in contrast to the unloaded and 
delayed timing conditions, people‟s inferences made under time pressure or cognitive load 
rarely seemed to be informed by more than one knowledge domain. 
Similarly, it is difficult to see how connectionist models, whose hallmark processes are 
associative and nondirectional, could explain the asymmetries that arise when considering 
causal predictive inferences compared to diagnostic inferences. Based on a rational Bayesian 
analysis, inferences about disease transmission ought to be stronger from prey to predator 
than from predator to prey (Shafto, et al., 2008), as categories higher up the food chain may 
have contracted diseases for reasons outside the food chain. However, in order to appraise 
this, it is necessary to both assign structural roles to each category and bring to mind 
alternative mechanisms by which an organism may contract the disease. Whilst the current 
experiments do not pinpoint precisely which of these steps is mediated by an effortful 
analytical process, one or both of these aspects are likely to require mental resources and 
processing which goes beyond simply evaluating the strength of association between the 
categories. Thus, the current experiments suggest that distinguishing knowledge by type (i.e. 
structured and unstructured knowledge) rather than by domain (e.g. causal versus 
taxonomic) could be crucial for furthering our understanding of the mental processes that 
underlie category-based inductive reasoning.   
In general, the current findings extend our understanding of the mental processes 
mediating category-based induction, providing a link to other domains of reasoning. For 
example, Verschueren, Schaeken and d‟Ydewalle (2005) contend that causal conditional 
reasoning can be mediated by a heuristic process, in this case by a fairly effortless assessment 
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of the probability with which the cause and effect co-vary. However, this can be overruled by 
an analytical process responsible for retrieving counterexamples. Their dual-process 
explanation parallels our current work, in which we suggest that unstructured knowledge is 
based on the extent to which both categories are associated or co-occur in the environment 
and which appears to influence inductive reasoning in a heuristic manner. In contrast, in order 
to appraise the importance of structural relations between categories, it is necessary to assign 
structural roles and/or perhaps retrieve alternative mechanisms by which categories come to 
share properties. Thus, the effects of structured knowledge seem to be mediated by more 
effortful mental processes, underscoring Evans‟ (Evans, 2006; 2007; 2008) repeated 
observation that analytical reasoning can be contextualized. 
Our claim that the use of unstructured knowledge such as feature similarity or strength of 
association is mediated by an effortless heuristic process is reflected by the tendency to rely 
more on unstructured, associative knowledge when under time pressure or when burdened 
with a memory task. This is consistent with findings from other causal reasoning paradigms. 
For example, Evans, Handley, Neilens & Over (2008) showed that people lower in cognitive 
ability seem to be more prone to interpreting a causal conditional statement such as „if 
primary school class sizes are reduced, then national literacy improves‟ to also imply its 
converse, i.e. that „if national literature improves, then class sizes were reduced‟. Apparently, 
they fail to take the directionality of the causal conditional into account, relying more on 
simple associations between events. This might suggest that inductive and deductive 
reasoning are mediated by similar mental processes, especially when people use quick 
heuristic estimates based on probabilistic information encountered in the environment (Chater 
& Oaksford, 2007; Oaksford & Chater, 2001, 2009; Oaksford & Hahn, 2007). What sets 
these two types of reasoning apart are the knowledge structures that more effortful analytical 
reasoning processes are based upon.  Thus, whereas inductive reasoning is more likely to be 
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informed by domain-specific information such as causal interactions, taxonomic relations and 
similar knowledge structures, accurate deductive reasoning is more likely to be based on 
abstract logical structures (Rotello & Heit, 2009).  
Conclusions 
We provide support for the claim that structured and unstructured knowledge, which are 
mediated by two contrasting mental processes (Rehder, 2009), can have dissociable effects on 
category-based inductive reasoning. Use of unstructured knowledge, such as nondirectional 
associative strength (Rogers & McClelland, 2004; Smith & DeCoster, 2000), seems to reflect 
a relatively effortless process, thus having a pervasive influence on people‟s inductive 
inferences. However, this can be supplemented by the use of more elaborate structured 
knowledge (Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Shafto, et al., 2008), mediated by a cognitively more 
demanding analytical process. Structured knowledge can encode intuitive theories about the 
structural relationships between categories and can give rise to qualitative reasoning 
phenomena, such as the causal asymmetry effect when reasoning about disease transmission. 
Use of this type of knowledge is constrained by time and cognitive resources but can 
maximize inductive potency of inferences beyond the use of unstructured knowledge, such as 
simple associative strength between categories.  
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4 Chapter IV  
 
 
Generative Category-Based Induction 
 
The experiments described in the previous chapter suggest that manipulations designed to 
compromise slow analytical processes, such as encouraging people to respond quickly or 
burdening their working memory, decrease people‟s ability to use structured sources of 
knowledge as a guide to their inductive inferences. When analytical processes are 
compromised, people seem to rely more on unstructured knowledge, such as degree of 
association (Dickinson, 2001; Rogers & McClelland, 2004; Shanks, 2007) between 
categories, as a cue to inductive strength. This acts as a useful heuristic when more effortful 
evaluations are not possible. In contrast, people may prefer to draw on structured sources of 
knowledge to guide their inductive generalizations when they have the time and mental 
resources to do so. For example, if people do not have time or the necessary mental 
resources, they may infer that it is highly likely that carrots have a disease if they learn that 
rabbits have it, given that they are strongly associated. In contrast, they may be less likely to 
infer that rabbits have certain cells given that camels have them, as these two categories are 
only weakly associated. However, upon careful reflection, people may realize that rabbits and 
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camels are taxonomically related. Consequently, when people draw on structured taxonomic 
knowledge rather than relying solely upon unstructured knowledge, they may be more 
confident that rabbits would also have the cells.  
However, Coley et al. (2005) have argued that some phenomena may simply be task-
specific artifacts, especially if people are unaware of the nature of the relation between 
categories. For example, studies such as Lopez et al. (1997) and Proffitt et al. (2000) suggest 
that whereas experts are able to draw on their extensive background knowledge to let 
thematic relations guide their inductive inferences, novices tend to use taxonomic similarity 
as a default reasoning strategy. Such findings are predominantly based on experimental 
paradigms in which people evaluate the strength of an inductive argument (Rabbits have 
property X, therefore, Foxes have property X), evaluate a series of conclusions (Rabbits have 
property X. How likely is that Foxes have property X? Eagles? Hares?), or are forced to 
choose between two alternative conclusion categories (Rabbits have property X. Is it more 
likely that Hares or Foxes have property X?). Yet when people make inferences in tasks that 
are less rigid than the aforementioned paradigms, even novices show extensive use of 
structured knowledge about causal and ecological relations. For example, Baker and Coley 
(Baker & Coley, 2005; Coley & Baker, 2004) gave their participants two related category 
pairs and asked them to make inference about which other categories might also have a novel 
property. Overall, people tended to make more ecological than taxonomic inferences, 
suggesting that the open-ended methodology allowed them to use relevant knowledge more 
flexibly. 
Vitkin, Coley and Hu (2005) used a similar paradigm with children, in which the young 
children were asked to generate categories that might share a disease or internal substance 
known to be present in two base categories.  They found that older rural children, who have 
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more experience with the natural world, were inclined to use the relation between the base 
categories as an inductive guide. Thus, they made more similarity-based inferences when the 
base pairs were taxonomically related (e.g. newt and box turtle) and more interaction-based 
inferences when the base category pairs were ecologically related (e.g. salmon and black 
bear). In contrast, urban children and younger rural children tended to be guided by similarity 
regardless of the nature of the relation between the two categories.  
Both of the studies described above focus on the flexible use of domain-specific 
knowledge (such as taxonomic versus ecological) rather than looking at the use of different 
types of knowledge that diverge in their processing properties. Yet using such an alternative 
open-ended induction paradigm would also be another way of exploring whether people who 
are cognitively compromised do indeed rely more strongly on unstructured knowledge, such 
as simple associations, rather than drawing on highly structured knowledge sources which 
involves effortful processing. We would have a stronger claim for the importance of 
considering the influence of unstructured types of knowledge alongside more structured 
sources of knowledge if we could show that the dissociable effects of structured and 
unstructured knowledge demonstrated in the previous experiments emerge for generative 
inferences as well as evaluative inferences of the kind used in Experiments 1 to 3.  In this 
context, evaluative inferences are those which ask people to evaluate the likelihood that two 
(or more) categories share a property, whereas for generative inferences people need to 
produce their own conclusion category upon learning that a base category has a certain 
property.  
4.1 Experiment 4  
In this experiment we used a generative inference paradigm where people were told that a 
base category had a novel infection or cells and were asked to infer which other category was 
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most likely to also have the infection or cells. We predicted that under cognitive load, people 
who were asked to generate a conclusion category would fall back onto unstructured 
knowledge, such as simple associations. Consequently, category pairs generated under 
conditions of memory load should be rated as more strongly associated than categories 
generated under uncompromised circumstances. For example, if people learn that rabbits 
have a novel disease, they might respond that hares are likely to also have the disease, based 
on the strong association between these two categories. In contrast, it might be that people 
who have time and available mental resources maximize the potency of their inductive 
inferences by drawing on several sources of structured knowledge. In the above example, 
people might reason that the disease found in rabbits is most likely to also be present in foxes, 
by virtue of their shared habitat, food chain relation, as well as belonging to the same 
biological group of mammals. Thus, whilst it could be said that “rabbits and foxes” are 
related in more ways than “rabbits and hares”, the mean association rating from our pre-test 
showed that the latter category pair was nonetheless rated as being more strongly associated 
(M = 8.28) than the  former category pair (M = 6.00).   
4.1.1 Method 
Design and Materials 
The experiment had two phases, the induction generation phase and an associative rating 
phase.  
Induction Generation Phase 
The first phase of the experiment had a 2 (load: heavy or light) by 2 (property: infection or 
cells) between-subjects design.  
Thirty six people (the “reasoners”) completed the generative inductive task. They were 
presented with 10 base categories and were told that each category had a novel property, 
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either a disease (e.g. has disease 5y5u) or cells (e.g. has 3-yu-cells). Participants were then 
asked to generate ONE other category that they believed was most likely to also have the 
property.  Half of the participants generated their inferences whilst carrying out a resource-
demanding secondary task. The remaining participants in the light load condition carried out 
a secondary task designed to place minimal burden on cognitive resources. Of the 18 
participants in each load condition, 9 reasoned about infections, whereas the other 9 reasoned 
about cells. For example, people would read the following generative induction problem:  
Weasels have 4Ou-cells / infection 4Ou. 
Which other category is most likely to also have 4Ou-cells/ infection 4OU? 
Once people had written down their response, they rated how likely they thought it was that 
the two categories shared the property on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 9 (highly likely).  
Preceding each of the induction trials was a secondary memory task. People were 
presented with a 4*4 dot matrix with 4 randomly placed black dots. Participants had to 
remember the location of the dots, complete the induction task and then recall the location of 
the dots in an empty matrix. The configuration of the dots was different for each of the 10 
trials.  
In the heavy load condition, the dots were completely randomly placed, with the 
restriction that they could never appear in a straight or diagonal line. In the light load control 
condition, the dots always appeared in a straight or diagonal line, placing minimal burden on 
working memory.  
Association Rating Phase 
Following this generative task, in the second phase of the study each individual‟s 10 category 
pairs were transcribed onto an association rating sheet and interspersed with 10 weakly 
associated distracter items. Category pairs from 2 participants in the loaded condition could 
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not be transcribed, as more than 4 generated categories were unreadable or hadn‟t been 
completed. Thus, we had 34 different rating sheets.  
A group of 136 participants (the “raters”) who had not taken part in the first phase 
received one of 34 different sheets (approximately 4 participants per sheet) and were asked to 
rate the strength of association on a scale from 1 (unrelated) to 9 (very highly associated) 
between 20 pairs of categories. These included the 10 idiosyncratic category pairs generated 
by participants in phase 1 and 10 identical weakly related distracter pairs. The format for the 
association ratings was identical to the one used in the pre-test reported in Chapter 2.  
We then compared the mean strength of association ratings assigned to the categories the 
“reasoners” had generated when reasoning about cells or infections under loaded or unloaded 
conditions.  It might be the case that reasoners under loaded conditions rely more heavily 
upon easily available unstructured knowledge.  Consequently we expected that the categories 
generated under a heavy memory load would be rated as more strongly associated than 
category-pairs generated under a minimal load. 
Structured Relation Ratings 
To look at the nature of the relationship between the base and the generated target category, 
the experimenter and a second blind coder rated whether there was a taxonomic and/or 
interaction-based relationship between the two categories for each the 10 category pairs 
generated by the “reasoners” in phase 1. We tried to keep this very simple as it can be 
difficult to judge what exact relation people were thinking about. Thus, categories were 
classed as taxonomically related if they belonged to the same biological group. Categories 
could be coded as causally related if they had a similar diet, lived in a similar habitat, or if 
they exhibited behavioural or food chain interactions. The detailed template can be found in 
Appendix A. Coders attached a score of 0 if there was no discernable relation between the 
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two categories (e.g. fox → hedgerow). They attached a score of 1 if they were exclusively 
interaction-based (e.g. fox → chicken) or taxonomically related (e.g. fox → dingo).  As the 
two relations were not mutually exclusive, coders attached a score of 2 if they were related in 
both ways (e.g. fox → rabbit). 
Participants 
The 36 “reasoners” who took part in phase 1 were recruited via the Durham Psychology 
participant pool and received course credit for their participation. There were 5 males and 31 
females with a mean age of 21.3 years (SD= 3.1 years).  
The 136 “raters” in phase 2 completed the association rating task at the beginning of one 
of their Psychology lectures at Durham University. There were three groups, one group of 58 
first-year Psychology students, a group of 54 second-year Psychology students and a group of 
24 Psychology Masters students. 
Procedure 
The inductive generation task was run individually on a laptop. Instructions stated that we 
were interested in people‟s beliefs about shared infections and cells whilst remembering dot 
patterns. They were asked to think of ONE other category which was most likely to share the 
disease or cells with a base category. They were given the following example not used in the 
main experiment: 
Squirrels have infection Rtt5/ t3e-cells. 
Which other category do you think might have infection Rtt5/ t3e-cells? 
The instructions emphasized that the category they generated could be anything, such as 
another animal, a plant and that there were no right or wrong answers.  
Participants were randomly assigned to either the heavy load or control condition and 
reasoned either about cells or infections. To familiarize them with the experimental sequence, 
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participants completed two practice trials which had an identical format as the main trials. On 
each trial, participants saw a matrix with 4 randomly placed dots. This was displayed for 2 
seconds. Following this, people read the premise which stated that a specific plant or animal 
category had a novel infection or cells. They were then asked to generate one other category 
that they thought would most likely share the property with the premise category. Once they 
had written down their response on a score sheet, participants were instructed to rate how 
confident they were that that this category also has the infection/cell by pressing any number 
between 1 (very unlikely to share the infection/cells) to 9 (highly likely) on the keyboard. 
This was followed by an empty dot matrix and people recalled the location of the dots by 
holding and pressing down the mouse cursor over the appropriate box. Following this, a 
newly configured dot matrix was presented, followed by the next premise sentence.  
In phase two of the study, groups of “raters” who had not taken part in the first phase 
randomly received one of 34 different association rating sheets. The format and instructions 
were identical to the pre-test association rating task reported in Chapter 2. To summarize, 
participants were informed that we were interested in their beliefs about the strength of 
association between category pairs. They were asked to think about all kinds of possible 
associations, such as causal, functional or similarity-based, and although these examples 
included structured relations, we emphasized that we wanted them to give the answer that 
came to mind first, as fast as possible. They were asked to rate the association between the 20 
pairs of categories (10 category pairs generated by one of the participants in phase 1, 
interspersed with 10 weakly associated distracter pairs) on scale from 1 (unrelated) to 9 (very 
strongly associated). 
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4.1.2 Results  
 Two “reasoners” who had taken part in phase 1 in the heavy load condition had to be 
eliminated, one because they gave „don‟t know‟ responses on  more than 25% of the trials in 
the generative task, and another because more than 25% of their generated categories could 
not be deciphered due to bad handwriting.  
Strength of Association Ratings  
First and foremost, we were interested whether people whose resources are restricted rely 
more heavily on unstructured knowledge, such as simple associations, when making 
inductive inferences. Association ratings made by the 136 “raters” were averaged across the 
10 idiosyncratic category pairs generated by the “reasoners” and were analysed with a 2 
(load: heavy or light) by 2 (property: cells or infection) between-subjects ANOVA.  
There was a main effect of property, F (1, 132) = 6.34, p = .013, effect size d = .44. Thus, on 
average, people rated category pairs which had been generated for shared cells as more 
highly associated (M = 6.69, SE = .14) than categories generated for shared infections (M = 
6.21, SE= .13). Likewise, there was a main effect of load, F (1, 132) = 8.08, p = .005, effect size 
d = .50, such that categories generated under conditions of heavy load (M = 6.72, SE =.14) 
were rated as more strongly associated than categories generated by people whose resources 
had been minimally taxed (M = 6.16, SE =.13). This supports our hypothesis that 
unstructured knowledge such as strong associations between categories, act as a useful 
heuristic for inductive reasoning when cognitive resources are sparse.  
Finally, there was no interaction between property and load condition F (1, 132) = .17, p = 
.68, effect size d = .06. 
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Generative Inductive Strength Ratings 
We examined “reasoners” actual inductive strength ratings for the categories they had 
generated.  The results from a 2 (load: heavy versus light) by 2 (property: cells or infections) 
between-subjects ANOVA showed that inductive strength ratings did not differ between the 
load conditions, F (1, 30) = 1.22, p = .28, effect size d = .4. People under heavy load gave a 
mean inductive strength rating of 5.79 (SE = .38) whereas people under minimal load rated 
the strength of their inductions at 5.22 (SE = .35). There was also no main effect of property, 
F (1, 30) = .53, p = .47, effect size d = .26. Inferences about cells (M = 5.70, SE = .37) were 
rated as strong as inferences about infections (M = 5.32, SE = .37). Finally, there was no 
interaction between property and load, F (1, 30) = .088, p = .77, effect size d = .11.  
Relation between Inductive Strength Ratings, Strength of Association and Structured 
Relations between Categories 
Table 4.1 below shows descriptive statistics for inductive strength, strength of association and 
the measure of structured knowledge across the two load conditions for the 34 “reasoners”. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Inductive Strength, Strength of Association and 
Structured Relations across the 34 “Reasoners” 
Measure  Mean SD Range 
Inductive 
Strength 
Heavy 5.79 1.07 3.60 
Light 5.22 1.61 5.90 
Strength of 
Association 
Heavy 6.67 .69 2.35 
Light 6.22 .86 2.97 
Structured 
Relation 
Heavy 1.05 .17 .60 
Light 1.17 .15 .50 
 
We wanted to explore whether there were systematic differences across the two load 
conditions with regards to the types of knowledge (i.e. structured versus unstructured 
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knowledge) that influence people‟s inductive strength ratings,.  For each of the 34 
“reasoners” who had generated a category and rated the inductive strength of this argument, 
we calculated an association strength measure and a structured relation measure for each of 
their 10 individual category pairs. For each “reasoner”, we then used these as predictor 
variables in a linear regression analysis to predict their inductive strength ratings.   
The associative strength measure represented the mean strength of association scores for 
a “reasoner‟s” 10 category pairs across the four “raters” from phase 2. For each of the 34 
“reasoners”, we calculated Cronbach‟s Alpha across the association ratings. The mean 
Cronbach‟s Alpha across all “reasoners” was .68 (SD = .18), which indicated that the 
association ratings had an acceptable inter-rater reliability.  
The structured relation measure represented an index of the possible underlying 
structural relations between the 10 base categories and the categories generated by a 
“reasoner”.  The experimenter and a second coder who was unaware of the conditions under 
which the participants had generated their targets evaluated in how many ways the generated 
target could be related to the base, assigning 0 if there was no discernable link, 1 if they were 
either exclusively taxonomically related or shared an interaction-based relation, and 2 if they 
were related in several ways. Concordance rate between the two coders was 82%. For the 
category pairs where there was disagreement, this was resolved through discussion with a 
third independent coder.  
For each of the 34 “reasoners”, we then ran individual linear regression analyses. We 
used the associative strength and structured relation measures to predict each “reasoner‟s” 
inductive strength ratings across the 10 category pairs. We then used the beta weights 
assigned to these two predictors in a 2 (load: heavy or light) by 2 (type of beta-weight: 
Chapter 4  Generative Category-Based Induction 
 
135 
 
associative or structured relation beta weight) mixed-design ANOVA, with type of beta-
weight as the repeated-measures variable.  
Although the associative strength beta-weight (M beta = .19, SE = .07) was of larger 
magnitude than the structured relation beta-weight (M beta = .02, SE = .07), this difference 
was not statistically significant, F (1, 32) = 3.07, p = .089, effect size d = .6. 
There was no significant main effect of load, F (1, 32) = .16, p = .69, effect size d = .14. 
Thus, under heavy load conditions the mean beta-weight was .12 (SE = .07), whereas in the 
light load condition, it was .09 (SE = .06). 
However, there was a significant interaction between beta-weight type and load, F (1, 32) = 
4.18, p = .049, effect size d = .72. Bonferroni posthoc tests showed that when people were 
under heavy memory load, the associative beta-weight (M beta = .3, SE = .09) was 
significantly larger than structured relation beta-weight (M beta = -.06, SE = .1, p = .014, 
effect size d = .7). In contrast, this difference was not significant when people were not under 
a heavy memory load, where the associative beta weight (M beta = .07, SE = .09) was of a 
similar magnitude as the structured relation beta-weight (M beta = .1, SE = .09), p = .83, 
effect size d = .05). This interaction is illustrated in Figure 4.1 below. 
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Secondary Task Manipulation Check 
To check the effectiveness of our secondary task manipulation, we compared the mean 
number of dots people correctly recalled across the two load conditions. This confirmed that 
the complex dot patterns were more difficult than the simple dot patterns. Reasoners were 
significantly worse at remembering the location of the complex dot patterns in the heavy load 
condition (M correct recall = 2.8, SD = .73) than the people who had to remember the correct 
location for the simple dot patterns used in the light load condition (M correct recall = 3.6, SD 
= .50), t (32) = 3.69, p = .001, effect size d = 1.3. 
Relations between Association Ratings, Index of Structured Relations and Web-Based 
Co-occurrence 
If structured and unstructured knowledge are indeed dissociable, then mean associative 
strength ratings should not be correlated with the index of structured relations for the 
category pairs. However, they should be correlated with a measure of conditional co-
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Figure 4.1: Mean Beta-Weights across the two Load Conditions in Experiment 4 
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occurrence. To check this, we calculated the correlation between the mean associative 
strength rating and the index of structured relations for each individual across the 10 category 
pairs they had generated. We then calculated the conditional World Wide Web co-occurrence 
as described in Chapter 2 for each of the individual “reasoner‟s” 10 category pairs, and 
correlated this with the mean associate strength score. For both correlations, we used 
Kendall‟s Tau-b rather than a parametric test of correlation, as each measure was on a 
different scale, and the index of structured knowledge could only take on 3 different values.  
These two correlation coefficients were then compared across the 34 reasoners with a 
paired samples t-test, t (32) = 3.29, p = .002. This showed that the mean correlation coefficient 
between association ratings and co-occurrence (M Kendall‟s τ =.19, SD = .26) was 
significantly larger than the mean correlation coefficient between association ratings and the 
index of structured knowledge (M Kendall‟s τ = -.02, SD = .28). This was further supported 
by a one-sample t-test, which showed that the mean correlation coefficient between 
association ratings and co-occurrence was significantly different from zero, t (33) = 3.87, p < 
.0005. In contrast, the mean correlation coefficient between association ratings and the index 
of structured knowledge was not significantly different from zero, t (33) = -.36, p = 72. 
4.1.3  Discussion 
The current study looked at whether the influence of different types of knowledge, 
unstructured and as well as structured sources of knowledge, is also evident in a paradigm 
where people were asked to generate rather than simply evaluate a  category-based inductive 
inference. We showed that as well as structured sources of knowledge, such as taxonomic 
group membership or causal relations, strength of association had a crucial influence on 
people‟s generative inferences. Categories produced under heavy load were rated as more 
strongly associated than categories generated under a light load. Furthermore, under heavy 
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load conditions, those association ratings were better predictors of inductive strength than an 
index of structured relations. In contrast, in the light load condition there was no difference in 
how well association ratings and the index of structured relations predicted inductive strength 
ratings. Thus, we have further evidence that inductive reasoning is influenced by different 
and dissociable types of knowledge. Unstructured knowledge, such as associative strength, is 
especially powerful when people can dedicate relatively little cognitive resources to 
recruiting more structured knowledge. Rather than being paradigm-specific, unstructured or 
associative knowledge appears to be a useful heuristic for guiding induction across a range of 
paradigms, especially when more analytical processes are compromised. 
 Interestingly, there were no differences in peoples‟ inductive confidence across the two 
load conditions.  The reason may be that people based their inductive evaluations on different 
types of knowledge in the two conditions. As suggested by the systematic differences in the 
associative strength and structured relation beta weights across the two load conditions, 
people in the heavy load condition seemed to base their ratings more on strength of 
association, whereas people in the unloaded condition appeared to rely equally on strength of 
association and structured information about possible diverse relations between the base and 
generated target categories. This suggests that inductive inferences can be informed by 
dissociable types of knowledge, which appear to be subject to diverging cognitive processing 
constraints. 
4.2 Experiment 5 
The goal of the second experiment was to replicate the finding that people seem to rely more 
heavily on unstructured knowledge when making generative inductions under cognitive load, 
but draw on structured sources of knowledge when they are not cognitively compromised. As 
drawing on different kinds of structured knowledge is especially crucial when people make 
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inductions about a variety of different properties, we manipulated property (cells or 
infections) about which people made generative inductive inferences in a within-subjects 
design. This might amplify the need to draw on different sources of structured knowledge, 
especially when people are not burdened with a heavy memory load.   
4.2.1 Method 
Participants 
The “reasoners” who took part in the first phase of the study were 23 Undergraduate and 
Graduate students from Durham University who received either course credit or £5 for their 
involvement. There were 4 males and 19 females with a mean age of 23.5 years (SD = 5.2 
years).  
The “raters” recruited for the second phase were 92 Durham Undergraduate Psychology 
students who completed the association rating sheets at the beginning of their group seminars 
or practical lectures. 
Materials and Design 
Inductive Generation Task 
The first phase of the experiment had a 2 (load: heavy or light) by 2 (property: infection or 
cells) mixed design, with load as the between-subjects manipulation. The materials had the 
same format as the previous experiment, with some minor changes so that property could be 
manipulated within participants. Thus, each “reasoner” was presented with 20 base categories 
and asked to generate ONE other category that they believed was most likely to also have the 
property.  For half of the base categories people reasoned about infections, whereas they 
reasoned about cells for the other half. 11 “reasoners” generated their inference under heavy 
cognitive load and 12 generated their inferences under minimal cognitive load.  
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As before, depending on the condition “reasoners” were randomly allocated to, each trial was 
preceded by either a complex or simple 4*4 dot matrix. Once people generated their 
responses, they rated how likely they thought it is that the two categories shared the property 
on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 9 (highly likely). Following this, participants recalled the 
location of the dots as best as they could.   
Association Ratings 
Following the generative task, in the second phase of the study each “reasoner‟s” 20 category 
pairs were transcribed onto an association rating sheet and interspersed with 15 weakly 
associated distracter items. Each of these sheets was randomly given to one of the 92 “raters” 
(approximately 4 “raters” per sheet), who rated the strength of association between the two 
category pairs on a scale from 1 (unrelated) to 9 (very highly associated). People were 
instructed to include all kinds of associations, such as causal, functional or similarity-based 
and were asked to give the first response that came to mind, as fast as possible. Based on 
Experiment 4, we predicted that categories generated by “reasoners” under the condition of 
memory load would be rated as more strongly associated than category pairs generated under 
minimal cognitive load. 
Structured Relation Ratings 
As in the previous experiment, in order to determine the underlying structural relations 
between the base categories and the categories generated by “reasoners” in phase 1, the 
experimenter and a second blind coder rated whether there was a taxonomic and/or 
interaction-based relationship between the 20 category pairs. The criteria for judging a 
response as taxonomic and/or causal were the same as in the previous experiment. To 
recapitulate, participants were awarded 0 if there was no discernable link between the base 
and the generated category (e.g. alligator → soil), 1 if they were taxonomically related (e.g. 
zebra → horse), 1 if they were related through a causal link or ecological interaction (e.g. 
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hawk → mouse) and 2 points if there was both a taxonomic and interaction-based relation 
between the categories (e.g. cod → shark). 
Procedure 
The inductive generation task was run individually on a laptop. “Reasoners” were given 
verbal and written instructions which included an example not used in the main task. They 
were randomly assigned to either the heavy or light load condition. As before, 2 practise trials 
familiarized participants with the experimental sequence. 
On each trial, participants saw a matrix with 4 randomly placed dots for 2000 
milliseconds. This was followed by the premise stating that a specific plant or animal 
category had a novel infection or cells. Participants generated one other category that they 
believed would most likely share the property with the premise category and rated  how 
strong they thought this inference was on a scale from 1 (very unlikely to share the 
infection/cells) to 9 (highly likely) by pressing any number between 1 and 9 on the keyboard. 
This was followed by an empty dot matrix. People had to recall the location of the dots in the 
empty dot matrix by pressing down the mouse cursor over the appropriate box. Following 
this, a newly configured dot matrix was presented, followed by the next premise sentence.  
In the second part of the study, a group of 92 “raters” who had not taken part in the first 
phase received one of 23 different sheets (4 “raters” per sheet) and were asked to rate the 
strength of association between the 35 pairs of categories (20 idiosyncratic pairs generated by 
“reasoners” in phase 1 and 15 weakly related distracter pairs). They were instructed to 
consider all kinds of associations but to give the answer that came to mind first.  
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4.2.2 Results 
Association Ratings 
As in the first generative induction experiment, we averaged association ratings made by 
“raters” in phase 2 across all 20 category pairs generated by “reasoners” in phase 1. One 
“rater” in phase 2 failed to complete more than 50% of the association ratings and was 
excluded from the analysis. 
The mean association scores were then analyzed with a 2 (load: heavy or light) by 2 
(property: cells or infection) mixed-design ANOVA, with load as the between-subjects 
variable.  
There was no main effect of property, F (1, 89) = 1.08, p = .30, effect size d = .22. People 
gave a mean association rating of 6.23 (SE = .12) for category pairs which had been 
generated about shared cells, and a mean association rating of 6.15 (SE = .13) for category 
pairs generated about infections.  
As predicted though, there was a main effect of load, F (1, 89) = 4.03, p = .048, effect size d 
= .42, such that categories generated under conditions of heavy load (M = 6.42, SE =.16) 
were rated as more strongly associated than categories generated by “reasoners” whose 
resources were minimally taxed (M = 5.96, SE = .16).  
Finally, there was no interaction between property and load condition F (1, 89) = .55, p = 
.46, effect size d = .16. 
Generative Inductive Strength Ratings 
We examined “reasoners‟” actual inductive strength ratings for the categories they had 
generated.  The results from a 2 (load) by 2 (property) mixed-design ANOVA with load as a 
between-subjects variable paralleled those from Experiment 4. Inductive strength ratings did 
not differ between the load conditions, F (1, 21) < .001, p = .99, effect size d < .01. “Reasoners” 
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under heavy load gave a mean inductive strength rating of 5.55 (SE = .40) whereas those 
under minimal load rated the strength of their induction at 5.56 (SE = .42).  
There was also no main effect of property, F (1, 21) = 2.1, p = .16, effect size d = .63. 
Inferences about cells (M =5.68, SE = .32) were rated as strong as inferences about infections 
(M =5.42, SE = .29).  
The interaction between load and property was not statistically significant, F (1, 21) = 2.68, 
p = .12, effect size d = .71. Thus, these results mirror those from the previous experiment. 
Relations between Inductive Strength Ratings, Structured Relations and Associative 
Strength 
Means, standard deviations and ranges for inductive strength, structured relations and 
associative strength across the 23 “reasoners” are shown in table 4.2 below. As in Experiment 
4, in order to explore whether “reasoners‟” inductive strength ratings might be influenced by 
different types of knowledge in the two load conditions we used an associative strength 
measure and an index of structured relations to predict their inductive strength ratings.  
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Inductive Strength, Strength of Association and 
Structured Relations across the 23 “Reasoners” 
Measure Load Mean SD Range 
Inductive 
Strength 
Heavy 5.56 1.31 4.45 
Light 5.55 1.43 4.90 
Strength of 
Association 
Heavy 6.42 0.84 2.85 
Light 5.92 0.80 2.39 
Structured 
Relation 
Heavy 0.92 0.17 0.65 
Light 1.03 0.14 0.50 
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To create associative strength measure we averaged the mean strength of association scores 
attached to each “reasoner‟s” 20 category pairs across the four “raters” from phase 2. We 
then calculated Cronbach‟s Alpha for each of the 23 “reasoners” across the association 
ratings. The mean Cronbach‟s Alpha across all “reasoners” was .71 (SD = .13), showing that 
the association ratings had good inter-rater reliability. 
To create the structured relation measure, the experimenter and a second blind coder 
then assessed in how many ways the generated target could be related to the base. 0 was 
attached if there was no obvious structured link, 1 if there was either a taxonomic or 
interaction-based connection, and 2 if they were related in more than one way. Disagreement 
was resolved through discussion with a third independent coder. Concordance rate was 
somewhat lower than in the first experiment at 67%, probably due to the additional number of 
fairly unusual base categories (e.g. Eucalyptus).  Disagreements between the two primary 
coders were resolved through discussion with two further colleagues.  
For each “reasoner” who had taken part in phase 1, we used the associative strength and 
structured relation measures to predict his/her inductive strength ratings. The beta weights 
were then subjected to a 2 (load: heavy or light) by 2 (type of beta weight: associative versus 
structured relation beta weight) mixed-design ANOVA, with type of beta weight as the 
repeated-measures variable.  
There was no significant main effect of type of beta weight, F (1, 21) = .068, p = .80, effect 
size d = .11.  The associative beta weight (M beta = .16, SE = .05) was similar to the 
structured relation beta weight (M beta = .15, SE = .03).  
Although the average beta weight in the light load condition was larger (M beta= .20, SE 
= .04) than in the heavy load condition (M beta= .11, SE = .04), this main effect did not reach 
statistical significance, F (1, 21) = 3.22, p = .09, effect size d = .78. However, there was a 
Chapter 4  Generative Category-Based Induction 
 
145 
 
significant interaction between beta weight type and load, F (1, 21) = 6.53, p = .018, effect size 
d = 1.1. This is illustrated below in Figure 4.2  
 
 
 
 
Bonferroni posthoc tests showed that when “reasoners” were under heavy memory load, the 
associative strength beta weight (M beta= .20, SE = .07) was larger than the structured 
relation beta weight (M beta = .02, SE = .02), although this difference was not quite 
statistically significant due to the small number of participants in this condition (p = .065, 
effect size d = 1.2). The pattern was reversed when “reasoners” were not under a heavy 
memory load. Thus, the structured relation beta weight (M beta = .28, SE = .05) was slightly 
but not significantly larger in magnitude than associative strength beta weight (M beta = .11, 
SE = .07, p=.11, effect size d = .62). 
-0.1
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Figure 4.2: Beta Weights across the two Load Conditions in Experiment 5 
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Across the two load conditions, the associative strength beta weight was slightly but not 
significantly larger for “reasoners” who generated their inferences under load compared to 
those who were not cognitively compromised (p = .44, effect size d = .32). In contrast, the 
mean structured relation beta weights were significantly larger for “reasoners” who 
generated their inferences under minimal cognitive load compared to “reasoners” who were 
cognitively burdened by the complex dot matrix task (p = .001, effect size d = 1.6). 
This suggests that “reasoners” seemed to rely on different types of knowledge depending 
upon the availability of mental resources. It seems that both structured and unstructured types 
of knowledge were influencing inductive strength ratings when “reasoners” were only under 
minimal cognitive load. In contrast, it appears that “reasoners‟” inductions in the heavy load 
condition were predominantly influenced by unstructured knowledge. 
Relations between Association Ratings, Index of Structured Relations and Web-Based 
Co-occurrence 
As in the previous experiment, it is important to confirm that association ratings and the 
index of structured relations are measuring different types of knowledge. If this is the case, 
then there should be a stronger correlation between mean associative strength ratings and 
conditional web-based co-occurrence (two measures of unstructured knowledge) than 
between associative strength and the measure of structured relations between category-pairs.  
We calculated the Kendall‟s Tau-b correlation coefficient between the mean associative 
strength rating and the index of structured relations for each of the 23 individuals across the 
20 category pairs they had generated. For each of the 23 individual “reasoner‟s” 20 category 
pairs, we then calculated the conditional World Wide Web co-occurrence as described in 
Chapter 2. Again, for each individual we obtained a Kendall‟s Tau-b correlation coefficient 
between web-based co-occurrence and the mean association ratings attached to each of the 20 
category pairs.   
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We then compared these two correlation coefficients across the 23 reasoners using a 
paired-samples t-test, t (21) = 5.97, p < .0005. The mean correlation coefficient between 
association ratings and co-occurrence (M Kendall‟s τ =.41, SD = .12) was significantly larger 
than the mean correlation coefficient between association ratings and the index of structured 
knowledge (M Kendall‟s τ = .14, SD = .20). These correlations were somewhat larger than in 
the previous experiment.  The one-sample t-test showed that both the mean correlation 
coefficient between association ratings and co-occurrence, t (22) = 16.62, p < .0005, and the 
mean correlation coefficient between association ratings and the index of structured 
knowledge, t (22) = 3.37, p = .002 were significantly different from zero. However, given that 
a correlation of .14 is very small and the correlation coefficient between the two indices of 
unstructured knowledge was three times larger, this does support our contention that 
association ratings and the index of structured relations are measuring dissociable types of 
knowledge. 
Secondary Task Manipulation Check 
In order to verify our manipulation of compromising “reasoners‟” available mental resources 
with a secondary memory task, we compared the mean number of dots people correctly 
recalled across the two load conditions. As expected, remembering the complex dot patterns 
was more difficult than memorizing the simple dot patterns. People made significantly more 
errors recalling the location of the 4 dots in the heavy load condition (M correct recall = 2.7, 
SD = .65) compared to the light load condition (M correct recall = 3.4, SD = .45), t (18) = 2.9, p 
= .009, effect size d = 1.3. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
The current findings largely replicated those from the previous Experiment 4. In phase 1, 
“reasoners” generated their own inference categories either under a heavy or light cognitive 
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load and rated their confidence in their inference. In a second phase, another group of “raters” 
rated the strength of association between the category pairs generated in phase 1. Crucially, 
“raters” in phase 2 rated the base and conclusion categories as more strongly associated when 
the inferences had been generated by “reasoners” who were under a heavy cognitive burden 
than when the inferences had been made by “reasoners” under minimal cognitive load. 
Furthermore, on average, strength of association between the category pairs was slightly 
more predictive of “reasoners‟” evaluations of the strength of their inferences in the heavy 
load condition compared to the light load condition. In contrast, a measure of structured 
relations between the category pairs was predictive of “reasoners‟” inference strength in the 
minimal load condition but did not predict evaluations of inductive inference strength in the 
heavy load condition.  
One interesting difference was the fact that the average structured relation beta weight 
was much larger than the associative strength beta weight in the light load condition, whereas 
in the previous experiment, there was no difference between the two types of beta weights in 
the light load condition. Unlike Experiment 4, in this experiment the property “reasoners” 
generated their inferences about was manipulated within- rather than between-subjects. It is 
feasible that having to make inferences about two different properties might have highlighted 
the need to draw on different domains of structured knowledge.  
The current findings also raise some interesting questions about the role of inhibitory 
control in inductive reasoning. Thus, whilst a strong association between categories is often a 
good guide for inductive reasoning, there seem to be occasions where inductions can be more 
potent when a strong association is inhibited. For example, consider the case in which 
oranges are known to have a novel infection, certain kinds of cells or another specific 
property. The primary associate of orange is apple (Moss & Older, 1996). Although both 
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categories belong to the superordinate category of fruits, apples are pomaceous fruits whereas 
oranges are citrus fruits, which differ in important characteristics such as ideal growing 
conditions and botanical anatomy. Thus, an inductively more potent inference might be from 
oranges to lemons, grapefruits, limes or kumquats. However, to make such an inference, 
people have to inhibit the strong association they have between apples and oranges and 
recruit structured knowledge about oranges, such as facts about their physical, anatomical 
and botanical attributes, how and where they are grown, typical culinary uses or any other 
knowledge that might be relevant for generalizing a certain property (Barsalou, 1982; Lin & 
Murphy, 2001; Ross & Murphy, 1999). However, inhibiting unstructured associative 
knowledge is likely to involve effortful executive processing. 
Additionally, recruiting structured knowledge presumably requires considerable time, 
effort and available mental resources (Fenker, et al., 2005; Satpute, et al., 2005). Hence, these 
two sources of difficulty, inhibiting unstructured knowledge on the one hand and recruiting 
structured knowledge on the other, might explain why people who are cognitively 
compromised rely more heavily on the useful heuristic of generalizing to strongly associated 
categories. 
4.3 General Discussion 
The goal of the two studies was to try and replicate the finding that category-based induction 
is shaped by two contrasting types of knowledge, structured and unstructured,  with a less 
artificial paradigm. In the spirit of the philosophical principle of diversity (Bacon, 1620/1898; 
Hempel, 1966; Myrvold, 1996; Nagel, 1939; Steel, 1996, Heit, Hahn & Feeney, 2005)
6
, using 
a variety of methods should deliver more convincing evidence for our hypothesis that 
                                                          
6
 For a critical evaluation, see Wayne (1995) 
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inductive reasoning is shaped by unstructured as well as structured knowledge, each of which 
has different processing characteristics. 
As suggested by Coley et al. (2005), some inductive inference phenomena may simply be 
artifacts arising from the use of specific paradigms, rather than reflecting the fundamental 
principles governing category-based inductive reasoning.  The evaluation task has been a 
popular method for assessing features of category-based induction since its introduction by 
Rips (1975). In this task, people evaluate arguments pre-selected by the experimenter. Some 
of these inferences may appear unnatural to participants if they lack the relevant knowledge. 
In normal everyday circumstances we are unlikely to ever juxtapose two unrelated categories 
and then evaluate the „unlikelihood‟ that they share common features.  Thus, if people fail to 
show a particular phenomenon, such as the use of causal knowledge, it may simply reflect the 
fact that they had no specific factual knowledge about the relationship between two 
categories. Our post-test from the previous experiments for example showed that there were 
vast differences in people‟s knowledge about food chain relations. Whereas only a minority 
knew that cats hunt squirrels, or that eagles prey on meerkats, almost everyone knew that 
snails feed on cabbage or that frogs eat flies. Thus, using evaluative paradigms can make it 
problematic to disentangle lack of knowledge from the effects of more domain-general 
manipulations on the use of knowledge, such as putting people under time pressure (e.g. 
Shafto et al. 2007).  
The risk of masking or distorting the use of domain-general reasoning strategies because 
of lack of domain-specific knowledge is akin to a problem that arises in developmental 
research on the diversity effect. Early studies (Gutheil & Gelman, 1997; Lopez, et al., 1992) 
suggested that children under the age of 9 years did not use diversity as a guide to their 
inductive inferences, leading them to conclude that adult and child inductive reasoning is 
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mediated by fundamentally different processes. However, Heit and Hahn (2001) 
demonstrated that the results were largely an artifact of the experimental design and stimulus 
materials. Thus, when they used familiar categories (e.g. dolls or balls), transparent (e.g. 
belongs to) rather than hidden properties (e.g. has leukocytes inside) and did not force the 
children to switch strategies between adjacent trials, they showed that even 5-year-old 
children used diversity as a category-based inductive reasoning strategy. If the reasoner lacks 
relevant knowledge, there will be an inevitable discrepancy between performance and 
competence. Such discrepancies suggest that the differences observed between adults‟ and 
children‟s reasoning patterns do not lie in the nature of the processes per se, but are 
determined by crucial differences in content-specific knowledge.  
The situation could be similar in evaluative induction paradigms, whereby the failure to 
observe a specific reasoning phenomenon might be attributed to domain-general factors, 
when it is in fact driven by a lack of domain-specific knowledge. The use of the generative 
induction paradigm enables people to recruit whatever relevant knowledge they have, 
enabling us to be more certain that differences which emerge under divergent levels of 
cognitive pressure are attributable to processing differences rather than divergences in 
content-specific knowledge. 
As knowledge is central to inductive reasoning (Coley, et al., 2005; Heit, 2000), it is 
crucial to allow people to draw on whatever knowledge structures they deem relevant. Coley, 
Hayes, Lawson and Moloney (2004) suggest that people‟s inductive inferences are often 
driven by relatively abstract conceptual structures about interrelationships between 
organisms. Although these knowledge structures may not be factually accurate or have much 
explanatory depth (Keil, 2003; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002), they can nonetheless generate 
expectations about features of specific category members that go beyond what is known 
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about specific individual instances, forming a foundation for category-based inductive 
generalizations. Thus, classifying zebra as mammals is likely to generate expectations about 
properties this category instance may have. Asked to generalize a property from zebra to 
another instance, people might reasonably assume that horses are most likely to share a 
feature by virtue of their close taxonomic link. Incidentally, these two instances are also fairly 
closely associated. Thus, regardless of whether or not people explicitly think of the structured 
relationship between the two instances, they may fall back on this unstructured associative 
knowledge when they are under time pressure or cognitive burden, offering a sound basis for 
making a confident generalization.  However, if people have the time and mental resources to 
do so, they may carry out a more fine-grained analysis of the interrelationships between 
members of a specific category, drawing on other relevant relations between categories 
(Medin, et al., 2003).   For example, because zebras are African mammals, they may prefer to 
make inferences to hyenas or lions. In this case, not only are the categories related by virtue 
of a taxonomic link, they also share an ecological (same habitat) and causal connection (part 
of the same food chain). Thus, in this case, structured knowledge is the foundation for a 
sound inductive inference.   
Conclusions 
Using a naturalistic paradigm, we obtained further evidence that people‟s inductive 
inferences can be influenced by two dissociable types of knowledge. Unstructured knowledge 
seems to encode statistical regularities within the environment, such as temporal or spatial co-
occurrence, and can be psychologically captured by strength of association. People appear to 
rely more heavily on this type of knowledge when they do not have the available mental 
resources, suggesting that unstructured knowledge influences reasoning in a heuristic, 
effortless manner. In contrast, structured knowledge, which captures the underlying abstract 
interrelationships between categories within a particular domain, appears to be of more 
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importance to the inductive reasoning process when cognitive processing capacity is not 
compromised. Thus, the involvement of this type of knowledge seems to require a more 
analytical, effortful mode of reasoning. However, a weakness is that the current experiments 
cannot precisely identify which processes involved in the recruitment and use of structured 
knowledge are effortful. This weakness will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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5 Chapter V    
 
 
When Two Types of Knowledge conflict: 
Association versus Structured Knowledge 
The previous experiments suggest that two separable types of knowledge drive category-
based inductive reasoning. On the one hand, the degree to which people believe the 
conclusion of an inductive argument can be influenced by a fairly automatic and effortless 
process that is based largely on associative strength without any necessary reference to the 
precise nature of the relationship between the categories. This might be especially true when 
time and cognitive resources are sparse. Such unstructured associative knowledge is likely to 
reflect the frequency of repeated co-occurrence between two categories, perhaps resulting in 
a proportionately weighted connective link in long-term memory. As reviewed in the 
introduction in Chapter 1, theories which emphasize such unstructured knowledge include 
Rogers and McClelland‟s (2004) connectionist model of category-based semantic induction, 
Sloman‟s (1993b) associative feature-overlap model and Sloutsky and Fisher‟s (2004) SINC 
(Similarity, Induction and Categorization)  model.   
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On the other hand, people are also able to draw on more structured sources of knowledge, 
taking into account the relationship between the categories. Such structured knowledge can 
be based on the relation that is deemed most relevant in a specific context, such as taxonomic 
knowledge when people are reasoning about anatomical or genetic properties (Tenenbaum et 
al., 2006; 2007), similarity relations between sub- and superordinate categories (Sloman, 
1998) or causal relations between categories when reasoning about disease transmission 
(Medin et al., 2003; Shafto et al., 2008).  Drawing on such structured knowledge during the 
inference process seems to be a slower, cognitively more demanding task. To derive 
maximum inductive accuracy the person must not only appraise the nature of the relationship 
between the categories, but must also evaluate whether this relationship provides a 
mechanism by which a specific property might be common to both categories.  
This apparent dissociation between the two types of knowledge leads to some interesting 
questions regarding the interaction between effortless processes based on unstructured 
knowledge and the more effortful use of structured knowledge when reasoning selectively 
about different properties. Of particular interest here is what happens when use of different 
types of knowledge leads to opposing inferences. For example, sometimes two categories 
might be very highly associated, but depending on the property, the actual nature of the 
relation between them might not warrant a strong inference. To illustrate, owing to the strong 
association between carrots and rabbits, people might infer that these two categories are 
likely to share cells. However, if they apply structured knowledge, they may realize that the 
causal relation between carrots and rabbits does not warrant a strong inference about shared 
cells. Similarly, people may initially be unwilling to make a strong inference from carrots to 
bamboo, as these two categories are not strongly associated. Yet if people base their inference 
on the structural taxonomic relation, they should be more confident that the two plants, 
carrots and bamboo, might share a property such as cells. In the former case, people would 
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have to inhibit the automatic activation of a strong association in order to make an accurate 
inference. In the latter example, an accurate inference might depend more on the effortful 
retrieval of the relational link and hence mechanisms by which the two are related and might 
share cells. 
Putting different types of knowledge into conflict with one another bears some 
resemblance to research strategies employed by dual process theorists in order to disentangle 
the nature of the processes underlying human reasoning (De Neys, 2009; Sloman, 1996). It 
can also help illuminate how contrasting processes might interact with one another (Sloman, 
1996; De Neys, in press). To explore the processes underlying the use of structured and 
unstructured knowledge, we used a triad task in which people learnt that a base category had 
a novel property and had to choose which of two target categories was more likely to share 
the novel property with the base. People could either make an inference based on 
unstructured knowledge, represented by a strong association between the base and one of the 
targets (e.g. carrot has cells X → rabbit?), or based on structured knowledge about an 
appropriate taxonomic link between the base and the alternative target (e.g. carrot has cells X 
→ bamboo?). By manipulating the nature of the property, we ensured that the inference based 
on structured knowledge ought to be more accurate than an inference based on unstructured 
knowledge. Thus, when reasoning about cells, only an inference based on structured 
taxonomic knowledge (between carrots and bamboo) is appropriate. In the above example, it 
might be the case that the use of unstructured knowledge is mediated by an effortless, 
heuristic process. In contrast, inhibiting such unstructured knowledge, or retrieving structured 
knowledge, might be a more time-consuming and effortful process. When structured and 
unstructured knowledge compete, people may need more available mental resources in order 
to select appropriate structured knowledge. Selecting appropriate structured knowledge ought 
not to require additional resources or inhibitory control if such competition is absent.  
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To substantiate our suggestion that there may be a link between degree of inhibitory 
control and accurate selective reasoning, we also included a correlational aspect in the current 
study. If accurate selective induction is related to inhibitory control, we might expect people 
lower in inhibitory control to be less accurate in their selective inductions than people with a 
high level of inhibitory control. Thus, people high in inhibitory control should display more 
accurate inductive selectivity and make more inferences based on structured knowledge.  In 
contrast, people lower in inhibitory control might be more inaccurate and swayed by strong 
but irrelevant associations between categories as a basis for making their inferences. If they 
cannot inhibit a prepotent response based on unstructured knowledge, such as associative 
strength, they may fail to thoroughly assess how context and the actual structural relation 
between the two categories impacts upon inductive strength.  
There are several caveats to bear in mind when considering correlational studies which 
have implicated inhibitory control in the ability to resist belief-based answers (Handley, 
Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis, & Evans, 2004; Markovits & Doyon, 2005), or in our 
case, in the hypothesized need to inhibit different types of knowledge. One problem with the 
construct of inhibitory control is that there seems little consensus about whether it is a 
unidimensional construct, or whether there are different kinds of inhibitory control (Nigg, 
2000). For example, Logan (1994) defines inhibitory control as an executive function that is 
necessary in order to dynamically pursue goals in an ever-changing environment, in which 
new information may change one‟s course of action. Thus, when new information becomes 
available it may at times be necessary to inhibit a prepared or overlearnt response. Logan‟s 
(1994) definition suggests that people‟s level of inhibitory control can be indexed by their 
ability to stop a pre-programmed response. One typical task used for this is the Stop Signal 
task in which people have to respond as fast as possible by pressing either X or O, depending 
upon which symbol appears on the computer screen. After a series of such response trials, 
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people are instructed to withhold their response when they hear a tone. As this only occurs on 
a quarter of all trials (25%), the dominant pre-programmed X and O response has to be 
inhibited.  
Others such as Hasher, Zacks and May (1999) view inhibitory control as consisting of a) 
the ability to prevent irrelevant knowledge from entering working memory, b) the ability to 
remove outdated information from working memory, and c) the ability to refrain from 
responding to an incorrect prepotent response. These can be summarized as different aspects 
of dealing with interference from irrelevant stimuli.  This parallels several authors‟ notion of 
intentional inhibition (Collette, Germain, Hogge, & Van der Linden, 2009; Harnishfeger, 
1995). Whereas unintentional inhibition occurs automatically and relatively early on during 
processing and is thus unlikely to reach conscious awareness, intentional inhibition is a 
consciously controlled process used to manage interference from irrelevant information. 
If inhibition is primarily defined as the ability to block out interference from irrelevant 
stimuli, then in order to measure an individual‟s level of inhibitory control, it is necessary to 
create a conflict between a to-be-inhibited prepotent response in favour of an alternative 
answer. One of the most widely used tasks is the Stroop task (Macleod, 1991). Participants 
see colour words in which the physical colour of the word is incongruent with the linguistic 
colour. Participants are asked to name the physical colour of the word whilst ignoring the 
semantically implied colour. For example, they may see the word green printed in blue ink, to 
which they have to respond with „blue‟. In contrast to trials in which the word is linguistically 
neutral (e.g. xxxx), people are slower when there is conflict between the physical and 
linguistic colour. As the linguistically implied colour is processed automatically, people have 
to inhibit this prepotent response in order to name the physical colour of the stimulus, which 
is a slower, more effortful process.  
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Another frequently used task is the Hayling test (Burgess & Shallice, 1996). People have 
to complete sentences in which the last word has been omitted. The sentences are designed so 
that they strongly prime the automatic retrieval of a particular word (e.g. The captain wanted 
to stay with the sinking _______.  → Ship). On the test trials, people are permitted to 
complete the sentence with the primed word. However, on the inhibitory trials, people are 
instructed to withhold the primed answer and complete the sentence with an unrelated word 
(e.g. The captain wanted to stay with the sinking _______.  → Thunder). The difference in 
reaction time between the test and inhibitory trials is taken as an index of inhibitory 
efficiency, with smaller differences indicating a more proficient inhibitory process. People 
with frontal lobe lesions perform poorly on the inhibitory trials (Burgess & Shallice, 1996) 
and there is increased left prefrontal activation in healthy subjects during the inhibitory trials 
(Collette, et al., 2001), lending credence to the use of this task as an instrument for measuring 
the construct of inhibitory control. As this task is primarily about semantic inhibitory control, 
we used a variant of this measure to explore whether there was a relationship between use of 
structured knowledge and level of inhibitory control. 
5.1 Overview Experiment 6 
To summarize, we used a triad task in which we created a conflict between responses based 
on unstructured and structured knowledge. People had to make an inductive choice between 
two target categories, one which was strongly associated, and a competing target which was 
weakly associated but structurally related to the base category. Compared to our control 
triads, where people had to choose between a weakly associated but structurally related target 
category and an unrelated category, we expected people to make more reasoning errors when 
there was competition between inferences based on a structured relation or a strong 
association between the base and target categories.  The primary goal was to demonstrate that 
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the ability to inhibit inappropriate unstructured knowledge in favour of more appropriate 
structured knowledge is an effortful process that draws on working memory resources. Thus, 
we compared the effects of a resource-demanding secondary task on people‟s ability to 
inhibit irrelevant unstructured knowledge and choose the more appropriate target category 
based on structured knowledge. 
Furthermore, we expected that people higher in inhibitory control might be more likely to 
reason based on structured rather than unstructured knowledge. That is, we expected them to 
be more successful at inhibiting the strongly associated choice in favour of the weakly 
associated but structurally related choice, resulting in a significant positive correlation 
between level of inhibitory control and successful selective reasoning.  
5.1.1 Method 
Participants 
34 participants from Durham either earned course credit or were paid £6 for their 
participation in the experiment. The mean age was 20.9 years (SD = 2.5 years). 
Triad Task with Memory Load 
For the triad task, people were given a base category which they were told had novel cells, 
and two target categories. We chose 14 conflict triads in which the base had a causal 
relationship with the strongly associated target and a taxonomic relation with the other 
weakly associated target. Whereas the causal relationship provides a route for the 
transmission of infection or disease, when reasoning about cells, structured taxonomic 
knowledge is likely to be more relevant and previous studies (Shafto et al., 2007) have shown 
that people are more likely to draw on knowledge about taxonomic relations when reasoning 
about cells than when reasoning about infections or diseases. For 8 conflict triads the causal 
relation between the base and target was predictive (i.e. from prey to predator), whereas for 
the remaining 6 conflict triads, this relation was diagnostic (i.e. from predator to prey). The 
Chapter 5  Conflicting Types of Knowledge 
 
161 
 
causal target was always from a different superordinate category than the base, whereas the 
taxonomically related target was always from the same superordinate category. Based on our 
pre-test described in Chapter 2, in which we had asked people to rate the strength of 
association between two categories on a scale from 1 (unrelated) to 9 (very highly 
associated), we selected conflict triads in which the strength of association between the target 
and causal choice was always significantly higher (all paired-samples t-tests had p‟s < .05) 
than the association between the base and the taxonomic target. Thus, we expected that if 
people did choose the causal target, this would be attributable to the strong association, and 
hence unstructured knowledge, rather than due to the underlying causal relation. This is 
because the causal relation ought to be irrelevant when reasoning about cells. We also added 
some new items which were pre-tested by asking 15 individuals to rate the strength of 
association for 41 new category pairs, using the procedure described in Chapter 2. A list of all 
triads and the strength of association between each base and its different target categories can 
be found in Appendix 4A. 
Participants were told that the base category has novel cells and were asked to make an 
inductive choice between two conflicting targets. For example, a cell conflict triad would be 
Butterflies have dF4-cells → Flowers or Locusts? For these conflict triads the accurate 
inductive choice should be based on structured knowledge about the taxonomic relation 
between the base and the target, in which case people should choose Locusts in the above 
example. In contrast, the erroneous choice would be based on unstructured knowledge 
represented by a strong association between the base and the alternative target, in which case 
people might choose Flowers.  
Control triads consisted of the base, the weakly associated taxonomic target and a 
completely unrelated alternative target (different superordinate category, no causal or 
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ecological relation). For the above example, the corresponding cell control triad would be 
Butterflies have 5tR-cells → Seaweed or Locusts? 
In order to ensure that people were paying attention to the nature of the property, and to 
stop them developing the default strategy of always selecting the taxonomic choice, we 
included 28 filler triads in which people were asked to reason about diseases (e.g. has disease 
wQ2). Depending upon the mechanism people were basing their reasoning on, either the 
weakly associated taxonomic or strongly associated causal target could be an appropriate 
inductive choice. Consequently, unlike when reasoning about cells, there would not 
necessarily be a strong need to inhibit the strongly associated choice. As we were primarily 
interested in pitching structured knowledge against unstructured associative knowledge, we 
did not include these in our analysis. Thus, each participant reasoned about 14 conflict cell 
triads (8 in which the strongly associated causal choice was predictively related to the base 
and 6 in which the strongly associated causal target was diagnostically related to the base), 14 
control cell triads and 28 disease filler triads (i.e. 56 triads in total).  
The 14 triads consisted of real picture photographs of the category. Below the base 
pictures, participants read the statement: 
 [Category name] have C4x-cells/ disease sA3 
Which category is more likely to also have these cells/this disease? 
This was followed by two arrows, one pointing to the left target picture and one pointing to 
the right target picture. The category label was printed below the target images. For an 
example of a conflict triad in which people were requested to reason about cells, see Figure 
5.1. Figure 5.2 illustrates the corresponding cell control triad. 
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Figure 5.1: Example Cell Conflict Triad 
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Figure 5.2: Example Cell Control Triad 
 
The triads were presented on a laptop. Before each of the triad trials, people saw a 4 by 4 dot 
matrix, filled with four randomly placed black dots. These were shown for 2 seconds and 
participants had to try and memorize the location of the dots whilst carrying out the reasoning 
task. In the heavy load condition, the dots were randomly distributed, with the constraint that 
they could never form a straight or diagonal line. In contrast, in the light load condition, the 
dots always had an easily memorizable straight or diagonal line configuration.  
The base image was then displayed for 2 seconds, followed by the two target pictures. 
Participants made their choice by pressing 1 if they thought the category in the left picture 
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was more likely to share the property with the base, and 9 if they thought the category on the 
right was more likely to also have the property. 
Upon choosing a conclusion category, participants saw an empty dot matrix and were 
asked to recall the location of the dots by clicking on an empty matrix box with the mouse 
cursor. The dots appeared in the clicked box, regardless of whether or not this was the correct 
location.  There was a 500 ms delay before the appearance of the next filled dot matrix. The 
order of presentation of the triads was fully randomized. 
Design  
The experiment had a 2 by 2 mixed-design. The independent within-subjects variable was the 
type of triad (control or conflict) and the between-subjects independent variable was memory 
load (heavy or light).  The dependent variable was the number of appropriate taxonomic 
choices. 
We expected a main effect of type of triad, with people making more inferences based on 
structured knowledge in the control compared to the conflict condition where there was the 
lure from the strongly associated but inappropriate causal target. We also expected an 
interaction between load and triad type. People in the in both load conditions should make 
more inferences based on structured knowledge in the control compared to the conflict 
condition. However, people in the heavy load condition might not be able to effortfully 
recruit structured knowledge, amplifying this difference between the control and conflict 
triads compared to the light load condition. 
In a further analysis, we compared the proportion of taxonomic choices for the conflict 
triads in which the causal link was predictive to the proportion of taxonomic choices for the 
conflict triads in which the causal link was diagnostic. We did not expect an effect of causal 
direction (i.e. predictive verses diagnostic). This is because we assume that people may be 
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lured by the contextually inappropriate causal alternative because it is strongly associated 
with the base, in which case the underlying structural relation should not have an effect on 
the appeal of the strongly associated target (Fenker, et al., 2005).   
Finally, we assessed inhibitory control by means of a task that assesses inhibition of 
automatically activated semantic knowledge. If people have to inhibit a response based on 
strong semantic associations between categories in favour of a response that is based on a 
structured relation between the categories that is more effortful to retrieve, we might expect 
correlations between people‟s use of more appropriate structured knowledge and their ability 
to withhold a prepotent response. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly allocated to either the heavy or light load condition. They 
received detailed instructions emphasizing that there were no right or wrong answers. If they 
understood the instructions, they completed two practice trials to familiarize them with the 
alternating sequence of the dot pattern and induction task.  
Post-test 
In the post-test, participants were asked two questions about the 42 different category pairs 
(14 base and causal target pairs, 14 base and taxonomic target pairs and 14 base and unrelated 
target pairs). The questions were presented in a random order on a laptop PC. The first 
question assessed their belief about biological group membership. If people thought that the 
two categories belonged to the same biological group, they pressed C (corresponding to 
YES), whereas if they didn‟t believe they were taxonomically related they pressed M 
(corresponding to NO). If they didn‟t know, they pressed B (corresponding to DON‟T 
KNOW), although participants were asked to use this option sparingly.  
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The second question asked participants to indicate whether there was a causal 
relationship between the two categories and in particular, whether the two categories were 
part of the same food chain. As with the first question, participants pressed C (YES), B 
(DON‟T KNOW) or M (NO). People were given as much time as they wanted to make their 
responses. The order of presentation was fully randomized. 
Semantic Inhibitory Control Task  
To assess people‟s level of inhibitory control which includes a semantic component we used 
a variant of the Hayling test (Burgess & Shallice, 1996) which was adapted by Markovits and 
Doyon (2004). This task requires the inhibition of a strongly associated response without 
explicit instructions to do so. Inhibition in this task occurs at the semantic level and is 
designed so that people cannot adopt a low-level inhibitory strategy.  
People were given incomplete sentences for 2000 milliseconds, such as “His favourite 
sport is _______”. This was followed by a letter string which was a contextually appropriate 
real word (e.g. “cricket”), a contextually inappropriate real word (e.g. “daylight”), a 
contextually appropriate non-word that strongly resembled a real word (e.g. “footbalf”) and a 
contextually inappropriate non-word (e.g. “sinema”). People were instructed to decide 
whether the letter string was a real word which would appropriately complete the previous 
sentence. If they thought it was a contextually appropriate real word, they were instructed to 
respond with YES by pressing C on the keyboard. If they thought the letter string was a non-
word, or a contextually inappropriate real word, they responded with NO by pressing M.   
We adapted a total of 30 cloze sentences from Bloom and Fischler‟s (1980) database, 
which strongly prime the missing word. Each of these 30 sentences was combined with the 
four types of letter strings, resulting in a total of 120 trials. All sentences and filler words can 
be found in Appendix 4B. The order in which the sentences and letter strings were presented 
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was fully randomized, with the constraint that identical sentences paired with a different letter 
string could never appear adjacent to one another. 
Participants completed the experiments in one individual session of around 40 minutes. 
The tasks were completed in a fixed order, starting with the triad task, followed by the post-
test belief assessment and finishing with the semantic inhibitory control task. 
5.1.2 Results 
For each individual, we calculated the number of times they made an accurate taxonomic 
choice for the cell conflict triads, and likewise for the cell control triads. These were analysed 
with a 2 (triad type: conflict versus control) by 2 (load: heavy versus light) mixed-design 
ANOVA, with load as the between-participants manipulation. For the item analysis, the 
proportion of people who chose the taxonomic category was calculated and analysed with a 2 
(triad type) by 2 (load) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
The ANOVA showed that there was a marginally significant effect of load across 
subjects, FS (1, 32) = 3.97, p = .055, effect size d = .35. This effect was highly significant across 
items, FI (1, 13) = 40.2, p < .0005, effect size d = 1.76. People under heavy load made fewer 
appropriate taxonomic choices (M = 9.2, SE = .61) compared to people under a light 
cognitive load (M = 10.9, SE = .61).  
Furthermore, there was a main effect of triad type, FS (1, 32) = 66.71, p < .0005, effect size 
d = 1.44, FI (1, 13) = 35.07, p < .0005, effect size d = 1.64. As predicted, people made more 
accurate taxonomic choices for cell control triads (M = 12.3, SE = .28) than for cell conflict 
triads (M = 7.8, SE = .66).  
However, these two main effects were modulated by a significant interaction between 
triad type and load, FS (1, 32) = 4.96, p = .033, effect size d = .39, FI (1, 13) = 27.3, p < .0005, 
effect size d = 1.45. Illustrated in Figure 5.3, and confirmed by Bonferroni post-hoc 
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comparisons, load only had an effect on people‟s number of accurate taxonomic choices for 
cell conflict triads (p < .0005, effect size d = .76), but not on the number of accurate 
taxonomic choices for the cell control triads (p = .41, effect size d = .29). Thus, whilst people 
more often failed to make an accurate taxonomic choice for cell conflict triads than for cell 
control triads across both load conditions, this effect was amplified when people were under 
cognitive load. This suggests that people under load struggled to inhibit the lure from the 
strongly associated but inappropriate target category. 
 
Figure 5.3: Number of Relevant Taxonomic Choices for the Two Types of Cell Triads across the Two 
Load Conditions  
 
Category lures in the conflict trial shared two relations with the base categories. The 
categories had a strong associative relation, but they were also part of the same food chain. 
Our hypothesis was that people would have to inhibit a response based on the associate 
relation in order to choose the taxonomically related target. However, it is possible that 
participants who chose the lures did so on the basis of the food chain relation. To rule out this 
possibility, we also looked at whether there was a causal asymmetry effect. As demonstrated 
in Experiments 1 and 2 reported in Chapter 3, inferences based on structured causal 
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knowledge should lead to a causal asymmetry effect, with more causal choices in the 
predictive (e.g. salmon → grizzly bears or goldfish?) compared to the diagnostic case (e.g. 
monkeys → peanuts or seals?). If we are dealing predominantly with competition from 
unstructured associative knowledge then we would not expect to find effects that depend 
upon people using structured causal knowledge, such as the aforementioned causal 
asymmetry effect. As we had a different number of conflict triads in which the strongly 
associated but irrelevant causal target was predictively (8 conflict triads) or diagnostically (6 
conflict triads) related to the base category, we compared the effect of causal direction on the 
proportion of taxonomic choices for the conflict triads. The proportion of taxonomic choices 
for the conflict triads in which the causal choice was predictively related to the base was .55 
(SD = .34), which was not significantly different than the proportion of taxonomic choices 
when the causal link was diagnostic (M = .52, SD = .27), tS (33) = .99, p = .33, effect size d = 
.17.  An independent samples t-test with direction as the between-item variable verified the 
above result across items, tI (12) = .51, p = .62, effect size d = .26. The absence of a causal 
asymmetry effect supports our contention that it is the unstructured associative aspect of the 
strongly associated but inappropriate causal target which is swaying people from making a 
more appropriate inference based on structured knowledge. 
Post Test Check 
We checked that people knew about the purported relationships between the categories. In the 
post-test, people stated whether they believed that the two categories were part of the same 
food chain (causal relatedness) and whether the category pairs belonged to the same 
biological group (taxonomic relatedness). For the causally related categories, the mean causal 
relatedness endorsement proportion was .85 (SD = .13) and the mean endorsement proportion 
for being taxonomically related was .11 (SD =.10). For the taxonomically related categories, 
the taxonomic relatedness endorsement proportion was .71 (SD = .19) and .11 (SD =.10) for 
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being causally related. The causal relatedness endorsement rate for unrelated category pairs 
was .19 (SD =.11), and the taxonomic relatedness endorsement proportion was .07 (SD =.08). 
A one-way ANOVA on causal relatedness endorsement proportions confirmed that there 
was a significant main effect of type of relation between the categories, F (2, 66) = 406.27, p < 
.0005. Bonferroni post-hoc tests verified that the mean causal relatedness endorsement was 
significantly higher for the causally related categories than for both the taxonomically and 
unrelated categories (p‟s< .0005). The causal relatedness endorsement for the unrelated 
categories was significantly higher than for the taxonomically related categories (p = .003).  
Likewise, a one-way ANOVA on taxonomic relatedness endorsement proportions 
showed that there was a main effect of relation between the categories, F (1.08, 39.12
7
) = 266.96, 
p < .0005. Bonferroni post-tests showed that as expected, the taxonomic endorsement 
proportion for the taxonomically related categories was significantly higher than for both the 
causally (p < .0005) and unrelated categories (p < .0005). The taxonomic relatedness 
endorsement proportion was marginally higher for the causally related categories than for the 
unrelated categories (p = .053).  
One criticism may be that any effects we find in which people are swayed by a strong but 
inappropriate association rather than choosing the weakly associated category with the 
appropriate structural relation might be because people simply did not have the knowledge 
that the two weakly associated categories were in fact related. As the causally related 
categories were always strongly associated and taxonomically related pairs were always 
weakly associated, if it was indeed lack of knowledge driving an effect, we would expect to 
see significant differences in post-test endorsement rates for causal and biological beliefs. We 
compared the proportion of positive responses to the question whether the (strongly 
                                                          
7
 df adjusted for Non-sphericity using Greenhouse-Geisser corrections 
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associated) causally related pairs were part of the same food chain with the proportion of 
positive responses to the question whether the (weakly associated) taxonomically related 
category pairs belonged to the same biological group. A paired-samples t-test was significant, 
t (33) = 3.69, p = .001, effect size d = .63. However, this seemed to be driven by a minority of 
participants whose taxonomic knowledge was significantly below their knowledge about the 
causal food chain links. We calculated the difference between the taxonomic and causal 
endorsement ratings and excluded participants whose difference scores were further than 1.5 
standard deviations away from the mean. 
Another way of checking that people do have the relevant knowledge but are still swayed 
by the strong but irrelevant association for the conflict triads is to compare the proportion of 
biological relatedness endorsements for the taxonomically related targets where people chose 
the taxonomic target with the proportion of biological endorsements where they chose the 
causal target. This is a very stringent test, because in cases where people did not make any 
causal choices, the proportion of taxonomic endorsement when choosing the causal target 
would be zero, even though this does not reflect their actual lack of knowledge, but merely a 
lack of causal choices.  When all participants were included (3 people made no causal 
choices), the mean biological endorsement proportion for conflict triads where people made a 
taxonomic choice was .77 (SD = 17), whereas it was .58 (SD = .36) for conflict triads in 
which people chose the causal target. A paired samples t-test showed that this difference was 
significant, t (26) = 2.92, p = .007, effect size d = .56. As with the previous method of assessing 
people‟s level of structured knowledge, this seemed to be driven by a small group of 
individuals who lacked relevant taxonomic knowledge, therefore choosing the strongly 
associated causal alternative.  Hence, we calculated the difference between the proportion of 
taxonomic endorsements when people chose the weakly associated but appropriate taxonomic 
target and the proportion of taxonomic endorsements when they chose the strongly associated 
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but irrelevant causal target and excluded participants whose difference score was larger than 
1.5 standard deviations than the mean difference. 
We then re-ran the comparison of people‟s level of structured knowledge excluding those 
individuals whose knowledge level difference scores were 1.5 standard deviations larger than 
the mean difference on either of aforementioned knowledge difference measures (10 
participants). Two paired-samples t-tests showed that for the remaining participants, there 
was no difference between their taxonomic endorsement proportions for taxonomically 
related categories (M = .77, SD = .33) and their causal endorsement for causally related 
category pairs (M = .84, SD = .15)  (t(23) = 1.81, p = .084, effect size d = .37), nor for their 
taxonomic endorsement proportions for the cell conflict triads for which they made a 
taxonomic (M = .85, SD = .17) compared to a causal choice (M = .76, SD = .20) (t(23) = -1.78, 
p = .088, effect size d = .36).  
To confirm that these people were lured by the appeal of the strong association between 
the base and the inappropriate target despite having knowledge about the appropriate 
structural relation between the base and the alternative target, we re-ran the 2-way ANOVA 
on the number of accurate taxonomic choices on the subgroup of 24 individuals who had 
relevant taxonomic knowledge. This corroborated the findings from the full analysis, with a 
significant main effect of memory load F (1, 22) = 4.29, p = .05, effect size d = .44, a significant 
main effect of triad type, F (1, 22) = 43.33, p < .0005, effect size d = 1.4, and a significant 
interaction between triad type and memory load, F (1, 22) = 6.12, p = .002, effect size d = .53. 
As with the full sample, the interaction arose because the load manipulation had an effect on 
the conflict cell triads but not on cell control triads. Thus, compared to those under light load, 
people under heavy load were less able to choose the weakly related but appropriate 
taxonomically related target when there was a highly associated but irrelevant alternative 
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target (p = .026). In contrast, when there was no competition between structured taxonomic 
and unstructured associative knowledge, people in both load conditions made a similar 
number of relevant taxonomic choices (p = .56). 
Relation between Selective Inductive Reasoning and Semantic Inhibition 
Next we explored whether people‟s tendency to inhibit a response based on a strong but 
contextually inappropriate association between two categories and instead to choose the 
weakly associated but structurally related category was correlated with their general ability to 
withstand interference by semantic knowledge on our semantic inhibition task. In this task, 
people had been presented with an incomplete sentence (e.g. The sailor wanted to stay with 
the sinking _____) which was followed by one of four letter strings, a contextually 
appropriate non-word (shifp), a contextually appropriate real word (boat), a contextually 
inappropriate non-word (basana) or a contextually inappropriate real word (ketchup) and 
were asked to judge whether the letter string would suitably complete the sentence. In line 
with Markovits and Doyon (2004), we argue that correctly rejecting contextually appropriate 
non-words as suitable sentence fillers necessitates the inhibition of semantic content activated 
by both the sentence and the similarity between the non-word and a real cloze sentence filler 
word.   
To guard against the possibility that people simply adopt a low-level processing strategy 
in which they ignore the sentence and base their judgements purely on whether the letter 
string is a real or non-word, we also looked at their performance on the real words. Whilst 
this low-level strategy would result in correct judgements for the non-word letter strings 
regardless of the sentence context, people would be at chance performance for the real words, 
where half of the words are in fact suitable fillers. The probability of making 50 out of 60 
correct judgements for real words if people were merely guessing is below .000001. As none 
of our participants made more than 10 mistakes when judging real words, we can safely 
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assume that they were processing the sentence context in order to make their decision. Table 
5.1 summarizes the results from the inhibitory control task. 
Table 5.1: Means and Standard Deviations for the Semantic Inhibition Task 
Experiment 6 
Measure Mean SD Min Max 
Correct Judgement Contextually Appropriate Non-word 28.5 1.7 23 30 
Correct Judgement Contextually Appropriate Word 27.5 1.6 23 30 
Correct Judgement Contextually Inappropriate Non-word 29.9 0.4 28 30 
Correct Judgement Contextually Inappropriate Word 29.7 0.6 28 30 
 
If using structured knowledge requires the inhibition of inappropriate unstructured 
knowledge, we would expect to find correlations between individuals‟ ability to choose the 
weakly associated but appropriate taxonomic choice and the ability to correctly reject 
contextually appropriate non-words. When all participants were included there was only a 
small and non-significant correlation, r (34) = .29, p = .1. However, the correlation between 
inhibitory control and use of structured knowledge may only hold for individuals with 
appropriate taxonomic knowledge. When the 10 individuals who lacked this structured 
knowledge were excluded, the correlation rose to r (24) = .37, p = .08, which was still non-
significant. As semantic inhibition requires the availability of cognitive resources, we were 
interested to see whether there might be differences between the two load conditions. We 
therefore looked at the correlations separately for the two memory load conditions. 
Light Load Condition 
For the 12 knowledgeable people who only had to remember very simple straight line dot 
patterns, inhibitory control was significantly negatively related to the difference in number of 
taxonomic choices between cell conflict and cell control triads, r(12) = -.72, p = .008. This 
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means that people high in semantic inhibitory control exhibited more consistent reasoning 
patterns, making a similar number of relevant taxonomic choices in the conflict and control 
triad trials. Inhibitory control was also positively related to the number of taxonomic choices 
in the conflict triads, r (12) = .55, p = .06. However, due to the small sample size this 
correlation did not quite reach statistical significance. Nonetheless, it does provide some 
preliminary evidence for the idea that people higher in inhibitory control were better at 
inhibiting the lure of a strongly associated irrelevant target. 
Heavy Load Condition 
In contrast, for the 12 knowledgeable participants who had to remember complex 
configurations of dots whilst carrying out the inductive reasoning task, scores on the semantic 
inhibitory control task were neither correlated with the difference in number of taxonomic 
choices between cell conflict and cell control triads, r (12) = -.14, p = .67, nor with the overall 
number of taxonomic choices they made for conflict triads, r (12) = .2, p = .54. This might 
suggest that semantic inhibitory control is effortful and requires available working memory 
resources. Thus, load might only be detrimental in people who are high in inhibitory control, 
but have less effect on people who are lower in inhibitory control and are already performing 
poorly. This hypothesized divergent effect of load upon high and low performers might be 
similar to studies (Kane & Engle, 2000) which show that secondary tasks only leads to a 
decline in performance for  individuals with high working memory spans but not for people 
with low working memory spans. However, the contention that secondary task differentially 
affects inductive reasoning in people who are high or low in inhibitory control would have to 
be followed up with a factorial design (load: heavy versus light by semantic inhibitory 
control: high versus low) in a larger sample.  
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Secondary Task Analysis 
In a dual task paradigm, there is a risk that the dissociable effects of memory load on the 
number of taxonomic choices for conflict and control cell triads could reflect a strategic 
trade-off between primary and secondary tasks (Hegarty, et al., 2000). That is, participants 
may simply allocate more mental resources to the conflict cell triads than to the control cell 
triads, neglecting the secondary task.  
To check for such a trade-off, we calculated the number of dots correctly recalled for the 
trials preceding the two crucial types of triads separately for the two load conditions. A 2 
(triad type: conflict or control) by 2 (load: heavy versus light) mixed-design ANOVA, with 
load as the between-subjects variable showed that the only significant difference in the 
number of dots recalled was between the two load conditions, F(1, 32) =  27.76, p < .0005, 
effect size d = .93. In the heavy load condition, participants recalled a mean of 3.2 dots (SE = 
.07), whereas they recalled on average 3.7 dots (SE = .07) when they were only under a light 
memory burden. There was no main effect of triad type F (1, 32) = .003, p = .96, nor an 
interaction between load and triad type, F (1, 32) = .13, p = .72.   
This suggests that people were consistent in how they allocated their mental resources to 
the primary and secondary tasks across all problems and also verified that the more complex 
patterns were harder to remember and more burdensome than the simple dot patterns.  
5.1.3 Discussion 
In the current experiment we looked at people‟s inductive choices in a triad task when there 
was a conflict between the two types of knowledge, i.e. unstructured versus structured 
knowledge. Whilst reasoning about cells, we pitched a weakly associated but appropriate 
taxonomic choice against a strongly associated but inappropriate causal choice. Compared to 
the control triads, in which the alternative to the weakly related taxonomic choice was an 
Chapter 5  Conflicting Types of Knowledge 
 
178 
 
unrelated category, people were more frequently swayed by the strongly associated but 
inappropriate target. The results from the current study also suggest that the ability to inhibit 
unstructured knowledge in favour of contextually more appropriate structured knowledge is a 
resource-demanding process. Thus, the failure to make the inductively most potent choice by 
inhibiting the lure from a highly associated target was amplified when people had to contend 
with a heavy secondary memory burden.  
It seems that reasoning based on the contextually more appropriate source of structured 
knowledge requires people to inhibit the competing strong association activated in semantic 
memory. For people who had relevant structured knowledge and who were not cognitively 
compromised, the ability to draw on this in favour of inappropriate unstructured knowledge 
was correlated with performance on a semantic inhibitory control task. By demonstrating 
such a correlation, the current experiment links the use of different types of knowledge in 
category-based inductive reasoning to more domain-general reasoning processes. We focused 
on two major aspects, the processing characteristics of the two types of knowledge and the 
nature of the inhibitory process required for successful selective induction.  
Regarding these two points, our findings suggest that activation of unstructured 
knowledge is automatic, fast and effortless, whereas use of structured knowledge might 
require more deliberate and effortful processing. This resonates with the characteristics 
ascribed to heuristic and analytical processes in dual-process theories of reasoning (Evans, 
2007, 2008; Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996). These theories suggest that when output 
from two processes conflict, people have to withhold a response based on effortless, 
automatic processing in favour of more effortful reasoning. Applying this to our findings, 
people may only be able to engage in slow, deliberate reasoning based on structured 
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knowledge if they have sufficient cognitive resources and can inhibit an appealing inductive 
choice based on unstructured associative knowledge.  
This implies that the processes which mediate accurate selective induction when there is 
conflict between the two types of knowledge are domain-general. For example, similar results 
ascribing an important role to inhibitory control in ensuring a correct response have been 
obtained in deductive reasoning paradigms. In a typical task, people have to inhibit belief-
based responses in order to reason in line with the logical structure of a problem. Studies 
have shown that the ability to resist belief-based responses in syllogistic reasoning follows a 
curvilinear trend across development, thus tracing the same developmental trajectory as 
inhibitory capacities (De Neys & Van Gelder, 2009). Similarly, people who resist belief-
based reasoning are higher in semantic inhibitory control (Markovits & Doyon, 2004). 
Resisting a belief-based response activates brain regions in the lateral prefrontal cortex, 
which are implicated in general inhibitory functions (De Neys, et al., 2008).  
The current experiment is the first demonstration that it might be inhibitory functions that 
are crucially involved in maximizing the potency of category-based inductive reasoning.  
However, the number of participants was fairly small and the correlations which support our 
hypothesis about the role of inhibitory control in category-based induction were based on 
only 12 knowledgeable participants in the light load condition. Thus, to try and gain more 
support for our position, and to try and elucidate the nature of the inhibitory control process, 
we carried out a further study in which we increased number of participants and dropped the 
cognitive resource manipulation.  
5.2 Overview Experiment 7 
In the next experiment, we wanted to firstly replicate the finding that in order to use 
structured knowledge, people may have to inhibit conflicting unstructured knowledge. 
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Secondly, we wanted to explore the nature of inhibitory control in more detail. The range of 
theoretical frameworks and resultant inhibitory control tasks make it challenging to evaluate 
the level at which inhibition may come into play in inductive reasoning and to find possible 
correlations between measures of inhibitory control and use of different types of knowledge 
in category-based induction. Also, even within the literature primarily concerned with the 
construct of inhibitory control there is little consensus as to whether the processes that 
underlie inhibition of simple motor tasks are identical to those that are needed to inhibit 
higher-level competing semantic knowledge (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). For example, the 
Stop Signal task measures inhibition at the motor level, in which people have to inhibit a 
prepotent motor response. Unlike some of the other inhibitory measures, there is no direct 
conflict between two responses.   The Stroop task on the other hand involves more semantic 
processing and a direct conflict between two alternative responses, although the nature of the 
pre-potent and target response are somewhat different. Thus, the pre-potent response involves 
word processing, whereas the latter involves perceptual colour naming.  In contrast, the 
Hayling task, and our variant thereof, requires the inhibition of a pre-potent semantic 
response in favour of a less automatic answer that is also semantic in nature. As the 
knowledge recruited in category-based induction is semantic, we might expect the strongest 
correlations between use of different types of knowledge and tasks that assess inhibitory 
control at the semantic rather than at a lower perceptual or the motor-response level of 
processing.  If there is a dissociation in the degree to which the two inhibitory control 
measures correlate with patterns of inductive reasoning, we can get a better idea of the nature 
of the prepotent response and the processes needed to inhibit this unstructured knowledge 
when it is inappropriate. In the following experiment we explore this possibility by 
contrasting the strength of correlation between reasoning performance and scores on the 
Hayling task (our measure of semantic inhibitory control) with the strength of the correlation 
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between reasoning performance and the stop signal task (our measure of low-level inhibitory 
control). 
5.2.1 Method 
Participants 
28 participants from Durham were paid £5 for their participation. Their mean age was 26.4 
years (SD = 5.6 years). 
Materials 
Triad Task  
The materials were similar to the ones used in the previous experiment, but we dropped the 
secondary memory load component. To recapitulate, there were 14 triads in which 
unstructured knowledge was pitched against structured knowledge. Thus, when people were 
reasoning about cells, the appropriate choice (taxonomically related target) was weakly 
associated, whereas the inappropriate choice (causally related target) was strongly associated. 
For the cell control triads, we replaced the inappropriate but strongly associated target with a 
completely unrelated alternative target. To try and ensure that people paid attention to the 
property they were reasoning about, we included 28 filler triads in which they made inductive 
inferences about diseases (e.g. has disease wQ2). When reasoning about diseases, both the 
taxonomic or causal target could be an appropriate inductive choice, obviating the necessity 
to inhibit unstructured knowledge. In total, each participant reasoned about 56 triads, 14 
conflict cell, 14 control cell triads and 28 disease filler triads.  
Stop Signal Task 
The Stop Signal task (Aman, Roberts, & Pennington, 1998; Handley, et al., 2004) assesses 
inhibitory control by means of a computerized reaction time experiment. There were two 
kinds of trials, primary go trials and stop signal trials. For the primary go trials, participants 
first saw a fixation point for 500 ms (a small smiley face), followed by either an “X” or “O” 
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stimulus. Participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible by pressing the 
corresponding letter on the keyboard without sacrificing accuracy. On the stop signal trials, 
participants were instructed not to press anything if they heard a beep before seeing the “X” 
or “O”. The tones were presented randomly 150 ms or 250 ms before the participant‟s mean 
reaction time to primary trials. Adjusting the tone delay to each individual‟s mean reaction 
time ensured that the inhibitory requirements were roughly alike across participants and 
independent from primary response times. As the stop signal trials constituted the minority of 
trials (25%) the dominant response was to press “X” or “O”, requiring people to inhibit this 
action when hearing the tone. 
There were 4 blocks of trials. In the first block, participants encountered 30 primary trials 
(equal number of “X”s and “O”s), which were used to measure a participant‟s individual 
mean reaction time. Thus, this reaction time was used in later trials to determine the 
magnitude of the delay between the tone and the letter stimulus. 
The next block consisted of 23 practice trials, of which 8 were stop signal trials. The next 
two experimental blocks consisted of 48 trials each, with 32 primary trials and 16 stop signal 
trials (8 trials at the two different delay settings). The presentation of the primary and stop 
signal trials was completely randomized in all blocks. 
Post-test and Semantic Inhibitory Control Task 
The materials for the post-test and the semantic inhibitory control task were identical to the 
previous experiment. To reiterate, for the post-test, people answered two questions about 
each category pair, firstly, whether they belonged to the same biological group and secondly, 
whether they were part of the same food chain.  
For the semantic inhibitory control task, people verified whether a letter string 
constituted a suitable sentence filler.  
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Procedure 
Participants completed the four experimental components in one individual session of around 
50 minutes. They started with the triad task. This was followed by the post-test belief 
assessment and the stop signal task. Participants finished with the semantic inhibitory task.  
5.2.2 Results 
Triad Task 
For each individual, we counted the number of times a participant chose the weakly 
associated taxonomic category separately for the cell conflict triads and cell control triads and 
analysed these with a paired-samples t-test, with type of triad as the independent variable. For 
the analysis by items, we calculated the proportion of participants which chose the weakly 
associated category for the cell conflict and control triads and analysed these with a paired-
samples t-test. 
As expected, there was an effect of type of triad, tS (27) = -6.78, p < .0005, effect size d = 
1.28; tI (13) = -3.67, p = .003, effect size d = .98. Thus, as Figure 5.4 below illustrates, people 
chose the weakly associated taxonomic target more frequently for the control triads (M 
number of taxonomic choices = 12.86, SD = 1.51) than for the conflict triads where there was 
competition from the strongly associated but irrelevant causal target (M = 10.18, SD = 2.84).  
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Figure 5.4: Mean Number of Taxonomic Choices across the two Types of Triads when reasoning 
about Cells 
 
This suggests that people were indeed swayed by the strong but contextually inappropriate 
association between the base and the causally related target.  
As in the previous experiment, we wanted to show that it was unstructured knowledge in 
form of a strong association drawing people towards an inappropriate inference rather than 
the structured causal relation between the strongly associated base and target. If this is the 
case, there should be no causal asymmetry effect. We had 8 conflict triads in which the 
strongly associated but inappropriate causal target was predictively related to the base and 6 
conflict triads in which the direction of the causal link was diagnostic, so we compared the 
effect of causal direction on the proportion of taxonomic choices for the conflict triads with a 
paired-samples t-test. The proportion of taxonomic choices for the conflict triads in which the 
causal choice was predictively related to the base was .75 (SD = .23), which was not 
significantly different from the proportion of taxonomic choices when the causal link was 
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diagnostic (M taxonomic proportion = .70, SD = .21), tS (27) = 1.51, p = .14, effect size d = .28.  
An independent samples t-test with direction as the between-item variable verified the above 
result across items, tI (12) = .38, p = .71, effect size d = .21. 
In fact, the direction of the difference is opposite to the one that would be predicted if 
people were using structured causal knowledge, in which case they should be more likely to 
make a causal choice (and hence less likely to make a taxonomic choices) when the causal 
link was predictive (see Shafto et al., 2008, for a Bayesian justification of this assumption).  
This supports the claim that the above effect of triad type was indeed due to the strong 
association between the causal target and the base rather than being based on the structural 
relation.  
Post-test check  
To check that people knew about the purported relationships between the categories, we 
checked the beliefs about food chain relations (causal relatedness) and biological group 
membership (taxonomic relatedness) in a post-test. Data from one participant was lost due to 
equipment failure.  
For the causally related categories, the mean causal relatedness endorsement proportion 
was .86 (SD = .21) and the mean endorsement proportion for being taxonomically related was 
.17 (SD = .20). For the taxonomically related categories, the taxonomic relatedness 
endorsement proportion was .73 (SD = .17) and .13 (SD =.12) for being causally related. 
Finally, for the unrelated categories, the causal relatedness endorsement rate was .22 (SD = 
.19) and the taxonomic relatedness endorsement proportion was .07 (SD = .10).  
A one-way ANOVA on causal relatedness endorsement proportions showed that there 
was a significant main effect of type of relation between the categories, F (1.52, 39.39
8
) = 102.12, 
                                                          
8
 Adjusted for Nonsphericity using Greenhouse-Geisser 
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p < .0005. Thus, Bonferroni post-hoc tests confirmed that as expected, the mean causal 
relatedness endorsement was significantly higher for the causally related categories than for 
the taxonomically and unrelated categories (p‟s < .0005), whereas there was no difference 
between the latter two (p = .98).  
Similarly, a one-way ANOVA on taxonomic relatedness endorsement proportions 
showed that there was a main effect of relation between the categories,  F (1.27,33.03
9
) = 209.84, 
p < .0005, with endorsement proportions significantly higher for the taxonomically related 
categories than for both the causally and unrelated categories (p‟s < .0005). Also, taxonomic 
endorsement proportion was higher for causally related categories than for unrelated 
categories (p = .051), probably owing to the fact that one causally related category pair (cat 
and squirrel) was indeed from the same biological group.   
As in the previous experiment, in order to rule out the possibility that our effects were 
confounded by lack of appropriate structured taxonomic knowledge, we carried out two 
comparisons on people‟s causal and taxonomic relatedness endorsements. Firstly, we 
compared the proportion of positive responses to the question whether the (strongly 
associated) causally related pairs were part of the same food chain with the proportion of 
positive responses to the question whether the (weakly associated) taxonomically related 
category pairs belonged to the same biological group. A paired-samples t-test was significant, 
t (26) = 2.83, p = .009, effect size d = .54. As in the previous experiment, this seemed to be 
driven by a small minority of participants whose taxonomic knowledge was significantly 
below their knowledge about the causal food chain links. We calculated the difference 
between the taxonomic and causal endorsement ratings and excluded participants whose 
difference scores were more than 1.5 standard deviations away from the mean difference.  
                                                          
9
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Secondly, we compared the proportion of biological relatedness endorsements for the 
taxonomically related targets for the conflict triads where people chose the taxonomic target 
with the proportion of biological endorsements where they chose the causal target. The mean 
biological endorsement proportion for conflict triads where people made a taxonomic choice 
was .77 (SD = 17), which was significantly higher than the biological endorsement proportion 
(M = .58, SD = .36) for conflict triads in which participants chose the causal target, t (26) = 
2.92, p = .007, effect size d = .56. Again, this seemed to be due to a minority of individuals 
who did not have enough taxonomic knowledge, therefore choosing the strongly associated 
causal alternative.  Thus, we calculated the difference between the proportion of taxonomic 
endorsements when people chose the appropriate taxonomic target and the proportion of 
taxonomic endorsements when they chose the strongly associated but inappropriate causal 
target. We excluded participants whose difference score was larger than 1.5 standard 
deviations than the mean difference. 
People whose knowledge level difference scores were 1.5 standard deviations larger than 
the mean difference on either of aforementioned knowledge difference measures (8 
participants) were excluded. Two paired-samples t-tests showed that for the remaining 
participants, there was no longer a significant difference between their taxonomic 
endorsement proportions for taxonomically related categories (M = .79, SD = .15) and their 
causal endorsement for causally related category pairs (M = .84, SD = .23), t(19) = 1.03, p = 
.32, effect size d = .23. There was also no longer a significant difference in biological 
endorsement proportions for taxonomic (M taxonomic endorsement = .79, SD = .17) versus 
causal inductive choices (M taxonomic endorsement = .71, SD = .31), t (19) = 1.18, p = .25, 
effect size d = .24. 
Chapter 5  Conflicting Types of Knowledge 
 
188 
 
For thoroughness, the comparison on the mean number of taxonomic choices for the cell 
conflict triads and cell control triads was also checked for this subgroup. This confirmed that 
the difference was still highly significant, t (19) = 6.78, p < .0005, effect size d = 1.52. 
Taxonomic choices for the cell conflict triads were less frequent (M taxonomic choice cell 
conflict = 10.15, SD = 2.68) than for the cell control triads (M taxonomic choice cell control 
= 12.85, SD = 1.60). This supports our contention that participants chose the lure on conflict 
trials because they were influenced by the appeal of the strongly associated but 
inappropriately related causal target, and not because they lacked the structured knowledge 
required to select the taxonomically related target. 
Semantic Inhibition 
We suggested that in order to reason based on appropriate structured knowledge, people have 
to inhibit contextually inappropriate unstructured knowledge. If this is the case then people 
who are better able to withhold a prepotent response should show more appropriate selective 
inductive reasoning and be less likely to be swayed by the inappropriate but strongly 
associated alternative target.  As in the previous experiment, we assessed whether people‟s 
tendency to inhibit a response based on a strong but inappropriate association between two 
categories and to choose the weakly associated but appropriately related category was 
correlated with their performance on our semantic inhibition task. Table 5.3 below shows the 
results from the Semantic Inhibition task. Again, to ensure that people were not employing a 
low-level processing strategy by ignoring the prime sentence and simply judging whether the 
letter string was a real or non-word, we checked their performance on the real words. The 
probability of making 50 out of 60 correct judgements for real words by guessing is below 
.000001. As can be seen from the descriptive statistics shown in table 5.2 below, none of our 
participants made more than 10 mistakes when judging real words. We take this as 
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confirmation that people processed the prime sentence context before making their 
judgement.  
 
Table 5.2: Means and Standard Deviations for the Semantic Inhibition Task in 
Experiment 7 
Measure Mean SD Min Max 
Correct Judgement Contextually Appropriate Non-word 27.6 4.5 9 30 
Correct Judgement Contextually Appropriate Word 27.8 1.5 24 30 
Correct Judgement Contextually Inappropriate Non-word 29.7 0.5 29 30 
Correct Judgement Contextually Inappropriate Word 29.5 1.2 25 30 
 
As predicted, there was a significant correlation between people‟s tendency to choose the 
weakly associated taxonomic category when reasoning about cells and their level of semantic 
inhibitory control, i.e. their ability to make a correct judgement for the related non-word 
trials. In particular, there was a negative correlation between inhibitory control and the 
difference in number of taxonomic choices between the conflict and control trials when 
reasoning about cells, r (28) = -.47, p = .012. Thus, people higher in inhibitory control showed 
more consistency in their reasoning, making a similar number of relevant taxonomic choices 
in the conflict and control triad trials. Furthermore, inhibitory control was positively 
correlated with people‟s tendency to make a taxonomic choice in the conflict trials, thus 
inhibiting the strongly associated alternative, r (28) = .64, p < .0005.  
Whilst this suggests that people high in semantic inhibitory control can withstand the 
interference of strongly associated but irrelevant unstructured knowledge in order to reason 
on the basis of more structured relevant knowledge, this is only true for people who actually 
have the relevant knowledge and for whom there is a conflict between irrelevant unstructured 
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and contextually more appropriate structured knowledge. As mentioned in the previous 
section, there was a minority of 8 individuals who did not have the necessary structured 
knowledge. We re-analyzed the correlation between taxonomic choices and inhibitory control 
for the 20 participants who had the relevant taxonomic knowledge. The correlation between 
inhibitory control and the difference in number of taxonomic choices between cell conflict 
and control triads was r (20) = -.46, p = .041. Similarly, the correlation between semantic 
inhibitory control and total number of taxonomic choices for the cell conflict triads was r (20) 
= .65, p= .002. The results of this re-analysis rule out the possibility that our results are due to 
a correlation between semantic inhibition and possession of structured semantic knowledge. 
When only those participants with high levels of structured semantic knowledge are included, 
we continue to observe a correlation between semantic inhibition and reasoning performance. 
This suggests that people who are high in inhibitory control are most capable of maximizing 
inductive potency by withstanding interference from strongly associated but contextually 
irrelevant unstructured knowledge. 
Low-Level Motor Inhibitory Control 
Whereas the semantic inhibition task taps people‟s ability to inhibit semantic information that 
has been automatically activated by context, inhibitory control can be tapped at a lower level. 
Perhaps the relation between semantic inhibition and people‟s ability to resist the lure of the 
strong but irrelevant association and reason based on a relevant relation between base and 
target premise merely reflects their ability to withhold an appealing  prepotent response in 
order to give a more carefully considered answer. To explore the possibility that the relation 
between inhibitory control and use of structured knowledge is not constrained to the semantic 
level of processing, we also looked at the relation between reasoning patterns on the conflict 
triads and performance on the stop signal task.   Descriptive statistics for the stop signal task 
are presented in Table 5.3 below.  
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics for the Stop Signal Task in Experiment 7 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Stop signal accuracy 27.04 4.65 7 32 
Primary accuracy 60.11 8.76 24 64 
MRT primary trials  in ms 559 131 352 971 
Stop accuracy 250 ms delay 12.54 2.65 3 16 
Stop accuracy 150 ms delay 14.50 2.35 4 16 
 
Total accuracy on the stop signal trials of the  inhibitory control measure neither correlated 
with the mean number of taxonomic choices  for the conflict triads when reasoning about 
cells, r(28) = .05, p= .80,  nor with the difference in number of taxonomic choices between the 
conflict and control trials when reasoning about cells, r(28) = -.17, p= .39. Even when people 
who lacked appropriate taxonomic knowledge were excluded, the correlation between total 
stop signal accuracy and the mean number of taxonomic choices  remained non-significant 
r(20) = -.27, p= .28, as did the correlation between stop signal task performance and the 
difference in number of taxonomic choices between the conflict and control trials , r(20) = .06, 
p= .08. It thus seems that the lack of a significant relation is because the stop signal task 
measures inhibitory control at a simple motor response level. This suggests that in order to 
resist the lure of strong associative knowledge in order to recruit more structured knowledge 
requires the ability to inhibit the intrusion of semantic knowledge rather than the ability to 
simply withhold a response. Interestingly, the measure of semantic inhibition (i.e. rejecting 
contextually appropriate non-words as suitable sentence fillers) was not correlated with 
people‟s performance on the stop signal task, suggesting that they are not tapping into the 
same domain-general construct of inhibition, r(28) = -.1, p = .61. 
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5.2.3 Discussion 
In the current experiment we confirmed that recruiting contextually appropriate structured 
knowledge is harder when there is competition from highly available but inappropriate 
unstructured knowledge. Thus, people in our triad task more frequently chose the weakly 
associated but contextually more appropriate taxonomic target category when there was no 
competition from the inappropriate but strongly associated causal target. This suggests that 
the use of contextually more appropriate source of structured knowledge can at times 
necessitate the inhibition of a strong but inappropriate association activated in semantic 
memory. This was supported by our findings that accurate context-sensitive reasoning and 
use of structured knowledge on the triad task was related to performance on a semantic 
inhibitory control task.  
The nature of this inhibitory process deserves a more fine-grained analysis, as not all 
inhibitory measures show equal levels of association with reasoning performance (Miyake, et 
al., 2000). We found that people‟s ability to resist the inappropriate choice based on 
unstructured associative knowledge and reason based on a more suitable structural relation 
between the base and the alternative target category was correlated with their ability to resist 
interference by automatic semantic knowledge on a lexical decision-making task. In contrast, 
there was no relationship between the measure of inhibition obtained from the stop-signal 
task and inductive reasoning performance. Furthermore, there was a near-zero correlation 
between the semantic inhibition measure and the stop-signal task. This concurs with other 
research suggesting that different measures of inhibitory control are poorly correlated (Fan, 
Flombaum, McCandliss, Thomas, & Posner, 2003; Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, Logan, & 
Strayer, 1994; Salthouse & Meinz, 1995; Shilling, Chetwynd, & Rabbitt, 2002; Wager, et al., 
2005).  
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A recent study by Bissett, Nee and Jonides (2009) suggests that dissociable inhibitory 
control processes operate at different processing levels, explaining the lack of correlations 
between tasks that selectively tap into the independent inhibitory processes. This might 
explain why the nature of the inhibitory process required to reason based on contextually 
more appropriate knowledge appears to be circumscribed and highly selective. Concerning 
our current findings, the most interesting dissociation found by Bissett et al. (2009) was 
between interference control and conflict resolution at the response selection stage and 
prepotent inhibition at the response output stage. Research has also confirmed this distinction 
by demonstrating that these two kinds of inhibitory processes activate common as well as 
dissociable neural regions (Nee, Wager, & Jonides, 2007). In our reasoning task, automatic 
activation of strongly associated but inappropriate unstructured knowledge is likely to create 
a conflict at the response selection stage. To maximize the potency of their selective 
inference, people have to decide whether to reason based on this strong associative but 
inappropriate relation or allocate additional resources to processing the more pertinent 
structural relation. Once this conflict has been resolved, it is unlikely to require further 
inhibitory processes to provide the correct answer.  
Our semantic task also creates a conflict at the response selection stage. Thus, the 
response cued by the semantic resemblance of the non-word with the primed cloze word 
conflicts with the response required by the non-word itself. The idea that response selection is 
prolonged in tasks that require conflict resolution at this processing stage is supported by a 
study demonstrating increased ERP amplitude arising from activity in the lateral frontal and 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (West, 2003; West, Jakubek, Wymbs, Perry, & Moore, 
2005). In contrast, this conflict at the response selection stage is supposedly absent in the 
stop-signal task (Rubia, Russell, et al., 2001; Rubia, Smith, et al., 2001), instead only 
requiring the inhibition of a prepotent response at the output stage. This suggests that 
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inhibitory functions operating in category-based induction are fairly subtle and specific rather 
than reflecting a global ability to control prepotent responses.  
5.3 Overview Experiment 8  
In the next experiment, we wished to replicate the finding that in order to maximize selective 
inductive potency, people must at times inhibit inappropriate unstructured knowledge if this 
conflicts with more appropriate structured knowledge. Furthermore, we also wanted to 
explore the possibility that in addition to inhibitory control, the recruitment of structured 
knowledge might pose a secondary source of difficulty. For example, in order to exhibit the 
diversity effect with specific conclusions, it is necessary to generate a superordinate category 
that includes both the premise and conclusion categories. Feeney (2007) has shown that the 
diversity effect for specific conclusion categories is correlated with people‟s cognitive ability, 
suggesting that only people high in cognitive resources might be able to engage in an 
effortful assessment of taxonomic interrelationships. Thus, in addition to failures of 
inhibition, failing to effortfully recruit structured knowledge might further explain why 
people are sometimes swayed by inappropriate unstructured relations between categories, 
such as a strong association. In this case, people high in working memory resources might be 
better able to effortfully recruit contextually appropriate structured knowledge. Besides the 
relationship we found between inhibitory control and selective inference, we might expect a 
correlation between working memory capacity and appropriate selective inductive reasoning.  
Based on the previous experiments, we expected to replicate the finding that people make 
selectivity errors when they reasoned about cells and there was a conflict between a highly 
associated but inappropriate causal target and a more appropriate, but only weakly related 
taxonomic target. We also hoped to repeat the observation that people higher in inhibitory 
control are more successful at inhibiting unstructured knowledge in favour of more 
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appropriate structured knowledge. Finally, we examined whether people who were more 
successful at using appropriate structured knowledge outperformed people who were swayed 
by the inappropriate unstructured knowledge on the Operation Span task, a measure of 
working memory capacity.   
5.3.1 Method 
Design 
The experiment had a repeated-measures design. The independent variable was the type of 
triad (type of triad: control or conflict) and the dependent variable was the number of 
appropriate taxonomic choices. We expected a main effect of type of triad, with people 
making more contextually appropriate inferences in the control compared to the conflict 
condition where there was the lure from the strongly associated but inappropriate causal 
target.  
As before, we expected correlations between people‟s use of more appropriate structured 
knowledge and their ability to withhold a prepotent semantic response, measured by the 
variant of the Hayling Task. Thus, there should be a positive correlation between level of 
semantic inhibitory control and successful selective reasoning, and a negative correlation 
between inhibitory control and the difference between conflict and control trials. 
In addition, we expected to find correlations between people‟s appropriate selective 
inductive reasoning on the cell conflict triads and their working memory capacity as 
measured by the Operation Span task. 
Participants 
50 participants from Durham University earned course credit for their participation in the 
experiment. Their mean age was 23.1 years (SD = 4.2 years). 
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Triad Task  
The materials were identical to the ones used in the previous experiment. To briefly 
summarize, we chose 14 triads in which we pitched unstructured knowledge in form of a 
strongly associated target category against structured knowledge in form of a more 
appropriately related, but weakly associated alternative target. Thus, when people were 
reasoning about cells, the appropriate choice (taxonomically related target) was weakly 
associated, whereas the inappropriate choice (causally related target) was strongly associated. 
For the cell control triads, the inappropriate but strongly associated target was substituted for 
a completely unrelated alternative target. As before, we included 28 filler triads in which 
people were asked to reason about diseases (e.g. has disease wQ2) for which both the 
taxonomic or causal target could be appropriate, in order to ensure that people had to pay 
attention to the property they were reasoning about. In total, each participant reasoned about 
56 triads, 14 conflict cell, 14 control cell triads and 28 disease filler triads.  
 
Materials and Procedure Post-Test and Semantic Inhibitory Task 
The materials for the post-test and the semantic inhibitory control task were identical to the 
previous experiment.  
Automated Operation Span  
Materials 
People‟s working memory was assessed by means of the automated operation task, AOSPAN 
(Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). In this task, to-be-remembered items are 
interspersed with processing items. The memory items consist of 12 letters (F, H, J, K, L, N, 
P, Q, R, S, T and Y). The processing items consist of mathematical operations (e.g. (1*3) + 1 
= ? ), followed by a digit (e.g. 4) and a “true” and “false” box. Subjects had to solve the 
mathematical operation and click the appropriate box, verifying whether the presented digit 
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was a correct or incorrect solution.  For half of the mathematical operations, the subsequent 
digit represented a correct solution, whereas for the other half, the digit was not a valid result.  
Procedure  
The task was presented on a laptop and was mouse-driven. There were three practise 
elements. In the first section, participants completed the memory task. They saw a letter on-
screen for 800 milliseconds. After a varying number of letters, participants were presented 
with 4*3 letter matrix and they had to try and recall the previously presented letter sequence 
in the correct order by clicking a box next to the chosen letter. Participants were then 
provided with feedback on how many letters they had correctly remembered. Figure 5.5 
below, taken directly from Unsworth et al (2005), shows the basic task procedure. 
The second practice session familiarized participants with the mathematical operations 
and also served as the basis for determining an individual‟s unique response deadline for the 
main trials. Participants were asked to respond to the maths problems as fast as possible 
without sacrificing accuracy. Following each of the 15 trials, participants received feedback 
on their performance in form of the percent of maths problems solved correctly.  
For the final practice session, participants completed the letter and maths problems 
simultaneously. They were first presented with the mathematical operation. The response 
deadline was adjusted to each individual based on his/her performance on 15 pre-test maths 
problems by adding 2.5 standard deviations to their response mean. Once they had solved the 
maths operation, they were presented with a letter after 200 milliseconds. In total, there were 
three practice trials consisting of a letter set size of two.  
Next followed the main experimental trials. In total, there were five different set sizes, 
ranging from three to seven letters. There were three sets of each set size, totaling 75 letters 
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and 75 mathematical operations. The order of presentation of a given set size was completely 
random for each participant.  
In order to ensure that people did not develop a strategy of rehearsing the letters and 
disregarding the mathematical operations, participants were asked to try to be at least 85% 
accurate on the maths operations. Accuracy was fed back to participants during the recall 
stage, where a cumulative percentage in red was shown in the top right-hand corner. 
If recruitment of relevant structured knowledge does indeed require cognitive effort, we 
might expect to see correlations between people‟s number of accurate taxonomic choices in 
the conflict triads and their working memory capacity, operationalized as the total number of 
letters that they could correctly recall.  
Chapter 5  Conflicting Types of Knowledge 
 
199 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Illustration of the AOSPAN. Presentation of a math operation followed by a digit. Participants chose 
whether the digit is a correct or incorrect solution to the math operation. Followed by a letter for 800 ms. At 
recall, participants choose the presented letters in the correct order from an array. Followed by feedback for 
2000 ms. 
 
Participants carried out the four tasks in one individual session of around 50 minutes. The 
experimental components were completed in fixed sequence, starting with the triad task, 
followed by the post-test belief assessment, the semantic inhibitory control task, and finishing 
with the AOSPAN task.  
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5.3.2 Results 
Triad Task 
We summed the number of times a participant chose the weakly associated taxonomic 
category separately for the cell conflict triads and cell control triads and analysed these with a 
paired-samples t-test.  
As in the previous two experiments, there was an effect of type of triad, tS (49) = -7.68, p < 
.0005, effect size d = 1.1; tI (13) = -3.79, p = .002, effect size d = 1.0. Illustrated in Figure 5.6, 
people chose the weakly associated taxonomic target more frequently for the control triads 
(M number of taxonomic choices = 12.7, SD = 1.3) than for the conflict triads where there 
was competition from the strongly associated but inappropriate causal target (M = 9.7, SD = 
3.0). 
 
.  
Figure 5.6: Mean Number of Taxonomic Choices across the two Types of Triads when reasoning 
about Cells 
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This suggests that inappropriate unstructured knowledge was detrimentally affecting people‟s 
ability to base their inductive choices on more appropriate structured taxonomic knowledge.  
In order to show that people were swayed by unstructured knowledge in form of a strong 
association between the base and the causal target we compared the proportion of taxonomic 
choices for the conflict triads in which the causal link was predictive (8 triads) to conflict 
triads in which this link was diagnostic (6 triads). If people were lured by the strong 
association rather than by the structured relation, we would not expect to observe a causal 
asymmetry effect.   
The proportion of taxonomic choices for the conflict triads in which the causal choice 
was predictively related to the base (e.g. ants → anteaters or dragonflies?) (M taxonomic 
choice = .73, SD = .22) was significantly higher (tS (49) = 2.95, p = .005, effect size = .37) than 
the proportion of taxonomic choices for the triads in which the causal link was diagnostic 
(e.g. butterflies → flowers or locusts?) (M taxonomic proportion = .64, SD = .26). However, 
the effect of direction was only significant across participants, not across items (tI (12) = .6, p = 
.56, effect size d = .32). As the direction of this difference was opposite to the one that would 
be predicted if people were drawing on structured causal knowledge, we believe that the 
above effect of triad type can be attributed to the strong unstructured association between the 
causal target and the base rather than being based on the underlying structural relation.  
Post Test Check 
To check that people knew about the structured relations between the categories, we checked 
beliefs about food chain relations (causal relatedness) and biological group membership 
(taxonomic relatedness) in a post-test. For the causally related categories, the mean causal 
relatedness endorsement proportion was .84 (SD = .13) and the mean endorsement proportion 
for being taxonomically related was .15 (SD = .16). For the taxonomically related categories, 
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the taxonomic relatedness endorsement proportion was .73 (SD = .19) and .12 (SD = .15) for 
being causally related. Finally, for the unrelated categories, the causal relatedness 
endorsement rate was .17 (SD = .09) and the taxonomic relatedness endorsement proportion 
was .07 (SD = .1).  
A one-way ANOVA on causal relatedness endorsement proportions showed that there 
was a significant main effect of type of relation between the categories, F (1.62, 79.39
10
) = 
567.66, p < .0005. Bonferroni post-hoc tests confirmed the expected pattern of results. Thus, 
the mean causal relatedness endorsement was significantly higher for the causally related 
categories than for both the taxonomically and unrelated categories (p‟s < .0005). There was 
no difference in causal relatedness endorsement for the unrelated categories compared to the 
taxonomically related categories (p = .06).  
Similarly, a one-way ANOVA on taxonomic relatedness endorsement proportions 
showed that there was a main effect of relation between the categories, F (1.6, 78.57
11
) = 329.23, 
p < .0005. Bonferroni post-tests showed that the taxonomic relatedness endorsement 
proportion was significantly higher for the causally related categories than for the unrelated 
categories (p = .002). However, the important finding was that the taxonomic endorsement 
proportion for the taxonomically related categories was significantly higher than for both the 
causally and unrelated categories (p‟s < .0005).  
To check that people weren‟t simply choosing  the strongly associated but inappropriate 
target because they lacked structured knowledge about the taxonomic relation between the 
two weakly associated categories, we compared the proportion of positive responses to the 
question whether the (strongly associated) causally related pairs were part of the same food 
chain with the proportion of positive responses to the question whether the (weakly 
                                                          
10
df adjusted for non-sphericity using Greenhouse-Geisser  
11
 df adjusted for non-sphericity using Greenhouse-Geisser 
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associated) taxonomically related category pairs belonged to the same biological group. As in 
the previous two experiments, a paired-samples t-test was significant (t (49) = 3.56, p < .0005, 
effect size d = .55), showing that the endorsement rates about biological relatedness for the 
taxonomically related pairs (M proportion = .73, SD = .19) was significantly lower than the 
endorsement rate of being part of the same food chain for the causally related pairs (M 
proportion = .84, SD = .13). We worked out the difference between the taxonomic and causal 
endorsement ratings and eliminated participants whose difference scores were larger than 1.5 
standard deviations away from the mean difference. 
As in the previous experiments, we also compared the proportion of biological 
relatedness endorsements for the conflict triads where people chose the taxonomic target with 
the proportion of biological endorsements where they chose the causal target. When all 
participants were included, the mean biological endorsement proportion where people made a 
taxonomic choice was .80 (SD = .19), whereas it was only .60 (SD = .35) for conflict triads in 
which people chose the causal target. A paired samples t-test showed that this difference was 
statistically significant (t (49) = 4.07, p < .0005, effect size d = 1). Again, we computed the 
difference between the proportion of taxonomic endorsements when people chose the 
appropriate taxonomic target and the proportion of taxonomic endorsements when they chose 
the inappropriate causal target and excluded participants whose difference score was larger 
than 1.5 standard deviations than the mean difference 
To remedy the problem of lack of appropriate taxonomic knowledge, we excluded 18 
participants whose difference scores were further than 1.5 standard deviations away from the 
mean difference on either of the two aforementioned structured knowledge indices. For the 
remaining participants, the results showed that there was neither a difference in the mean 
biological endorsement proportion (M = .82, SD = .16) and their causal relatedness 
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endorsement proportion (M = .83, SD = .14), t(31) = .84, p = .41, effect size d = .09, nor a 
significant difference (t (31) = .42, p = .68, effect size d = .08) in biological endorsement 
proportions for taxonomic (M taxonomic endorsement = .81, SD = .21) versus causal 
inductive choices (M taxonomic endorsement = .79, SD = .23). 
To be sure, we repeated the comparison on the mean number of taxonomic choices for 
the cell conflict triads and cell control triads for people who had relevant structured 
knowledge. This confirmed that the difference was still highly significant (t (31) = 5.5, p < 
.0005, effect size d = .95). Participants made fewer appropriate taxonomic choices for the cell 
conflict triads (M = 10.2, SD = 3.0) than for the cell control triads (M = 12.9, SD = 1.0). This 
supports our suggestion that they were swayed by unstructured knowledge instantiated by the 
strongly associated but inappropriately related causal target. 
Relation between Selective Inductive Reasoning and Semantic Inhibition 
The first correlations we looked at were between people‟s successful use of structured 
knowledge and their performance on the inhibitory control task, which assesses inhibition at a 
semantic level. Table 5.4 below gives descriptive statistics for the semantic inhibition task. 
Table 5.4: Means and Standard Deviations for the Semantic Inhibition Task 
Experiment 8 
Measure Mean SD Min Max 
Correct Judgement Contextually Appropriate Non-word 28.3 2.1 21 30 
Correct Judgement Contextually Appropriate Word 27.5 2.1 20 30 
Correct Judgement Contextually Inappropriate Non-word 29.8 0.6 27 30 
Correct Judgement Contextually Inappropriate Word 29.8 0.5 28 30 
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In line with the findings from Experiments 7, there was a significant correlation between 
choosing the weakly associated taxonomic category when reasoning about cells and level of 
semantic inhibitory control, i.e. people‟s ability to make a correct judgement for the related 
non-word trials. Across the whole sample, inhibitory control was negatively related to the 
difference in number of taxonomic choices between cell conflict and cell control triads, r (50) 
= -.33, p = .019. This means that people high in semantic inhibitory control exhibited more 
consistent reasoning patterns, making a similar number of appropriate taxonomic choices in 
the conflict and control triad trials. Inhibitory control was also positively related to the 
number of taxonomic choices in the conflict triads, r (50) = .30, p = .034, supporting the idea 
that they were better at inhibiting unstructured knowledge in favour of more appropriate 
structured knowledge. 
However, these correlations were substantially smaller than those obtained in the 
previous experiment. This decreased magnitude of the relationship between semantic 
inhibitory control and appropriate context-sensitive inductive reasoning might be driven by 
the people who did not have relevant taxonomic knowledge as suggested by the post-test. To 
explore this possibility, we divided our sample into two groups of individuals, those with and 
those lacking structured taxonomic knowledge. The group lacking appropriate structured 
knowledge (N = 18) was made up of people whose difference scores between their taxonomic 
and causal endorsements was further than 1.5 standard deviations away from the mean. It also 
included people whose taxonomic endorsement proportions were more than 1.5 standard 
deviations away from the mean difference between conflict triads where they chose the 
causal versus the taxonomic target. 
We then re-ran the correlational analyses separately for the two groups of people who 
differed in whether or not they had structured taxonomic knowledge. Figure 5.7 below shows 
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a visual illustration of the divergent relation between semantic inhibitory control and 
appropriate context-sensitive reasoning depending upon structured knowledge level. 
 
Figure 5.7: Relation between Semantic Inhibition and Number of Taxonomic Choices depending upon 
Presence of Structured Knowledge 
 
For the 32 individuals with taxonomic knowledge the correlation between inhibitory control 
and the difference in number of taxonomic choices between cell conflict and control triads 
increased to r (32) = -.57, p = .001. Similarly, the correlation between semantic inhibitory 
control and total number of taxonomic choices for the cell conflict triads increased to r (32) = 
.54, p = .001. This suggests that amongst those who have the appropriate background 
knowledge, appropriate context-sensitive reasoning is best when people are high in inhibitory 
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control, as they can better withstand the interference of strongly associated but inappropriate 
unstructured knowledge. 
Furthermore, when we ran the same correlation analyses on the individuals who did not 
have the relevant taxonomic knowledge, hence eliminating the potential conflict between 
structured and unstructured associative knowledge, the correlation between taxonomic 
choices and semantic inhibitory control was substantially reduced and no longer significant. 
Thus, for individuals lacking structured knowledge the correlation between semantic 
inhibitory control and the difference in number of taxonomic choices between cell conflict 
and control triads decreased to r (18) = -.15 , p = .55. The association between semantic 
inhibitory control and total number of taxonomic choices for the cell conflict triads decreased 
to r (18) = .22, p = .39.  
 
Relation between Working Memory Capacity and Appropriate Selective Induction  
People with greater working memory capacity might show superior performance on the 
inductive reasoning task, as they are better able to recruit appropriate structured knowledge 
whilst facing distraction/competition from inappropriate unstructured knowledge. The 
AOSPAN task assesses people‟s ability to store and recall letters from memory whilst 
simultaneously carrying out mathematical operations (Unsworth, et al., 2005). We used the 
total number of letters participants could correctly recall, thus giving them credit for partially 
correct sets. This method is superior to all-or-nothing scoring, showing the highest internal 
consistencies across different span tasks (Conway, et al., 2005). Table 5.5 below shows the 
mean and standard deviations for the correctly recalled letters, as well as mean number of 
speed and accuracy errors for the mathematical operations. Data from 2 people was missing 
due to equipment failure. 
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Table 5.5: Means and Standard Deviations for the AOSPAN in Experiment 8 
Measure Mean SD Min Max 
Total Number Correct Recall 55.8 14.3 13 73 
Math Speed Error  1.9 3.6 0 21 
Math Accuracy Error 6.2 6.3 0 42 
 
 
Overall, scores on the AOSPAN were significantly correlated with the difference between 
number of taxonomic choices for cell conflict compared to cell control triads (r (48) = - .35, p 
= .015), and correlated, but not significantly, with the overall number of taxonomic choices 
for cell conflict triads (r (48) = .27, p = .067). These relationships appear to be fairly modest, 
however, as with the relation between selective inductive reasoning and semantic inhibition, 
this may be attenuated by people who did not have relevant taxonomic knowledge. To 
explore this possibility, the correlations were re-run separately for the two subgroups 
differing in their level of taxonomic knowledge.  Figure 5.8 below shows this relation for the 
two subgroups. 
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Figure 5.8: Relation between Working Memory AOPSAN Score and Number of Taxonomic Choices 
depending upon Presence of Structured Knowledge 
 
As can be seen from Tables 5.6 and 5.7 below, there were robust correlations between 
working memory and the ability to choose the appropriate taxonomic target category in 
favour of the strongly associated but inappropriate competing category for people who had 
taxonomic knowledge, but not for those individuals lacking structured knowledge.  
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Table 5.6: Correlations between Taxonomic Choices, Semantic Inhibition and Working 
Memory Span for Individuals with Structured Knowledge (N=30) 
 Number 
Taxonomic 
Choices 
Semantic 
Inhibition 
Score 
AOPSAN 
Score 
Number Taxonomic Choices 1 .54
**
 .39
*
 
Semantic Inhibition Score 
 
1 .36
*
 
AOSPAN Score 
  
1 
            * p< .05     ** p< .001 
 
Table 5.7: Correlations between Taxonomic Choices, Semantic Inhibition and Working 
Memory Span for Individuals lacking Structured Knowledge (N=18) 
 
Number 
Taxonomic 
Choices 
Semantic 
Inhibition 
Score 
AOPSAN 
Score 
Number Taxonomic Choices 1 .04 -.15 
Semantic Inhibition Score 
 
1 -.18 
AOSPAN Score 
  
1 
 
Partial Correlations between Appropriate Context-Sensitive Induction, Semantic 
Inhibition and Working Memory 
According to Engle (2002), one important component of the working memory construct can 
be conceptualized as executive attention. Thus, we explore to what extent the AOSPAN and 
our measure of semantic inhibition each explains unique variance in the total number of 
appropriate taxonomic choices on the conflict triads. As we assume that inhibition is only 
required when there is a conflict between structured and unstructured knowledge, and 
working memory is involved with the recruitment of weakly associated but appropriate 
structured knowledge, we limited this analysis to the people who had structured knowledge.  
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Firstly, there was a significant correlation between semantic inhibitory control and 
AOSPAN scores, r (28) = .36, p = .05. Furthermore, the significant zero-order correlation 
between people‟s number of appropriate taxonomic choices for the cell conflict triads and 
their AOSPAN score, r(28) = .39, p = .034, decreased and became non-significant when 
controlling for people‟s semantic inhibitory control score, r(27) = .25, p = .2. However, the 
substantial zero-order correlation, r (28) = .54, p = .002, between number of taxonomic choices 
and semantic inhibitory control score was only slightly decreased when controlling for 
AOPSAN score, r (27) = .46, p = .011. This suggests that what makes the selection of 
appropriate knowledge difficult in our task is the ability to block out interference from 
inappropriate unstructured knowledge and focus attention upon more appropriate structured 
relations. This supports several authors‟ views (McCabe, Roediger, McDaniel, Balota & 
Hambrick, 2010; Engle, 2002; Barrett, Tugade & Engle, 2004; Kane & Engle, 2003) that 
working memory tasks and inhibitory control tasks share an underlying executive attention 
component. It seems that it is this component of working memory that drives its relation to 
inductive reasoning performance in our task. 
5.3.3 Discussion  
The results from the current study corroborate those from Experiment 6 and 7. When people 
had to choose which target was more likely to share novel cells with a base category, they 
were often swayed by an inappropriate but strongly associated target rather than choosing the 
appropriate taxonomically related category. The ability to choose the weakly associated but 
appropriate target was strongly related to people‟s performance on a measure of semantic 
inhibitory control, but only when people had the relevant background knowledge. 
Furthermore, in people with relevant structured knowledge, performance on the inductive 
reasoning triads was also related to scores on the AOSPAN, a measure of working memory, 
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although this correlation became non-significant when variance explained by semantic 
inhibitory control was partialled out.  Most interestingly, when we split our participants 
according to their level of structured knowledge, the correlations between inductive reasoning 
performance, semantic inhibitory control and working memory were only significant for 
those participants with structured knowledge, whereas the relation was absent for the group 
who lacked this knowledge. This would be expected, as the conflict between structured 
knowledge and unstructured associative knowledge would only be present in those who 
actually had the relevant background knowledge, strengthening our claim that category-based 
induction can be influenced by two types of knowledge that differ in their processing 
characteristics.  
5.4 General Discussion 
The three experiments described in this chapter provide further evidence that structured and 
unstructured knowledge influence selective category-based induction, and that the ability to 
reason based on structured knowledge is related to an individual‟s level of inhibitory control. 
Although these two types of knowledge will often coincide and afford similar inferences, 
there are occasions when structured and unstructured knowledge may conflict. In the current 
experiments, we created a conflict between inferences based on unstructured knowledge 
(strong association between base and target) and structured knowledge (weakly associated, 
but appropriate structural relation between base and alternative target). 
The results suggest that when the to-be-generalized property of a base category afforded a 
generalization to an appropriately related but weakly associated target, people were often 
swayed by the very strongly associated but inappropriate alternative target. The findings also 
showed that the tendency to inhibit the strong association in favour of the target with an 
appropriate structural relation was highly correlated with a specific type of inhibitory control, 
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namely semantic inhibitory control, but not with more basic-level motor-level inhibitory 
control. 
The notion that inhibitory control forms a crucial component of working memory is borne 
out in Engle‟s (2002; 2010) conceptualization of working memory as attention control. He 
claims that working memory reflects the interface between attention and memory, that is, the 
capability to either maintain or inhibit memory representations depending upon their 
relevance to the current task. In the first experiment, semantic inhibitory control only 
correlated with reasoning performance in the light load condition, not in the heavy load 
condition. To some extent, this dissociable effect of memory load mirrors the findings from 
Kane and Engle (2000), who showed that only people with superior working memory showed 
a decline in performance on a recall task under secondary load, whereas people with low 
working memory spans were unaffected by the secondary task. As secondary tasks are 
thought to interfere with the efficiency of working memory, it would appear that the 
predominant resource-demanding challenge in our category-based inductive reasoning task 
lies in inhibiting irrelevant memory representations, rather than in the subsequent ability to 
activate and maintain more task-relevant knowledge structures. This idea is further reinforced 
by the finding that although superior selective inductive reasoning performance was related to 
a measure of working memory in the third experiment, this was largely via the shared 
variance between the working memory and semantic inhibitory control measure. Once the 
variance accounted for by the semantic inhibitory control measure was partialled out, the 
association between working memory score and performance on the selective inductive 
reasoning task was no longer significant.  
The findings also help our understanding of the more domain-general processes involved 
in category-based induction and reasoning more generally. Thus, as already demonstrated in 
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the previous two chapters, reasoning based on unstructured knowledge seems to be mediated 
by an effortless, heuristic process, whereas the ability to draw on structured knowledge 
requires the involvement of more effortful, analytical reasoning processes. The experiments 
reported in the current chapter go some way in illuminating the nature of the interaction 
between the two contrasting processes, echoing similar findings in social cognition research 
(Macrae, Bodenhausen, Schloerscheidt, & Milne, 1999; von Hippel, Silver, & Lynch, 2000), 
as well as in the deductive reasoning and decision-making literature. For example, De Neys 
(2006b) demonstrated that reasoning performance was negatively affected by a secondary 
cognitive load, regardless of people‟s working memory capacity. De Neys (2006b) findings 
suggests that differences in reasoning performance do not arise because of qualitative 
differences in the reasoning architecture, but are due to the efficiency with which people may 
be able to inhibit an automatic response in favour of applying a more effortful process. Our 
results suggest a slightly more elaborate interpretation. Whilst a secondary memory load led 
to an overall decline in selection of appropriate knowledge, it also eliminated the relation 
between semantic inhibitory control and reasoning performance. One could speculate that the 
secondary task was more detrimental to people who are better at inhibiting irrelevant 
information compared to people who are less proficient at inhibiting appealing but 
inappropriate knowledge. The latter group might already be already performing poorly, so the 
secondary task would simply level the playing ground between people who are more or less 
proficient at inhibitory control, analogous to Kane & Engle‟s (2000) findings that a secondary 
task was more detrimental for people with higher working memory scores.  The fact that the 
correlation between the measure of working memory control and reasoning performance was 
largely mediated by scores on the semantic inhibitory control task suggests that it is the 
shared component of executive attentional control that is crucial for selecting appropriate 
structured knowledge, and which is disrupted by a secondary memory task.  
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6 Chapter VI  
 
 
Summary, Discussion and Final Conclusions 
A series of experiments examined the role of knowledge in category-based induction and 
how different types of knowledge, which are subject to contrasting processing constraints, 
can have dissociable effects on people‟s inferences. Experiments 1-3 (Chapter 3) used timing 
manipulations and a secondary task paradigm to explore whether it is possible to dissociate 
the effects of different types of knowledge in category-based inductive reasoning. It also 
examined whether knowledge from different structural domains differ in their relative 
accessibility. In Chapter 4, Experiments 4 and 5 used a more naturalistic paradigm to 
substantiate the claim that both structured and unstructured types of knowledge determine 
inductive reasoning output, and that these different types of knowledge are mediated by 
contrasting cognitive processes. The final series of experiments (Chapter 5) explored the role 
of mental processing capacities and inhibitory control in mediating the use of structured and 
unstructured knowledge. This chapter summarizes how the experimental findings answer the 
questions posed at the outset of this thesis. It then critically reviews what implications these 
answers have for theories of category-based inductive reasoning. With reference to more 
general theories of reasoning, in particular dual process frameworks, this chapter also 
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evaluates what the findings can tell us about the fundamental nature of cognitive processes 
involved in reasoning. The chapter concludes with an outlook onto future challenges and 
opportunities. 
6.1 Structured and Unstructured Types of Knowledge 
We began with the hypothesis that theories of category-based inductive reasoning form a 
dichotomy in how they conceptualize the nature of knowledge driving people‟s inferences. 
On the one hand, there are frameworks which call attention to knowledge that cannot be 
captured by a higher-order theoretical structure. We summarize these approaches under 
theories that emphasise the role of unstructured knowledge, such as featural similarity 
(Sloman, 1993b), perceptual similarity (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004a) and associative strength 
(Rogers & McClelland, 2004). On the other hand, there are frameworks in which theoretical 
interrelationships between categories are central to understanding people‟s inferences. We 
subsume these under theories that favour structured knowledge, such as taxonomic 
hierarchies (Osherson, et al., 1990), ecological relationships (Coley, et al., 2005) and causal 
relations (Rehder, 2006; 2009). One way to resolve this apparent theoretical dichotomy is to 
allow for both types of knowledge to influence people‟s inductions, but that different types of 
knowledge are subject to contrasting processing constraints. We re-interpreted the findings 
from several experiments (Barraff & Coley, 2003; Coley & Barraff, 2003; Shafto, Coley, et 
al., 2007) to argue that the application of unstructured knowledge may be a heuristic process, 
which is effortless and automatic, whereas the use of structured knowledge may require more 
analytical processing, requiring considerable time and cognitive processing resources (see 
Rehder, 2009). Our experiments demonstrate the tenability of this proposition, allowing us to 
answer the more specific questions raised in the introduction. 
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Question 1: 
Are unstructured and structured knowledge dissociable, and if so, do they have differential 
impact on the reasoning output? 
The first step to answering this question was to devise measures of each type of knowledge 
and show that they did not correlate with one another. We defined unstructured knowledge as 
the degree of simultaneous activation of two or more category instances, which may arise 
from spatial and/or temporal contiguity, or from having similar features. One way of 
psychologically representing unstructured knowledge seems to be strength of association 
between categories. Two categories ought to be more strongly associated the more frequently 
they co-occur, thus encoding statistical properties of our environment. One feature of 
unstructured knowledge is that people do not need to reason explicitly about how and why 
two categories are related/unrelated. In fact, there need not even be a deep underlying 
structure that relates one or more categories. This has been used extensively in advertising, 
where a brand (e.g. bathroom tissue paper) is associated with a structurally unrelated category 
which has favourable or positive properties (e.g. a cute, soft and cuddly puppy) (Knobil, 
2003).  
In a first step, we asked people for an evaluation of associative strength between 
categories, providing us with a subjective measure of unstructured knowledge. However, it 
was important to verify this subjective measure against a more objective criterion of 
associative strength, such as frequency of co-occurrence. Thus, in a second step we carried 
out a co-occurrence search on the World Wide Web using two different search engines, 
Google and Exalead. Using a formula suggested by Heylighen (2001), the conditional co-
occurrence was computed, which takes the frequency of each individual world in a pair into 
account. The correlations between the subjective associative strength measure and the two 
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objective co-occurrence indices were highly correlated, suggesting that we succeeded in 
creating an index of associative strength between categories. 
In contrast to unstructured knowledge, structured knowledge was defined as abstract and 
underlying theories which describe lawful relations between categories within a domain. We 
determined people‟s structured knowledge by asking them to explicitly assess causal and 
taxonomic relatedness between category pairs. When we correlated these two structured 
knowledge variables with the three different measures of unstructured knowledge in 
Experiments 1 to 3, only one out of the 36 individual correlation coefficients was significant. 
This supports our contention that we managed to create dissociated measures of structured 
and unstructured knowledge.  
To answer the second part of the question, whether structured and unstructured 
knowledge have dissociable effects on the reasoning output, it is necessary to look at whether 
inferences diverge depending upon which type of knowledge has most influence on the 
reasoning output. Several characteristics follow from the aforementioned conceptualization of 
unstructured and structured knowledge which permit a distinction between the influence of 
these two contrasting types of knowledge. For example, an important characteristic of 
unstructured knowledge that allows it to be dissociated from structured knowledge is that it 
should be nondirectional, so that inferences from A to B ought to be of similar strength as 
inferences from B to A. In contrast, structured knowledge has an underlying abstract 
theoretical organization which defines interrelationships between category instances 
(Tenenbaum, et al., 2007). Causal knowledge is one such type of knowledge, characterized 
by its complex underlying structure (Sloman, 2005). Categories might be related by a 
„common causal category‟ (e.g. pigeons and rats are treated as vermin by humans), or they 
may be related by a „common effect category‟ (e.g. hawks and cats both eat mice). However, 
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the simplest relation that can be exploited for maximizing the potency of inductive inferences 
is the asymmetry of causal knowledge, with causes always preceding, or at least coinciding, 
with their effects. For example, if people are reasoning about the transmission of diseases, an 
inference from prey to predator (e.g. from rabbits to foxes) should be stronger than from 
predators to prey (e.g. from foxes to rabbits) (Medin, et al., 2003; Rehder, 2009; Shafto, et 
al., 2008). Such causal asymmetry effects would not be expected if people were treating 
causal relations as simple symmetrical associations, a strategy employed by a substantial 
minority in Rehder‟s (2009) experiment. However, the challenge is to combine descriptive 
and computational-level models, such as the theory-based Bayesian approaches which predict 
phenomena such as the causal asymmetry effect, with concrete theories about online 
processing in order to explain when and how different types of knowledge affect the 
reasoning output. 
In the first study (Experiments 1 and 2), we used the standard inductive inference 
evaluation paradigm to explore whether the causal asymmetry effect is mediated by 
considerations of the underlying causal structure rather than relying on unstructured 
associative knowledge.  The findings strongly suggested that when people had the available 
mental resources, and were not under any time pressure or heavy cognitive burden, they were 
able to apply structured causal knowledge. In a relevant context, such as when reasoning 
about the likelihood of sharing diseases, these individuals thought that causal predictive 
inferences (i.e. from prey to predator or from plant to consumer) were stronger than causal 
diagnostic inferences (i.e. from predator to prey or from consumer to plant). Crucially 
though, this difference disappeared when people were not granted enough time or working 
memory resources to draw on structured causal knowledge. Instead, they seemed to use a 
non-directional associative strength heuristic as the basis for making their inductive 
evaluations.  This also parallels the finding that directional asymmetries in reaction times 
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between causally related concepts only emerge when people assessed causal relatedness but 
not when considering degree of association (Fenker, et al., 2005; Satpute, et al., 2005).  Thus, 
it appears that the use of structured knowledge can lead to a qualitatively different reasoning 
output than the use of unstructured knowledge.   
The second study (Experiments 4 and 5) used a completely different paradigm to explore 
whether people can draw on both structured and unstructured sources of knowledge to make 
category-based inductive inferences. Rather than being asked to evaluate pre-determined 
inferences between category pairs, participants were asked to generate their own inference in 
response to learning that a category had a specific property. This circumvents concerns that 
people may not always have the relevant structured knowledge that is necessary to spot the 
relation between base and target categories (Coley, et al., 2005). For example, in Shafto et 
al.‟s (2007) post-test, participants were asked to state whether category pairs were 
ecologically and/or taxonomically related. Participants were less certain about their 
ecological knowledge than about their taxonomic knowledge, giving twice as many „don‟t 
know‟ answers in response to the ecological relatedness question compared to the taxonomic 
relatedness question. Similarly, in our last series of experiments (Experiments 6, 7 and 8), 
there was a substantial minority of individuals whose taxonomic knowledge was substantially 
worse than their causal knowledge.  
When people are given the option to generate their own inferences, they may draw on 
several domains of structured background knowledge. For example, when reasoning about 
the transmission of diseases, people may apply causal knowledge (e.g. being part of the same 
food chain), ecological knowledge (e.g. living in the same habitat) as well as taxonomic 
knowledge (e.g. closely related species may share genetic vulnerabilities to certain diseases). 
This would almost certainly be more inductively potent than merely relying on the first 
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category instance that sprung to mind.  To test the assumption that people can draw on 
unstructured and structured knowledge when generating an inference, we manipulated the 
amount of mental resources people could dedicate to the inductive generation task, and thus 
presumably the likelihood that they could make use of structured knowledge. The results 
from both Experiments 4 and 5 demonstrated that when another group of people were asked 
to evaluate the strength of association between the base and generative target category, the 
pairs people had generated under a heavy cognitive burden were judged as being more 
strongly associated than the category pairs generated under minimal cognitive load. 
Furthermore, the inductive strength people assigned to their own inferences was better 
predicted by associative strength when people were under cognitive strain, but by an index of 
structured knowledge when they were not cognitively taxed. This is similar to the findings of 
Baraff and Coley (Baraff & Coley, 2003; Coley & Barraff, 2003), who asked musical experts 
and novices to make inductive inferences about musicians and/or composers. They found that 
music experts seemed to draw on structured context-dependent relational knowledge when 
they had plenty of time, but reverted to a similarity-based strategy akin to that used by 
novices when they were under time pressure. Such a strategy presumably reflects the 
effortless and heuristic use of more unstructured types of knowledge.  
Together the findings from the first and second set of experiments suggest that structured 
and unstructured knowledge can be dissociated, and demonstrate how these two types of 
knowledge can have a differential effect on the reasoning output. This provides a 
parsimonious way of uniting apparently dichotomous theories of inductive reasoning. It also 
links our work on category-based inductive reasoning to more general theories of reasoning, 
and specifically, dual process frameworks (Epstein, Pacini, DenesRaj, & Heier, 1996; Evans, 
2006, 2007; Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 1998), whereby 
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unstructured knowledge has a relatively automatic effect upon reasoning, whereas the use of 
structured knowledge will be constrained by contextual and cognitive factors.  
If we accept the assertion that the use of structured knowledge is facilitated by more 
effortful, time-consuming, analytical reasoning, this still leaves open the question of whether 
different domain-specific knowledge structures are equivalent in terms of their processing 
demands and availability. For example, Shafto et al. (2007) suggested that taxonomic 
knowledge is privileged and more available than ecological knowledge. They based this 
claim on the finding that timing had a detrimental effect on the use of ecological but not on 
taxonomic knowledge. However, the researchers did not control for strength of association 
between the categories. This could potentially confound any conclusion drawn about domain-
specific differences, an addressed by the next question. 
Question 2:  
Are apparent differences regarding the importance and availability of knowledge from 
different domains (Rehder, 2006; Shafto, Coley, et al., 2007) still evident when level of 
association between the categories has been controlled for? 
Different researchers have taken contrasting positions on which domain of knowledge might 
dominate the reasoning output. To ensure that we were dealing with the characteristics of a 
domain-specific knowledge structure rather than with a confounding variable such as 
unstructured strength of association between categories, we ensured that the level of 
association between causally and taxonomically category pairs was identical. Across all three 
experiments, there was neither a fundamental advantage for taxonomic knowledge, as 
suggested by Shafto et al (2007), nor for causal knowledge, as proposed by Rehder (2006). 
Some of the regression analyses did suggest that taxonomic knowledge might be less 
vulnerable to manipulations of time and mental resources. However, this was largely the case 
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when people were reasoning about cells. When they were reasoning about infections and 
diseases, it appears that the use of both taxonomic and causal structured knowledge was 
somewhat compromised when people were forced to respond fast or had to contend with a 
secondary memory load task. It could be speculated that when people reason about cells, they 
only need to consider one appropriate knowledge structure, taxonomic relations, whereas 
when they reason about diseases and infections, they might have to consider both causal and 
taxonomic relatedness, making the latter a more effortful and complex task. Thus, rather than 
being due to a fundamental availability advantage for taxonomic knowledge, the apparent 
advantage may be a by-product of only having to consider one knowledge structure. This 
would also be supported by the finding that when causal directionality was ignored, no 
apparent domain differences emerged depending upon the availability of time and mental 
resources. Rather, when level of association was controlled for, people seemed to use the 
property they were reasoning about as a guide for selecting relevant knowledge domains. 
This may also explain some previous differences between experts and novices in their 
use of knowledge from different domains. It is feasible that based on their extensive 
background knowledge and frequent involvement with relevant categories, experts would 
build stronger associations between various categories than novices. Furthermore, differences 
in associative strength might also emerge between experts depending upon the focus of their 
expertise. Consider the experiment carried out by Proffitt et al. (2000), who looked at 
inductive reasoning patterns amongst three different types of US tree experts, landscapers, 
taxonomists and maintenance workers. In one of their experiments (Experiment 1), they 
showed that whereas taxonomists exhibited a diversity effect, this effect was completely 
absent in maintenance workers. It is possible that such differences found in experts‟ use of 
reasoning strategies might be explained by group differences in the degree of association 
between various tree species. For example, maintenance workers may have a stronger 
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association between trees they encounter in a similar context on a daily basis, even if they are 
taxonomically diverse. In the long run, this frequent co-occurrence may lead to a stronger 
association between certain tree species in maintenance workers compared to taxonomists. 
Maintenance workers may thus be less likely to generalize a property shared by two diverse 
but nonetheless highly associated tree species to all other tree species compared to 
taxonomists.  
6.2 Executive Functions and Mental Resources 
To summarize thus far, our findings suggest that two types of knowledge influence category-
based induction, unstructured knowledge mediated by an effortless, automatic mental 
process, and structured types of knowledge mediated by effortful mental processes which 
have a longer time course. If knowledge effects in category-based induction depend crucially 
upon the interaction between easily available unstructured knowledge and more elaborate but 
less easily available structured knowledge, we can ask more specific questions about the 
nature of how these two contrasting types of knowledge interact, and what domain-general 
processes might be implicated. This leads to the next cluster of questions regarding the role of 
executive functions and mental resources in use of knowledge in category-based reasoning. 
Question 3: 
Do people have to inhibit one type of knowledge in order for the other to dominate the 
inference process? 
Having established that structured knowledge and unstructured knowledge differ in their 
processing characteristics we are able to link our research to broader frameworks of 
reasoning which explore how different processes might interact with one another. 
Characterizing the nature and interaction of different mental processes has been pursued by 
dual-process researchers such as Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005) and De Neys (De Neys, 
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2006a, 2006b; De Neys & Everaerts, 2008; De Neys & Franssens, 2009; De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008; De Neys, et al., 2008), using manipulations like restricting response times, 
loading working memory as well as drawing on correlational (De Neys, & Everaerts, 2008; 
Kokis, MacPherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002; Stanovich & West, 1998) and neuro-
imaging (De Neys, Vartanian & Goel, 2008) techniques. However, despite the range of 
reasoning domains covered (e.g. conditional reasoning, decision-making, probabilistic 
reasoning), the stimulus materials all have one feature in common, that is, there is always a 
clear conflict between a correct normative response and a dichotomous belief-based response. 
In contrast, responses to our inductive reasoning problems in Experiments 1 to 3 are of a 
more continuous nature. Thus, it is not possible to assign a response strictly to the output 
from either a heuristic or an analytical process. Rather, it suggests that the extent to which 
people‟s reasoning is determined by processes that are either relatively automatic or 
effortless, or controlled and effortful is a proportionate rather than a discrete matter (Crisp & 
Feeney, 2009). 
The fact that it is not possible to assign a response strictly to one process or the other 
elucidates the interactive nature (Elqayam, 2009) of the two purported processes, and fits 
parsimoniously with Evans‟s (2006, 2007) default-interventionist architecture. That is, a 
heuristic and effortless process might deliver an initial response based on unstructured 
knowledge arising from temporal or spatial contingencies, associations, or frequent co-
occurrences. If people then have time and available mental resources, they may be able to 
recruit more structured theoretical knowledge that may or may not lead to modifications to 
the response suggested by the heuristic process. This is seen most clearly in the case of the 
causal asymmetry effect about disease transmission in food chains. When people do not have 
available time and mental resources, they may rely strongly on the existence of an association 
between two categories. Both structured and unstructured knowledge might concur on the 
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fact that there is a strong relation between two categories (e.g. between carrots and rabbits). 
However, unstructured knowledge stops at the fact that there is a relation. In contrast, 
structured knowledge might go beyond this to explicitly account for knowledge as to why 
and how they are related (rabbits eat carrots, carrots don‟t eat rabbits), resulting in a robust 
causal asymmetry effect that follows the predictions of a rational Bayesian analysis of 
property distribution (Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Shafto, et al., 2008). This raises questions 
about exactly how mental resources are utilized, and how these two types of knowledge may 
interact. One possibility is that people have to exert inhibitory control over unstructured 
knowledge if they want to reason based on structured knowledge, a question addressed in the 
following section.  
The regression analyses from Experiments 1 to 3 demonstrated that when people have 
available time and mental resources, structured knowledge may augment unstructured 
knowledge. However, whilst there is a high probability that unstructured and structured 
knowledge coincide to deliver the same adaptive response in everyday life, there are 
instances where actions based on structured knowledge may oppose the intuitive response 
suggested by unstructured knowledge. For example, upon encountering a dangerous bear, 
most people‟s intuitive reaction would be to run away. However, running would trigger a 
bear‟s instinctual chase response, most likely resulting in a full-blown attack. In contrast, 
taking a non-threatening position is more likely to appease the bear. Using such elaborate 
causal knowledge would then afford the inference that lying flat on the ground is the better 
course of action. This is a prime example where people have to inhibit unstructured 
knowledge in favour of more elaborate structured knowledge, resulting in a very different and 
more adaptive inference.   
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In Experiments 6 to 8 we looked at how people deal with such a conflict between 
structured and unstructured knowledge. The results showed that people found it harder to 
draw on weakly associated but appropriate structured knowledge when they were lured by 
unstructured associative knowledge even if it was contextually inappropriate. As mentioned, 
this supports the idea that unstructured knowledge has to be inhibited if inferences are to be 
based on less available structured knowledge. The fact that this effect was amplified when 
people were put under cognitive load suggests that the inhibitory process required 
considerable mental effort. This is consistent with evidence from other reasoning domains, 
which suggests that inhibiting background knowledge relies on availability of central 
executive resources such as attention (Barton, Fugelsang, & Smilek, 2009) and inhibitory 
control. For example, the ability to reason counterfactually, such as imagining an alternative 
outcome had a preceding event not occurred, or imagining the outcome if a detail inconsistent 
with one‟s world knowledge was in fact true, is correlated with 3- and 4-year-old children‟s 
performance on inhibitory control tasks (Beck, Riggs, & Gorniak, 2009). Similarly, older 
children who are higher in inhibitory control perform better on belief-laden reasoning tasks, 
in which a response based on background beliefs conflicts with the correct logical response 
(Handley, et al., 2004). Finally, Markovits, Saelen and Forgues (2009) demonstrated that 
people have to inhibit contradictory background knowledge if it conflicts with the logical 
demands of a reasoning task and that this ability is related to a measure of semantic inhibitory 
control (Markovits & Doyon, 2004).  Interestingly, the ability to inhibit inappropriate 
unstructured knowledge in our adult task was strongly related to a measure of high-level 
semantic inhibitory control, but not with lower-level motor inhibitory control, a matter 
considered in more detail below. 
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Question 4:  
Does the ability to withhold a response based on unstructured knowledge correlate with 
general measures of inhibitory control? If so, are there differences depending upon the level 
at which an instrument measures the construct of inhibition?  
Another crucial finding from the final study was that for people who had relevant structured 
background knowledge, individual differences in the tendency to base their inductions on 
weakly associated but appropriate structured knowledge were related to semantic inhibitory 
control (Experiments 6 to 8) and to an index of working memory capacity (Experiment 8). 
Several researchers (Engle, 2002; Engle, et al., 1995; Lustig, Hasher & Tonev, 2001) posit 
that working memory reflects the ability to control attention. In this conceptualization, 
inhibitory control is a sub-process which ensures that conflicting memory representations or 
response tendencies do not interfere with the current goals of a task or action. The finding 
from our final study (Experiment 8) that scores on the working memory capacity task did not 
account for additional variance in people‟s performance on once semantic inhibitory control 
was accounted for suggests that it was the inhibitory control sub-process of working memory 
that played the greatest role in the inductive reasoning task. This coincides with evidence 
from Barton, Fugelsang and Smilek (2009) who have shown that inhibiting inappropriate 
background beliefs during a reasoning task requires working memory resources, leading to a 
decline in performance on a secondary task. Engle‟s (2010) conceptualization of inhibitory 
control as being at the interface between attention and memory raises further questions about 
the nature of the inhibitory process that is crucial in allowing people to draw on structured 
knowledge.  
Whereas we found strong correlations between the semantic inhibitory control task and 
selective reasoning performance, there was an absence of a correlation between reasoning 
performance and a low-level motor inhibitory control task. This goes some way to elucidating 
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the nature of the inhibitory control process. Firstly, it appears that inhibitory control is not a 
unitary construct, and that only certain aspects of inhibitory control are implicated in people‟s 
ability to withhold a response based on unstructured knowledge in favour of structured 
knowledge. Research on the construct of inhibitory control suggests that inhibition-related 
processes that operate on response selection are dissociable from those that operate on 
response output (Bissett, et al., 2009). The stop-signal task mainly taps inhibition at the 
response output stage, whereas our measure of semantic inhibition measured people‟s ability 
to rejct an erronous response in order to select the correct response. Whilst there was a strong 
correlation between inductive reasoning performance and our measure of semantic inhibitory 
control, there was no correlation with the stop-signal task This strongly suggests that 
successful selective reasoning requires effortful inhibition at the response selection stage, 
where there is a potential conflict between memory representations based on unstructured 
associative knowledge and the need to activate structured knowledge representations. Thus, 
people may have to inhibit the selection of a response based on unstructured knowledge and 
select a response based on an analysis of the structural relations between categories. Once 
they have resolved the potential conflict by selecting an appropriate response, there is no 
longer any need to exert inhibitory control over the subsequent motor response. 
To summarize, we suggest that one effortful process involved in basing inductive 
inferences on structured rather than on automatic and easily available unstructured 
knowledge is inhibitory control. This inhibitory control process seems to occur at the 
semantic level, where there is a conflict between memory representations at the response 
selection stage. Thus, people may have to resist the lure from a response based on easily 
available unstructured knowledge in order to select a response based on more elaborate 
structured knowledge.   
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6.3 Future Directions 
In the final section we discuss how widening the application of the concept of structured and 
unstructured knowledge can further elucidate the nature of the processes underlying selective 
category-based inductive reasoning, and help inform and refine theories trying to account for 
inductive reasoning. 
Category-Based Inductive Reasoning Phenomena 
An important issue is to extend the notion of different types of knowledge to a wider scope of 
inductive reasoning phenomena. The thesis focused on one-category premises and 
conclusions. In future it will be important to extend the notion of different types of 
knowledge to arguments with multiple premise and conclusion categories. Consider the 
following multi-premise arguments:  
  Cows have property X 
  Horses have property X 
  -------------------------------    
  Therefore, Bears have property X  (Argument 1) 
 
Cows have property X 
  Rats have property X 
  -------------------------------    
  Therefore, Bears have property X  (Argument 2) 
 
People tend to believe that argument 2, which includes more diverse premise categories than 
argument 1, provides stronger evidence that the property will be present in the conclusion 
category. Known as the diversity effect, this finding has been explained by the Feature-Based 
Induction Model (FBM) (Sloman, 1993) with reference to the extent to which the premise 
arguments cover the featural space of the conclusion category. In contrast, the Similarity-
Coverage Model (SCM) (Osherson et al., 1990) explains the effect in terms of the degree of 
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similarity between the premise and conclusion categories and the extent to which the premise 
categories are similar to members of the lowest superordinate category which includes both 
the premise and conclusion categories.   
These competing explanations could be reconceptualized in terms of the roles played by 
structured and unstructured knowledge. Whereas the SCM would assume that people have to 
apply structured knowledge about taxonomic relationships in order to be able to generate an 
inclusive superordinate category, the FBM only requires people to draw on unstructured 
knowledge encoding the degree to which each category activates overlapping features.   This 
leads to some straightforward predictions: if people do indeed have to apply structured 
knowledge in order to manifest the diversity phenomenon, then the diversity effect should be 
subject to cognitive processing constraints such as general cognitive ability, and availability 
of time and working memory resources. In contrast, if the diversity effect is only dependent 
upon featural overlap, factors related to cognitive resources should not affect the reasoning 
output. 
Experimental findings by Feeney (2007) suggest that in adults the diversity effect might 
best be explained with reference to the use of structured knowledge: he found that people 
higher in cognitive ability were more sensitive to diversity than people lower in cognitive 
ability. However, to provide further support for the contention that the diversity effect 
depends on the use of structured knowledge, future work would be necessary to show that 
manipulations of cognitive resources, such as restricting inference time or adding a cognitive 
burden, leads to a decrease in the rate with which people exhibit the diversity effect  (Evans, 
2010).  
Considering the role played by structured and unstructured types of knowledge would 
also provide a parsimonious explanation for phenomena that contradict those predicted by the 
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similarity-based models. For example, Medin et al (2003) find that people will often violate 
the diversity principle and rate an argument with less diverse premise categories (e.g.  
sparrows & dogs → all living things) as being stronger than an argument with a more diverse 
set of premise categories  if there is a causal relation between the two premise categories (e.g. 
sparrows & seeds → all living things). Similarly, people may not show the diversity 
phenomenon if the more diverse premise categories share a salient property (e.g. penguins & 
polar bears → camels) compared to the less diverse premise categories (e.g. penguins & 
eagles → camels). These researchers explain such causal non-diversity and non-diversity via 
property reinforcement effects in terms of relevance, whereby relations (e.g. a salient 
property, causal link or thematic relation) between the premise categories can supply 
information that is potentially more informative than similarity or category membership. If 
such a salient relation is not shared by the conclusion category, it may decrease people‟s 
belief in the inductive potency of an argument, even if the premise categories are more 
diverse.  
An alternative way of thinking about this is in terms of structured versus unstructured 
knowledge. Thus, causally related categories might become more strongly associated because 
they more frequently co-occur than unrelated categories. Similarly, categories sharing a 
salient property could be more strongly associated via activation of the shared property in 
semantic memory, akin to spreading activation mechanisms in connectionist models. To 
explore this possibility and provider a starting point for further research, we asked 23 
participants to rate the strength of association between Medin et al.‟s (2003) category pairs, 
as we had done in the pre-test described in Chapter 2. This showed that Medin et al‟s (2003) 
diverse, but thematically related premise pairs were rated as being more strongly associated 
(M = 5.4, SD = 1.2) than the non-diverse premise category pairs  (M = 3.4, SD = 0.8, t (30) = 
5.82, p < .0005, effect size d= 2).  
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In order to show a diversity effect with Medin et al.‟s (2003) materials, people would 
have to inhibit easily available unstructured knowledge, instantiated by the strong association 
between the premise categories, and dedicate additional resources to activating structured 
knowledge about taxonomic relations between the premise categories and conclusion. 
However, given that people only tend to entertain one hypothesis at a time
12
, such strong 
associations between the premise categories may reduce the likelihood that people would see 
a need to dedicate cognitive resources to assessing diversity. This alleged role of unstructured 
associative knowledge and structured knowledge in the manifestation of phenomena related 
to the diversity principle could be tested in future work by asking people to generalize a 
property that is contrary to the one suggested by the relation between the premise categories. 
Consider if people were asked to judge which of the two arguments is stronger: 
Sparrows have gene X 
  Seeds have gene X 
  -------------------------------    
  Therefore, all living things have gene X  (Argument 3) 
 
Sparrows have gene X 
  Dogs have gene X 
  -------------------------------    
  Therefore, all living things have gene X  (Argument 4) 
 
People would have to inhibit the strong association between the premise categories in 
Argument 3 in order to effortfully draw on structured knowledge about taxonomic hierarchies 
and hence spot that these premise categories actually provide better coverage of the 
superordinate category all living things than the unrelated and less diverse categories in 
Argument 4. Furthermore, if we were able to show that any tendency to pick the more diverse 
                                                          
12
 see Evans‟s (2006) three principles of hypothetical thought 
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premise in the above example is compromised by manipulations of cognitive resources or 
time constraints, we would have even more robust evidence that the diversity effect depends 
upon the inhibition of unstructured knowledge and effortful application of structured 
knowledge.  
Theories of Category-Based Induction 
Another important challenge will be to refine and extend existing theories of category-based 
induction in order to deal with the diverging processing aspects underlying the use of 
different types of knowledge. Several theories seem to offer a good account of either 
structured or unstructured knowledge. For example, Sloman‟s (1993b) Feature-Based 
Induction model and Roger and McClelland‟s (2004) Parallel Distributed Processing model 
can both easily explain why people instantly reject inferences in which the base and 
conclusion categories are only weakly associated or unrelated. As such categories are 
unlikely to have many features in common, there will be little common activation between 
the two categories, resulting in a weak inference. Sloman‟s (1993b) model has somewhat 
more difficulty explaining how two very dissimilar but strongly associated categories (e.g. 
honey and bees) result in strong inferences. Roger and McClelland‟s (2004) model fares 
somewhat better, as one could assume that the two concepts might be simultaneously 
activated via relational „nodes‟ in a spreading activation network.  
One limitation of most models that deal with unstructured types of knowledge is that they 
cannot easily accommodate context-sensitive inferences, that is, they make no predictions 
with regards to what domain of knowledge people will rely on. However, this is also a 
weakness of one of the models which includes a structured knowledge element, Osherson et 
al.‟s (1990) Similarity-Coverage model. Thus, whilst it parsimoniously explains inferences 
that draw on structured taxonomic knowledge, it cannot easily account for patterns of 
inductions driven by other domain-specific types of knowledge, such as causal relations.  
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Bayesian frameworks can more easily explain such selectivity effects by assuming that 
people draw on different theoretical knowledge structures depending upon context (Kemp & 
Tenenbaum, 2009). They also arguably provide an interesting possibility of integrating both 
structured and unstructured types of knowledge. For example, it may be that the individual 
probability components, such as likelihoods and prior probabilities, can instantiate 
unstructured sources of knowledge, as well as be based on more rigid structured sources of 
knowledge. Although there is great debate regarding the question where such priors come 
from and what would constitute reasonable prior assumptions (Oaksford & Chater, 2007, p. 
81), one possibility that would fit with our current notion of different types of knowledge is 
that priors can either be based upon unstructured knowledge acquired through simple 
statistical principles such as co-occurrences, or be derived from the application of highly 
structured background knowledge (Gopnik & Tenenbaum, 2007). The ability to integrate 
prior probabilities and likelihoods in Bayes‟ theorem in contrast may depend upon structured 
knowledge about how the different probability components relate to one another. Consider 
how people update their beliefs in the conditional probability when encountering a 
counterexample (Chater & Oaksford, 2007; Oaksford & Hahn, 2007). For example, based 
upon repeated experience and without having to have any specific structured knowledge, 
people may have a high degree of belief in the conditional that if x is a bird, then x flies. 
However, if they encounter a bird that does not fly, for example a penguin, they may apply 
structured knowledge that birds will only fly if their wings are sufficiently large relative to 
their bodyweight. This in turn might lead people to revise their initial belief in the conditional 
downwards to incorporate this counterexample via Bayesian updating.  
In this context, an important task would be to pinpoint the mental processes that mediate 
the Bayesian inferential process. Take for example the case of the causal asymmetry effect, 
whereby people assign higher inductive strength ratings to predictive compared to diagnostic 
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inferences when they have plenty of time and mental resources available. People are likely to 
hold beliefs about the prior probability with which a property is transferred between two 
species A and B. For example, people may believe that the probability with which carrots 
transfer a disease to rabbits can be assigned an approximate probability value of .4. In Shafto 
et al‟s (2008) model, this would be formalized as the transmission rate parameter. If people 
were asked to evaluate the probability that rabbits have the disease given that carrots have it, 
they might assess the conditional probability, which in this case is simply the probability of 
the conditional (i.e. the probability with which carrots transfer diseases to rabbits). However, 
Shafto et al‟s (2008) disease transmission model includes a second parameter, a background 
rate, specifying the probability that the disease was acquired from an alternative source 
outside the food web. Whilst people often neglect such base rates when reasoning causally, 
they are less inclined to do so when reasoning diagnostically (Fernbach & Darlow, 2009). 
Thus, if people are asked to make the reverse diagnostic inference, i.e. to evaluate the 
probability that carrots have a disease given that rabbits have it, they might apply their 
qualitative knowledge that diseases are more likely to be passed on from prey to predator 
rather than vice versa. This might induce people to think about alternative sources by which 
rabbits acquired the disease, for example contracting the disease from other rabbits, or eating 
contaminated grass. Such counterexamples might then lead to a downward revision in 
people‟s beliefs about the conditional probability that carrots have the disease given that 
rabbits have it, and hence in the probability of the conditional, explaining the emergence of 
the causal asymmetry effect. This would be akin to Oaksford, Chater and Larkin‟s (2000) 
probabilistic approach to human conditional inference, where the activation of 
counterexamples explains why valid modus tollens inferences are less frequently endorsed 
than valid modus ponens inferences.  
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Another important undertaking will be to pinpoint precisely which aspect of the Bayesian 
inductive inference process is compromised by burdening mental resources or restricting 
inference time. One possibility is that certain stages of a Bayesian inference process cannot 
operate optimally when cognitive resources are sparse. Thus, not only does a person have to 
activate relevant domain-specific representations, they also have to integrate these with 
Bayesian computations to arrive at the inductively most potent inference, a process which is 
likely to take time and considerable processing effort (Copeland & Radvansky, 2004; 
Straubinger, Cokely, & Stevens, 2009).  Regarding the causal asymmetry effect, people‟s 
ability to integrate transmission probability with the probability that a disease might have 
been acquired from an alternative source may be the process that is compromised when 
people are under time pressure or cognitive load. Thus, when people are burdened by a 
cognitive load, they may rely exclusively on easily activated unstructured knowledge about 
co-occurrence, which would be a very useful heuristic guide to transmission probabilities. 
Consequently, one would not expect asymmetries to arise based on the direction of a 
potential causal link. In contrast, if time and mental resources are available, people may apply 
more elaborate structured knowledge about disease transmission mechanisms, leading to a 
downward revision of inductive strength for diagnostic compared to predictive causal 
inferences. 
Another possibility is that people under heavy cognitive load cannot keep track of the 
probabilities assigned to different hypotheses. For example, in Kemp and Tenenbaum‟s 
(2009) theory-based Bayesian model the probabilities assigned to all possible hypotheses is 
exhaustive, that is, the probabilities have to add up to 1. However, there is ample evidence 
suggesting that people frequently fail to be coherent (Ayton, 1999; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009; 
Tversky & Koehler, 1994). For example, even highly-trained physicians are prone to sub-
additive probability estimations when there is abundant evidence to support exhaustive 
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hypotheses (Redelmeier, Koehler, Liberman & Tversky, 1995) or superadditive estimations 
when people have little supporting evidence for two mutually exhaustive hypotheses 
(Macchi, Krantz & Osherson, 1999). Indirect evidence that the ability to reason coherently 
requires mental effort comes from Feeney and Crisp (in 2010), who showed that inductive 
conjunction fallacies increase under cognitive load.  
Thus, it will be fruitful for future work to answer the question how the mind might 
instantiate processes that approximate theory-based Bayesian strategies. By exploring the 
interaction between types of knowledge and domain-general processing characteristics, it 
would also be possible to specify which of these Bayesian processes require mental 
resources. As a result, we would not only be able to understand the output of knowledge-
based inductive reasoning, but we would also be able to explain the mental processes by 
which this feat is accomplished. 
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8 Appendices 
Appendix 1A: Causal Strength Ratings 
 
Category Pairs Mean Causal 
Strength 
Std. 
Deviation 
One-sample t-
test p- value 
Acorn & Cat 1.1 0.3 0.343 
Acorn & Squirrel 6.1 2.2 0.000 
Butterfly & Swallow 2.8 1.9 0.016 
Cabbage & Hedgehog 1.9 1.3 0.054 
Cabbage & Snail 5.0 2.9 0.002 
Carrot & Fox 2.7 1.3 0.003 
Carrot & Rabbit 7.4 1.6 0.000 
Flour & Bread 7.3 1.7 0.000 
Flower & Butterfly 6.3 2.4 0.000 
Flower & Swallow 2.9 1.7 0.007 
Fly & Frog 5.7 3.4 0.002 
Fly & Heron 3.3 2.7 0.023 
Frog & Heron 3.4 2.3 0.010 
Grass & Sheep 7.6 1.5 0.000 
Grass & Sweater 1.9 1.5 0.095 
Grasshopper & Snake 4.9 1.7 0.000 
Grasshopper & Toad 4.7 1.8 0.000 
Krill & Orca 5.9 2.3 0.000 
Krill & Penguin 5.7 1.4 0.000 
Lead & Pipe 6.2 1.6 0.000 
Lead & Plumber 5.3 2.4 0.000 
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Meerkat & Eagle 4.4 1.6 0.000 
Mercury & Fisherman 5.2 3.6 0.005 
Mercury & Tuna Fish 4.1 3.0 0.010 
Mouse & Buzzard 4.5 2.3 0.001 
Paper & Book 7.9 1.5 0.000 
Penguin & Orca 5.2 2.7 0.001 
Pesticide & Frog 3.6 1.6 0.001 
Pesticide & Snail 4.6 2.0 0.000 
Pipe & Plumber 6.4 3.0 0.000 
Rabbit & Fox 6.2 1.5 0.000 
Salmon & Grizzly Bear 6.1 3.0 0.000 
Saucepan & Cook 7.4 1.9 0.000 
Scorpion & Eagle 3.4 2.0 0.004 
Scorpion & Meerkat 5.0 2.9 0.002 
Sheep & Sweater 5.6 1.6 0.000 
Shrimp & Grizzly Bear 2.1 1.6 0.057 
Shrimp & Salmon 6.1 2.5 0.000 
Snail & Frog 4.0 1.6 0.000 
Snail & Hedgehog 3.4 2.1 0.005 
Squirrel & Cat 2.9 1.7 0.006 
Steel & Cook 6.9 1.9 0.000 
Steel & Saucepan 4.8 1.5 0.000 
Toad & Snake 4.5 2.8 0.003 
Tree & Book 6.3 2.2 0.000 
Tree & Paper 8.2 1.3 0.000 
Tuna Fish & Fisherman 6.8 1.3 0.000 
Wheat & Bread 8.5 1.0 0.000 
Wheat & Buzzard 2.6 1.8 0.019 
Wheat & Flour 8.0 1.3 0.000 
Wheat & Mouse 2.1 1.4 0.040 
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Appendix 1B: Mean Subjective Association Ratings and Co-Occurrence Z-Scores 
 
Category Pair Mean 
Association 
Rating 
Exalead Co-
Occurrence Z-
Score 
Google Co-
Occurrence Z-
Score 
Acorn & Cat                      1.33 -.24 -.41 
Acorn & Coconut                  5.46 -.25 -.43 
Acorn & Lychee                   3.86 -.26 -.44 
Acorn & Pecan                    5.78 -.09 -.38 
Acorn & Squirrel                 6.06 -.24 -.26 
Acorn & Walnut                   6.33 -.22 -.27 
Ant & Aardvark                   5.72 -.25 -.02 
Ant & Cockroach                  5.39 -.25 -.01 
Ant & Praying Mantis              4.33 -.23 -.35 
Antelope & Crocodile             3.76 -.25 -.35 
Antelope & Goat                  5.59 -.24 -.21 
Antelope & Leopard               4.83 -.25 -.35 
Book & Newspaper                 6.33 -.25 -.18 
Book & Radio                     4.33 -.24 -.34 
Book & Television                5.17 -.18 -.28 
Book & World Wide Web              4.94 -.25 -.13 
Bread & Polenta                  4.67 -.23 -.22 
Bread & Rice Cracker              5.28 -.26 .39 
Bread & Tortilla                 6.44 -.18 .18 
Butterfly & Ant                  4.67 -.24 -.39 
Butterfly & Bee                  6.17 -.24 -.06 
Butterfly & Beetle               4.89 -.25 -.33 
Butterfly & Moth                 7.61 -.21 .13 
Butterfly & Silverfish           2.11 -.26 -.41 
Butterfly & Swallow              4.72 -.25 -.40 
Buzzard & Penguin                3.22 -.26 -.43 
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Buzzard & Seagull                5.72 -.26 .35 
Buzzard & Vulture                7.39 -.23 -.09 
Cabbage & Cauliflower            7.33 -.06 3.52 
Cabbage & Hedgehog               2.39 -.26 -.44 
Cabbage & Horseradish            4.72 -.23 -.19 
Cabbage & Rapeseed               3.72 -.25 -.40 
Cabbage & Snail                  4.11 -.25 -.43 
Cabbage & Turnip                 6.67 -.18 .30 
Carrot & Fennel                  4.65 -.21 -.06 
Carrot & Fox                     1.50 -.26 -.43 
Carrot & Parsley                 5.20 -.21 -.27 
Carrot & Potato                  7.28 -.07 .31 
Carrot & Rabbit                  6.06 -.20 -.05 
Carrot & Radish                  6.39 -.18 .36 
Carrot & Rapeseed                1.61 -.23 -.42 
Cat & Badger                     3.50 -.25 -.38 
Cat & Cheetah                    7.44 -.22 -.13 
Cat & Ferret                     4.35 -.20 .88 
Cat & Lynx                       7.56 -.22 -.24 
Cat & Puma                       7.28 -.20 .94 
Cook & Builder                   4.39 -.25 -.43 
Cook & Hairdresser               4.29 -.25 -.31 
Cook & Shop Assistant             3.94 -.26 -.41 
Eagle & Buzzard                  7.11 -.20 .63 
Eagle & Canary                   5.50 -.26 -.43 
Eagle & Penguin                  3.80 -.25 -.41 
Feathers & Fur                   5.88 -.24 .15 
Feathers & Leather               3.94 -.25 -.23 
Feathers & Pillow                6.61 -.25 -.23 
Fisherman & Captain              5.83 -.24 -.37 
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Fisherman & Farmer               5.71 -.23 -.31 
Fisherman & Waitress             3.33 -.26 -.43 
Flour & Bread                    8.11 -.21 .90 
Flour & Ground Nuts               4.47 -.26 -.03 
Flour & Sugar                    5.39 -.09 2.78 
Flower & Bamboo                  4.09 -.15 -.32 
Flower & Butterfly               6.39 -.13 .48 
Flower & Conifer                 5.11 -.25 -.40 
Flower & Fern                    4.82 -.25 -.27 
Flower & Moss                    4.61 -.24 -.39 
Flower & Seaweed                 3.91 -.26 -.38 
Flower & Swallow                 1.78 -.25 -.42 
Fly & Ant                        5.17 -.22 -.37 
Fly & Beetle                     5.44 -.25 -.29 
Fly & Cockroach                  5.33 -.21 -.11 
Fly & Earwig                     4.80 -.22 -.12 
Fly & Frog                       4.83 -.20 -.33 
Fly & Heron                      2.89 -.25 -.40 
Fly & Locust                     5.94 -.25 -.41 
Fly & Mosquito                   6.61 -.23 -.05 
Fly & Spider                     6.17 -.15 -.28 
Fly & Swallow                    3.67 -.25 -.40 
Fly & Waterbug                   5.61 -.13 11.37 
Fox & Black Bear                  3.83 -.26 -.36 
Fox & Dingo                      5.65 -.25 -.39 
Fox & Dog                        6.06 -.26 -.25 
Fox & Jackal                     6.56 -.23 .01 
Fox & Kangaroo                   1.89 -.24 -.36 
Fox & Wolf                       7.22 -.21 -.24 
Frog & Heron                     4.29 -.24 -.40 
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Frog & Newt                      6.65 -.23 -.09 
Frog & Salamander                5.83 -.25 .09 
Goose & Feathers                 7.29 -.25 -.11 
Goose & Finch                    4.65 -.25 -.41 
Goose & Kingfisher               3.17 -.26 -.36 
Goose & Pillow                   4.56 -.23 -.12 
Grass & Bamboo                   6.67 -.20 -.25 
Grass & Dandelion                6.24 -.24 -.25 
Grass & Eucalyptus               5.61 -.24 -.36 
Grass & Maize                    5.94 -.23 -.24 
Grass & Palm Tree                 4.68 -.25 -.37 
Grass & Poison Ivy                5.75 -.26 -.37 
Grass & Sheep                    6.94 -.25 -.30 
Grass & Shepherd                 4.56 -.25 -.40 
Grasshopper & Lice               3.72 -.26 -.43 
Grasshopper & Locust             6.83 -.25 -.18 
Grasshopper & Snake              3.17 -.25 -.40 
Grasshopper & Termite            5.11 -.23 -.42 
Grasshopper & Toad               3.78 -.25 -.42 
Grizzly Bear & Panda              5.83 -.16 -.32 
Grizzly Bear & Polar Bear          7.83 -.24 .13 
Grizzly Bear & Weasel             2.83 -.26 -.43 
Grizzly Bear & Wolf               4.28 -.22 -.21 
Hedgehog & Mole                  5.28 -.26 -.40 
Hedgehog & Shrew                 4.33 -.25 -.36 
Hedgehog & Sloth                 3.33 -.26 -.43 
Heron & Condor                   4.67 -.25 -.40 
Heron & Dove                     4.76 -.19 -.39 
Heron & Hawk                     5.06 -.21 -.25 
Heron & Parrot                   5.15 -.26 -.42 
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Heron & Penguin                  4.00 -.26 -.42 
Heron & Stork                    7.28 -.23 -.13 
Krill & Barnacle                 5.33 -.25 -.43 
Krill & Crayfish                 5.94 -.19 -.37 
Krill & Orca Whale                4.61 -.26 -.43 
Krill & Penguin                  3.56 -.25 -.36 
Krill & Woodlice                 2.83 -.26 -.34 
Lead & Cadmium                   6.59 .27 4.26 
Lead & Gold                      6.76 -.20 -.27 
Lead & Mercury                   6.72 -.19 .88 
Lead & Pipe                      5.94 -.20 -.33 
Lead & Plumber                   4.22 -.14 -.42 
Meerkat & Badger                 4.39 -.25 -.41 
Meerkat & Eagle                  3.41 -.26 -.42 
Meerkat & Lizard                 2.61 -.26 -.39 
Meerkat & Mouse                  3.83 -.25 -.33 
Meerkat & Polar Bear              3.27 -.26 -.41 
Meerkat & Skunk                  4.56 -.26 -.42 
Meerkat & Weasel                 5.89 -.26 -.42 
Mercury & Cadmium                6.94 -.16 2.28 
Mercury & Fisherman              2.35 -.26 -.43 
Mercury & Silver                 6.39 -.23 -.25 
Mercury & Tuna Fish               2.72 -.23 -.21 
Mouse & Buzzard                  3.78 -.25 -.42 
Mouse & Cat                      6.33 -.25 .05 
Mouse & Gerbil                   6.88 -.13 .45 
Mouse & Goat                     2.71 -.19 -.33 
Mouse & Hamster                  7.18 .00 -.23 
Mouse & Hawk                     5.22 -.24 -.41 
Mouse & Porcupine                3.72 -.25 -.35 
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Mouse & Porpoise                 3.04 -.25 -.42 
Mouse & Squirrel                 4.41 -.25 -.26 
Orca Whale & Cod                  5.28 -.25 -.43 
Orca Whale & Cow                  2.24 -.25 -.43 
Orca Whale & Dolphin              7.29 -.17 .76 
Orca Whale & Hippopotamus        3.00 -.26 -.43 
Orca Whale & Seal                 6.28 -.24 -.28 
Paper & Book                     7.72 -.15 -.12 
Paper & Papyrus                  6.06 -.21 .23 
Paper & Plastic                  4.06 -.13 .57 
Penguin & Buzzard                3.71 -.26 -.43 
Penguin & Chicken                3.11 -.25 -.41 
Penguin & Duck                   4.29 -.26 -.38 
Penguin & Orca Whale              4.83 -.25 -.36 
Pesticide & Fertilizer           5.88 -.14 .74 
Pesticide & Frog                 1.88 -.25 -.43 
Pesticide & Ink                  1.89 -.25 -.43 
Pesticide & Perfume              3.00 -.25 -.43 
Pesticide & Snail                3.28 -.26 -.43 
Pillow & Sheet                   7.72 -.15 .01 
Pillow & Tablecloth              4.00 -.25 -.29 
Pipe & Cable                     5.67 -.21 -.24 
Pipe & Plumber                   7.39 .00 -.11 
Pipe & Wire                      4.44 -.17 -.24 
Plumber & Electrician            6.65 .08 1.44 
Plumber & Gardener               5.12 -.21 -.38 
Plumber & Pilot                  2.89 -.26 -.41 
Rabbit & Beaver                  5.11 -.25 -.37 
Rabbit & Camel                   2.88 -.24 -.41 
Rabbit & Dolphin                 2.86 -.22 -.37 
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Rabbit & Falcon                  4.06 -.26 -.43 
Rabbit & Fox                     6.00 -.18 -.27 
Rabbit & Hare                    8.28 -.20 -.09 
Rabbit & Mouse                   4.78 -.25 -.20 
Rabbit & Porcupine               3.61 -.25 -.27 
Rabbit & Rat                     3.89 -.19 .04 
Robin & Rat                      2.22 -.23 -.42 
Salmon & Eel                     4.82 -.25 .04 
Salmon & Frogfish                4.84 -.26 -.42 
Salmon & Goldfish                5.00 -.25 -.41 
Salmon & Grizzly Bear             5.94 -.20 .20 
Salmon & Herring                 6.56 -.24 .42 
Salmon & Trout                   8.11 -.08 4.37 
Saucepan & Cake Tin               6.61 -.26 -.42 
Saucepan & Cook                  7.44 -.08 1.63 
Saucepan & Plate                 6.11 -.26 -.39 
Saucepan & Wineglass             3.44 -.26 -.41 
Scorpion & Eagle                 4.47 -.26 -.41 
Scorpion & Meerkat               3.39 -.25 -.41 
Scorpion & Spider                5.72 -.17 -.19 
Sheep & Antelope                 4.17 -.09 .00 
Sheep & Goat                     6.35 -.18 1.17 
Sheep & Ox                       4.44 -.21 -.21 
Sheep & Shepherd                 8.22 -.21 .25 
Sheep & Sweater                  5.33 -.25 -.40 
Sheep & Wool                     8.11 -.05 .51 
Shepherd & Bus Driver             3.28 -.26 -.44 
Shepherd & Cowboy                6.17 -.25 -.42 
Shepherd & Zookeeper             5.94 -.26 -.44 
Shrimp & Barnacle                4.67 -.22 -.38 
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Shrimp & Crab                    6.88 .00 2.18 
Shrimp & Grizzly Bear             2.41 -.26 -.44 
Shrimp & Haddock                 4.29 -.25 -.18 
Shrimp & Lice                    2.89 -.26 -.43 
Shrimp & Lobster                 7.72 -.14 1.56 
Shrimp & Salmon                  5.33 -.16 1.16 
Shrimp & Woodlice                2.66 -.24 .04 
Snail & Frog                     4.47 -.23 -.33 
Snail & Hedgehog                 4.28 -.25 -.41 
Snail & Limpet                   5.56 -.25 -.19 
Snail & Octopus                  2.83 -.25 -.38 
Snail & Slug                     7.72 -.22 .18 
Snail & Squid                    3.22 -.26 -.39 
Snake & Crocodile                4.41 -.20 -.12 
Snake & Gecko                    5.41 -.25 -.33 
Snake & Iguana                   5.72 -.23 -.26 
Snake & Lizard                   6.78 -.18 .17 
Sparrow & Hawk                   5.89 -.24 .15 
Squirrel & Cat                   3.89 -.23 .43 
Squirrel & Chipmunk              6.56 -.21 .22 
Squirrel & Goat                  3.14 -.24 -.39 
Squirrel & Llama                 2.97 -.26 -.43 
Squirrel & Prairie Dog            4.33 -.26 -.30 
Squirrel & Sheep                 2.67 -.25 -.25 
Steel & Brass                    7.06 -.08 .99 
Steel & Bronze                   7.11 -.18 .21 
Steel & Cook                     3.94 -.25 -.36 
Steel & Saucepan                 6.11 -.24 .30 
Swallow & Nightingale            6.56 -.25 -.42 
Swallow & Ostrich                3.56 -.26 -.43 
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Swallow & Ostrich                5.00 -.26 -.43 
Swallow & Parrot                 5.56 -.26 -.43 
Swallow & Pigeon                 6.11 -.25 -.42 
Swallow & Robin                  6.56 -.26 -.41 
Sweater & Blazer                 6.17 -.25 -.07 
Sweater & Hat                    5.28 -.19 -.14 
Sweater & T-Shirt                 6.44 -.24 .02 
Toad & Newt                      6.83 -.25 -.16 
Toad & Salamander                5.00 -.24 -.08 
Toad & Snake                     3.78 -.20 -.32 
Tree & Book                      6.00 -.20 -.31 
Tree & Bush                      7.06 -.25 -.31 
Tree & Flower                    6.35 -.19 .07 
Tree & Grass                     5.94 -.18 -.20 
Tree & Paper                     6.94 -.21 -.34 
Tuna Fish & Fisherman             5.17 -.26 -.33 
Tuna Fish & Goldfish              5.47 -.23 -.42 
Tuna Fish & Mackerel              7.33 -.16 1.89 
Tuna Fish & Swordfish             8.06 -.15 1.87 
Weasel & Earthworm               3.71 -.26 -.43 
Weasel & Otter                   6.39 -.26 -.33 
Weasel & Vole                    6.44 -.25 -.42 
Wheat & Bamboo                   3.83 -.24 -.38 
Wheat & Barley                   7.83 .11 3.32 
Wheat & Bread                    7.56 -.17 1.69 
Wheat & Buzzard                  1.94 -.26 -.44 
Wheat & Corn                     7.72 -.07 2.13 
Wheat & Flour                    7.94 .21 3.01 
Wheat & Maize                    7.76 -.16 1.30 
Wheat & Mouse                    4.39 -.26 -.43 
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Wheat & Rice                     7.17 -.18 1.08 
Wool & Cotton                    6.82 -.12 1.99 
Wool & Silk                      5.78 -.12 2.27 
Wool & Sweater                   7.17 -.15 1.28 
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Appendix 1C: Co-Occurrence Indexing using Google and Exalead Search 
Engines 
 
By the middle of 2008, the World Wide Web indexed over just below 571 million domains, 
representing a growth factor of around 148 over a 14-year period (Carpenter, 2009). As such, 
it probably represents the world‟s largest freely accessible source of printed word, making it 
ideal for Psycholinguistic research (Heylighen, 2001). We chose this as our data source for 
creating a co-occurrence index against which to verify subjective association ratings made by 
participants.  
One potential problem when using internet search engines for creating an index of co-
occurrence between two categories is that the search algorithms used to rank web pages, as 
well as the techniques used to „crawl the web‟ are closely guarded trade secrets. We believe 
that this is less of a problem in our case, as we are trying to get a measure of the absolute 
frequency with which the two categories co-occur. However, one way of circumventing 
possible confounds that are specific to one search engine, we used two very different search 
engines to carry out co-occurrence searches, the popular Google and the less well-known 
Exalead which supports explicit proximity searches. The extent to which the two indices 
correlate would indicate the validity of using the World Wide Web and search engines in 
order to estimate frequency of co-occurrence. 
Exalead (www.exalead.com) is a French search engine founded in 2000. It has an index 
of over 8 billion web pages (the biggest after Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft). One of the 
features which sets this search engine aside from others is that it specifically supports 
proximity functions with a NEAR operator. So for example, to search for the co-occurrence 
of dog and mouse within 6 characters, one would specify the following search term: 
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dog NEAR/6 mouse 
  
In Google, unordered proximity searches have to be specified by combining a string of 
ordered searches, for example: 
"dog***mouse" OR "mouse***dog" 
The fact that the search engines use slightly different search algorithms, which tend to be a 
close-guarded trade secret, the finding that there was such a significant correlation between 
the two contrasting search engines lends credence to this method of measuring co-occurrence.
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Appendix 2 
Appendix 2A: Mean Inductive Strength Ratings Experiment 1 
 
Property  Infection Cell 
Timing speeded delayed speeded delayed 
Krill & Penguin         4.00 4.00 4.00 3.50 
Squirrel & Cat          3.00 3.70 4.43 4.00 
Fly & Frog              4.29 4.80 3.57 3.38 
Carrot & Rabbit         5.57 6.20 3.71 4.38 
Snail & Hedgehog        3.71 4.63 3.57 3.10 
Wheat & Mouse           4.71 3.63 3.43 4.30 
Flower & Butterfly      4.71 4.50 2.57 4.00 
Tree & Bark Beetle       5.71 6.75 4.00 4.60 
Grasshopper & Toad      4.20 3.80 2.83 3.29 
Meerkat & Eagle         3.00 3.80 2.83 3.00 
Butterfly & Swallow     3.70 4.00 4.33 3.29 
Shrimp & Salmon         5.70 5.20 6.17 4.86 
Cabbage & Snail         5.50 4.71 4.70 5.00 
Frog & Heron            4.00 4.71 3.60 3.00 
Acorn & Squirrel        4.33 5.57 5.10 3.80 
Grass & Sheep           5.67 6.00 5.00 4.40 
Penguin & Krill         5.50 4.20 6.17 2.86 
Cat & Squirrel          4.10 4.80 3.50 4.71 
Frog & Fly              5.90 5.60 5.33 3.00 
Rabbit & Carrot         5.80 3.40 5.00 2.00 
Hedgehog & Snail        4.00 3.29 3.80 3.40 
Mouse & Wheat           2.83 3.86 3.10 2.80 
Butterfly & Flower      4.00 4.71 4.30 3.80 
Bark Beetle & Tree       5.00 5.86 4.80 4.00 
Toad & Grasshopper      4.00 2.80 3.43 3.13 
Eagle & Meerkat         3.43 2.60 2.71 2.00 
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Swallow & Butterfly     3.86 4.20 3.86 3.38 
Salmon & Shrimp         5.14 5.10 4.71 5.13 
Snail & Cabbage         3.71 4.25 3.71 4.90 
Heron & Frog            5.00 3.25 3.71 3.90 
Squirrel & Acorn        6.14 5.00 3.71 3.60 
Sheep & Grass           6.43 3.88 3.14 4.40 
Krill & Woodlice        4.43 3.20 3.71 2.63 
Squirrel & Prairie Dog   3.71 3.70 4.00 3.38 
Fly & Ant               4.86 3.20 3.71 5.25 
Carrot & Radish         6.57 6.00 5.14 6.50 
Snail & Squid           3.14 2.00 3.00 2.70 
Wheat & Bamboo          3.71 3.25 4.00 4.20 
Flower & Grass          5.71 4.75 6.29 5.50 
Tree & Bush             5.43 5.63 6.14 6.30 
Grasshopper & Lice      3.40 4.60 4.00 3.86 
Meerkat & Skunk         5.00 6.20 5.00 4.57 
Butterfly & Ant         2.70 4.80 2.33 4.43 
Shrimp & Barnacle       5.10 4.40 4.17 5.00 
Cabbage & Horseradish   4.67 4.86 5.50 5.20 
Frog & Newt             5.33 7.14 6.00 7.80 
Acorn & Pecan           3.00 4.57 5.20 5.20 
Grass & Dandelion       6.50 6.29 6.50 7.00 
Penguin & Chicken       3.50 3.60 2.00 4.00 
Cat & Badger            3.60 4.80 5.17 4.43 
Frog & Salamander       5.00 5.40 4.83 4.57 
Rabbit & Beaver         5.00 4.80 5.17 4.43 
Hedgehog & Shrew        4.33 5.57 5.30 5.00 
Mouse & Squirrel        4.33 4.43 4.30 5.20 
Butterfly & Bee         4.67 6.14 4.80 4.60 
Bark Beetle & Praying Mantis 3.00 4.43 4.60 5.20 
Toad & Salamander       4.71 3.70 3.57 5.25 
Eagle & Penguin         4.00 2.30 3.57 4.00 
Swallow & Parrot        4.29 3.40 5.29 5.13 
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Salmon & Goldfish       5.14 3.40 4.29 6.25 
Snail & Limpet          3.29 3.75 3.71 5.40 
Heron & Penguin         4.29 3.63 4.57 3.80 
Squirrel & Prairie Dog   3.71 3.38 3.29 4.10 
Sheep & Goat            6.14 6.25 5.43 6.60 
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Appendix 2B: Post-Test Endorsements Experiment 1 
 
 
Proportion who believe 
Categories are Causally 
Related 
Proportion who believe 
Categories are from 
same Taxonomic Group  
Timing speeded delayed speeded delayed 
Krill & Penguin         0.77 0.78 0.17 0.11 
Squirrel & Cat          0.15 0.22 0.75 0.50 
Fly & Frog              0.92 1.00 0.00 0.11 
Carrot & Rabbit         0.92 1.00 0.08 0.00 
Snail & Hedgehog        0.92 0.67 0.08 0.06 
Wheat & Mouse           0.92 0.94 0.00 0.06 
Flower & Butterfly      0.62 0.83 0.00 0.06 
Tree & Bark Beetle       0.92 0.94 0.00 0.06 
Grasshopper & Toad      0.63 0.55 0.19 0.27 
Meerkat & Eagle         0.44 0.55 0.31 0.09 
Butterfly & Swallow     0.63 0.64 0.25 0.00 
Shrimp & Salmon         0.63 0.45 0.63 0.64 
Cabbage & Snail         1.00 1.00 0.19 0.00 
Frog & Heron            0.67 0.82 0.19 0.18 
Acorn & Squirrel        0.94 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Grass & Sheep           1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Penguin & Krill         0.81 0.82 0.31 0.09 
Cat & Squirrel          0.13 0.27 0.69 0.73 
Frog & Fly              1.00 0.91 0.06 0.00 
Rabbit & Carrot         0.88 1.00 0.13 0.00 
Hedgehog & Snail        0.75 0.82 0.06 0.09 
Mouse & Wheat           0.88 0.91 0.06 0.00 
Butterfly & Flower      0.88 0.82 0.00 0.09 
Bark Beetle & Tree       1.00 0.82 0.06 0.00 
Toad & Grasshopper      0.54 0.61 0.25 0.11 
Eagle & Meerkat         0.23 0.33 0.00 0.00 
Swallow & Butterfly     0.54 0.67 0.08 0.06 
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Salmon & Shrimp         0.38 0.50 0.67 0.56 
Snail & Cabbage         1.00 0.94 0.08 0.22 
Heron & Frog            0.69 0.61 0.00 0.00 
Squirrel & Acorn        0.92 1.00 0.00 0.17 
Sheep & Grass           0.92 0.89 0.08 0.11 
Krill & Woodlice        0.08 0.11 0.31 0.44 
Squirrel & Prairie Dog   0.08 0.12 0.69 0.59 
Fly & Ant               0.17 0.17 0.85 0.94 
Carrot & Radish         0.08 0.11 1.00 1.00 
Snail & Squid           0.27 0.18 0.08 0.50 
Wheat & Bamboo          0.00 0.11 1.00 0.89 
Flower & Grass          0.17 0.00 0.92 0.94 
Tree & Bush             0.17 0.11 0.92 1.00 
Grasshopper & Lice      0.25 0.64 0.63 0.45 
Meerkat & Skunk         0.13 0.20 0.88 1.00 
Butterfly & Ant         0.13 0.36 0.44 0.73 
Shrimp & Barnacle       0.50 0.36 0.75 0.45 
Cabbage & Horseradish   0.19 0.18 0.56 1.00 
Frog & Newt             0.25 0.36 0.93 1.00 
Acorn & Pecan           0.13 0.27 0.80 0.73 
Grass & Dandelion       0.31 0.09 0.94 1.00 
Penguin & Chicken       0.00 0.00 0.63 0.45 
Cat & Badger            0.06 0.09 0.81 0.91 
Frog & Salamander       0.07 0.10 0.93 0.50 
Rabbit & Beaver         0.00 0.18 0.81 0.73 
Hedgehog & Shrew        0.19 0.09 0.94 0.64 
Mouse & Squirrel        0.19 0.18 0.88 0.91 
Butterfly & Bee         0.19 0.18 0.94 1.00 
Bark Beetle & Praying Mantis 0.50 0.60 0.69 0.70 
Toad & Salamander       0.17 0.11 0.92 0.76 
Eagle & Penguin         0.00 0.11 0.62 0.83 
Swallow & Parrot        0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Salmon & Goldfish       0.17 0.11 1.00 0.94 
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Snail & Limpet          0.27 0.12 0.75 0.71 
Heron & Penguin         0.08 0.22 0.69 0.83 
Squirrel & Prairie Dog   0.08 0.00 0.77 0.53 
Sheep & Goat            0.17 0.06 0.92 0.94 
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Appendix 2C: Mean Inductive Strength Ratings Experiment 2 
 
Property  Infection Cell 
Load heavy light heavy light 
Krill & Penguin         3.80 3.20 1.40 4.20 
Squirrel & Cat          4.20 3.00 3.40 4.00 
Fly & Frog              5.80 5.60 3.80 4.00 
Carrot & Rabbit         6.60 5.40 2.20 3.80 
Snail & Hedgehog        3.60 2.20 1.60 3.20 
Wheat & Mouse           3.60 2.20 3.40 2.20 
Flower & Butterfly      5.00 3.20 3.00 2.20 
Tree & Bark Beetle       5.20 4.60 3.80 5.00 
Grasshopper & Toad      5.20 3.80 4.40 2.60 
Meerkat & Eagle         5.80 1.40 4.00 3.80 
Butterfly & Swallow     5.20 4.00 3.00 2.60 
Shrimp & Salmon         6.00 4.60 4.80 3.00 
Cabbage & Snail         6.60 3.80 4.00 3.40 
Frog & Heron            3.80 4.00 3.60 3.80 
Acorn & Squirrel        4.40 4.20 4.60 4.00 
Grass & Sheep           5.40 5.40 3.20 6.00 
Penguin & Krill         4.60 3.40 5.40 1.80 
Cat & Squirrel          2.60 2.40 4.00 4.80 
Frog & Fly              4.60 3.60 2.80 2.80 
Rabbit & Carrot         4.60 3.00 3.60 1.20 
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Hedgehog & Snail        3.80 4.80 4.80 2.80 
Mouse & Wheat           2.80 2.20 4.00 2.40 
Butterfly & Flower      5.20 3.80 2.80 3.20 
Bark Beetle & Tree       5.20 5.00 5.20 3.60 
Toad & Grasshopper      2.00 3.20 2.80 2.60 
Eagle & Meerkat         2.20 1.40 1.80 3.00 
Swallow & Butterfly     2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 
Salmon & Shrimp         5.80 4.80 3.40 4.20 
Snail & Cabbage         2.80 3.20 2.80 3.40 
Heron & Frog            1.60 2.60 2.00 3.20 
Squirrel & Acorn        3.60 3.80 2.80 4.40 
Sheep & Grass           2.40 3.40 3.40 4.40 
Krill & Woodlice        4.00 3.40 3.20 3.40 
Squirrel & Prairie Dog   3.40 5.00 3.80 4.00 
Fly & Ant               3.80 3.40 2.40 4.20 
Carrot & Radish         3.80 5.60 5.40 6.20 
Snail & Squid           1.60 2.60 2.20 2.40 
Wheat & Bamboo          1.00 2.60 3.20 4.80 
Flower & Grass          4.00 5.00 5.80 5.80 
Tree & Bush             5.20 5.00 5.80 7.20 
Grasshopper & Lice      4.20 2.20 5.60 3.40 
Meerkat & Skunk         4.00 4.20 5.20 4.20 
Butterfly & Ant         5.60 3.80 3.60 2.60 
Shrimp & Barnacle       5.00 4.40 5.40 4.20 
Cabbage & Horseradish   4.60 3.80 5.60 4.20 
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Frog & Newt             7.60 5.40 7.00 6.20 
Acorn & Pecan           4.40 3.60 4.60 3.60 
Grass & Dandelion       7.00 4.80 6.20 5.40 
Penguin & Chicken       3.80 1.60 4.40 5.00 
Cat & Badger            4.80 2.40 3.80 4.20 
Frog & Salamander       4.80 4.20 6.60 4.00 
Rabbit & Beaver         6.40 1.40 4.80 3.60 
Hedgehog & Shrew        5.80 3.80 4.20 4.40 
Mouse & Squirrel        4.80 3.20 4.60 5.00 
Butterfly & Bee         5.60 5.40 4.00 4.00 
Bark Beetle & Praying Mantis 3.60 5.20 5.60 3.60 
Toad & Salamander       3.80 6.60 3.40 5.80 
Eagle & Penguin         2.00 3.40 4.00 4.40 
Swallow & Parrot        4.60 4.00 4.60 4.80 
Salmon & Goldfish       4.80 3.40 4.00 5.00 
Snail & Limpet          2.40 4.20 3.60 3.60 
Heron & Penguin         2.00 3.60 2.00 3.60 
Squirrel & Prairie Dog   3.60 4.00 3.20 5.40 
Sheep & Goat            4.25 5.00 4.80 7.40 
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Appendix 2D: Post-Test Endorsements Experiment 2 
 
 
Proportion who believe 
Categories are Causally 
Related 
Proportion who believe 
Categories are from 
same Taxonomic Group  
Load heavy light heavy light 
Krill & Penguin         0.71 0.65 0.11 0.10 
Squirrel & Cat          0.26 0.15 0.47 0.60 
Fly & Frog              0.89 0.95 0.05 0.05 
Carrot & Rabbit         0.95 0.95 0.05 0.05 
Snail & Hedgehog        0.63 0.70 0.05 0.00 
Wheat & Mouse           0.79 0.90 0.05 0.05 
Flower & Butterfly      0.68 0.74 0.00 0.00 
Tree & Bark Beetle       0.89 0.90 0.05 0.00 
Grasshopper & Toad      0.68 0.75 0.11 0.20 
Meerkat & Eagle         0.68 0.60 0.11 0.00 
Butterfly & Swallow     0.68 0.45 0.05 0.10 
Shrimp & Salmon         0.63 0.25 0.68 0.45 
Cabbage & Snail         0.84 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Frog & Heron            0.63 0.80 0.00 0.05 
Acorn & Squirrel        0.95 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Grass & Sheep           0.95 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Penguin & Krill         0.71 0.65 0.11 0.10 
Cat & Squirrel          0.26 0.15 0.47 0.60 
Frog & Fly              0.89 0.95 0.05 0.05 
Rabbit & Carrot         0.95 0.95 0.05 0.05 
Hedgehog & Snail        0.63 0.70 0.05 0.00 
  Appendix 2 
 
 
   
279 
 
Mouse & Wheat           0.79 0.90 0.05 0.05 
Butterfly & Flower      0.68 0.74 0.00 0.00 
Bark Beetle & Tree       0.89 0.90 0.05 0.00 
Toad & Grasshopper      0.68 0.75 0.11 0.20 
Eagle & Meerkat         0.68 0.60 0.11 0.00 
Swallow & Butterfly     0.68 0.45 0.05 0.10 
Salmon & Shrimp         0.63 0.25 0.68 0.45 
Snail & Cabbage         0.84 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Heron & Frog            0.63 0.80 0.00 0.05 
Squirrel & Acorn        0.95 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Sheep & Grass           0.95 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Krill & Woodlice        0.22 0.30 0.25 0.60 
Squirrel & Prairie Dog   0.20 0.30 0.50 0.80 
Fly & Ant               0.30 0.20 0.70 0.60 
Carrot & Radish         0.50 0.30 1.00 1.00 
Snail & Squid           0.30 0.10 0.50 0.60 
Wheat & Bamboo          0.10 0.20 0.80 0.90 
Flower & Grass          0.20 0.20 0.90 0.90 
Tree & Bush             0.10 0.20 1.00 0.90 
Grasshopper & Lice      0.33 0.30 0.78 0.60 
Meerkat & Skunk         0.11 0.00 0.89 0.90 
Butterfly & Ant         0.11 0.20 0.78 0.80 
Shrimp & Barnacle       0.56 0.20 1.00 0.70 
Cabbage & Horseradish   0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Frog & Newt             0.33 0.30 1.00 0.90 
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Acorn & Pecan           0.33 0.20 0.89 1.00 
Grass & Dandelion       0.56 0.00 1.00 0.80 
Penguin & Chicken       0.00 0.00 0.44 0.60 
Cat & Badger            0.22 0.00 0.89 0.90 
Frog & Salamander       0.33 0.50 0.89 0.60 
Rabbit & Beaver         0.11 0.00 0.44 0.70 
Hedgehog & Shrew        0.44 0.30 0.89 0.70 
Mouse & Squirrel        0.44 0.10 0.89 0.80 
Butterfly & Bee         0.33 0.10 1.00 0.90 
Bark Beetle & Praying Mantis 0.33 0.30 0.63 0.70 
Toad & Salamander       0.20 0.30 0.20 0.80 
Eagle & Penguin         0.30 0.00 0.30 0.90 
Swallow & Parrot        0.10 0.10 0.10 0.70 
Salmon & Goldfish       0.30 0.00 0.30 1.00 
Snail & Limpet          0.30 0.20 0.30 0.80 
Heron & Penguin         0.40 0.20 0.40 0.90 
Squirrel & Prairie Dog   0.30 0.30 0.30 0.60 
Sheep & Goat            0.10 0.20 0.10 1.00 
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Appendix 2E: Mean Inductive Strength Ratings Experiment 3 
 
 
Property  Disease Cell 
Timing speeded delayed speeded delayed 
Acorn & Squirrel          4.80 5.90 3.30 3.40 
Acorn & Walnut            4.10 4.50 5.50 6.20 
Butterfly & Ant           3.40 3.40 4.10 5.90 
Butterfly & Swallow       3.60 4.60 3.50 4.00 
Cabbage & Rapeseed        2.90 4.60 4.20 4.40 
Cabbage & Snail           4.20 5.00 3.50 3.50 
Carrot & Rabbit           3.70 3.60 4.30 2.80 
Carrot & Radish           5.20 4.60 4.60 5.90 
Fly & Ant                 3.70 3.80 4.60 4.40 
Fly & Frog                4.30 5.00 4.30 4.70 
Grass & Bamboo            4.10 3.80 6.10 6.60 
Grass & Sheep             4.90 5.00 3.50 3.00 
Grasshopper & Lice        2.90 3.90 3.80 4.80 
Grasshopper & Toad        3.10 3.50 3.40 4.10 
Krill & Penguin           4.80 4.60 3.90 3.40 
Krill & Woodlice          3.00 2.50 2.60 3.50 
Meerkat & Badger          3.90 4.00 4.00 5.70 
Meerkat & Eagle           3.50 4.30 2.00 4.50 
Mouse & Buzzard           4.80 6.00 3.00 3.80 
Mouse & Squirrel           4.70 5.60 5.20 6.00 
Penguin & Duck            3.60 3.20 4.90 6.90 
Penguin & Orca            4.80 5.30 4.20 4.90 
Rabbit & Fox              6.30 5.30 6.00 4.90 
Rabbit & Squirrel         4.60 4.10 5.50 5.10 
Salmon &  Grizzly         3.70 6.50 3.10 4.50 
Salmon &  Herring         4.30 5.00 6.50 6.50 
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 Scorpion & Eagle          2.70 3.00 1.80 2.80 
Scorpion & Spider         3.70 5.20 4.10 4.80 
Shrimp & Barnacle         4.90 4.50 4.60 4.70 
Shrimp & Salmon           4.80 5.10 5.00 3.80 
Snail & Frog              3.00 2.90 3.90 4.20 
Snail & Hedgehog          3.90 4.40 2.60 3.60 
Snail & Limpet            3.00 4.50 4.50 6.10 
Snail & Squid             2.90 2.50 2.80 4.00 
Squirrel & Cat            3.60 3.40 4.80 5.30 
Squirrel & Prairie Dog    2.30 3.40 6.00 4.60 
Toad & Salamander         4.60 4.10 5.40 5.60 
Toad & Snake              3.30 3.30 4.00 3.70 
Wheat &  Bamboo           2.80 3.90 4.40 5.20 
Wheat &  Mouse            3.30 4.80 2.80 3.60 
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Appendix 2F: Post-Test Endorsement Proportions Experiment 3 
 
 
 
Proportion who believe 
Categories are Causally 
Related 
 
Proportion who believe 
Categories are from same 
Taxonomic Group  
Timing speeded delayed speeded delayed 
Acorn & Squirrel          0.90 1.00 0.70 0.80 
Acorn & Walnut            0.25 0.16 0.95 1.00 
Butterfly & Ant           0.50 0.35 1.00 0.65 
Butterfly & Swallow       0.55 0.61 0.00 0.00 
Cabbage & Rapeseed        0.10 0.05 0.80 0.74 
Cabbage & Snail           1.00 1.00 0.05 0.05 
Carrot & Rabbit           0.95 0.85 0.05 0.05 
Carrot & Radish           0.20 0.20 1.00 0.95 
Fly & Ant                 0.00 0.10 0.85 0.65 
Fly & Frog                0.90 0.80 0.15 0.35 
Grass & Bamboo            0.25 0.35 0.95 0.95 
Grass & Sheep             0.90 0.90 0.00 0.00 
Grasshopper & Lice        0.30 0.24 0.75 0.50 
Grasshopper & Toad        0.70 0.63 0.40 0.50 
Krill & Penguin           0.90 0.82 0.05 0.10 
Krill & Woodlice          0.05 0.06 0.37 0.16 
Meerkat & Badger          0.11 0.16 0.80 0.94 
Meerkat & Eagle           0.74 0.63 0.11 0.11 
Mouse & Buzzard           0.85 0.83 0.85 0.89 
Mouse & Squirrel           0.15 0.22 0.95 0.70 
Penguin & Duck            0.45 0.50 0.85 0.75 
Penguin & Orca            0.79 0.60 0.05 0.11 
Rabbit & Fox              0.90 0.95 0.00 0.05 
Rabbit & Squirrel         0.25 0.26 0.95 0.84 
Salmon &  Grizzly         0.90 0.95 0.40 0.60 
Salmon &  Herring         0.35 0.33 0.90 0.90 
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Scorpion & Eagle          0.45 0.25 0.10 0.11 
Scorpion & Spider         0.30 0.15 0.65 0.55 
Shrimp & Barnacle         0.35 0.30 0.65 0.72 
Shrimp & Salmon           0.55 0.55 0.00 0.10 
Snail & Frog              0.40 0.20 0.05 0.15 
Snail & Hedgehog          0.70 0.53 0.50 0.35 
Snail & Limpet            0.05 0.20 0.80 0.76 
Snail & Squid             0.20 0.37 0.35 0.35 
Squirrel & Cat            0.10 0.15 0.15 0.06 
Squirrel & Prairie Dog    0.25 0.30 0.65 0.74 
Toad & Salamander         0.25 0.15 0.60 0.67 
Toad & Snake              0.55 0.47 0.05 0.05 
Wheat &  Bamboo           0.06 0.95 0.90 0.90 
Wheat &  Mouse            0.85 0.15 0.35 0.35 
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Appendix 3 
Appendix 3A: Base Categories Experiment 4 
 
Property  
(between subjects) 
Cell  Disease 
 Carrot  Carrot  
 Tuna  Tuna  
 Worm  Worm  
 Trout  Trout  
 Hawk Hawk 
 Mosquito  Mosquito  
 Dog  Dog  
 Zebra  Zebra  
 Crocodile  Crocodile  
 Weasel  Weasel  
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Appendix 3B: Base Categories Experiment 5 
 
Property  
(within-subjects) 
Cell  Disease 
 Bat  Kangaroo 
 Tuna  Dog 
 Bee Weasel 
 Trout  Elephant 
 Skunk Seagull 
 Mosquito  Rose 
 Dog  Flea  
 Snake Pigeon 
 Pig Chimpanzee 
 Heron Eucalyptus 
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Appendix 3C: Classification Criteria for Categories generated by Participants 
 
Taxonomic Relationship  
Category Membership 
Both Categories belong to the same class or category.  
Example: Zebra & Antelope→ Mammals 
Causal Relationship 
Similar Diet 
Both Categories are similar with respect to diet or eating the 
same kind of thing. 
Example: Mosquito & Vampire Bat→ feed on blood 
Similar Habitat 
Both Categories share similar or the same habitat. 
Example: Zebra & Antelope→ live in African Savannah 
Behavioural Interaction 
Both Categories interact via some aspect of behaviour. 
Example: Seagull &Fisherman→ Gulls trail fishing boats 
Food Chain Interaction 
Both Categories  interact with respect to diet or eating, i.e. one 
category eats or is eaten by the other. 
Example: Worm & Blackbird→ dietary connection 
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Appendix 4 
Appendix 4A: Triads and Strength of Association  
 
Table 4.1: Category Pairs for the Triad Items and Mean Strength of Association Ratings 
  Target Category (and Strength of Association with Base) 
 Base Category Irrelevant but Strong 
Association 
Taxonomic Weak 
Association  
Unrelated 
 Orca Whales   Cod (5.3) Cows (2.2) Pigeons 
Snails  Hedgehogs (4.3) Octopuses (2.8) Sloths 
Butterflies   Flowers (7.6)  Locusts (5.5) Seaweed 
Salmon   Grizzly Bears (7.5) Goldfish (5.0) Hedgehogs 
Monkeys   Peanuts (6.8) Seals (2.5) Almonds 
Acorns   Squirrels (7.9) Lychees (3.7) Seals  
Bananas   Monkeys (7.5) Tulips (2.4) Sea Lions 
Shepherds Sheep (8.2) Bus Drivers (3.3) Porpoises 
Mice   Wheat (4.4) Goats (2.7) Bamboo 
Grass   Sheep (7.5) Palm Trees (5.0) Hyenas 
Penguins   Orca Whales (5.9) Chickens (3.0) Dogs 
Ants   Anteaters (7.6) Dragonflies (4.5) Moose 
Carrots   Rabbits (7.7) Bamboo (3.1) Tigers 
Dolphins   Cod (7.3) Llamas (2.0) Parrots 
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Appendix 4B: Semantic Inhibitory Control Task   
 
  Prime Sentence Ap. Non-
Word 
Ap. Word In-ap. Non-
Word 
Ap. Non-
Word 
He was tired and went to ____ sleap  bed efent goat 
John felt sorry, but the accident was not his ___ foult responsibility lettor billboard 
The teacher wrote the problem on the ____ backboad paper craud talent 
Shuffle the cards before you ____ deel play klothes college 
The pigs wallowed in the ____ mudde dirt cource wrist 
Karen awoke after a bad ____ nitemair dream troubel ankle 
The movers put the sofa down on the bare ___ fhlore concrete rotton father 
The child was born with a rare ____ deseese illness delite planet 
The squirrel stored some nuts in the ____ threa nest grount blond 
Betty had no sense of ____ humah direction parens steak 
The captain wanted to stay with the sinking ___ shibp boat werde marathon 
John poured himself a glass of ____ millkh wine strewp duck 
He liked lemon and sugar in his ____ cofea tea peetal rooster 
They went as far as they ____ ccoud wanted lucke voice 
The derelict house will be torn____ dauwne apart proplem book 
Most cats see well at ____ nhite dusk crums moustache 
Sharon dried the dishes with a ____ taull cloth rowen safety 
Jean was glad that the affair was____ ovar finished traine parents 
The whole town came to hear the mayor ____ speek talk bibel newspaper 
The game was called off when it began to ___ rayn snow shing sing 
He scraped the cold food from his ____ plade dish vally hint 
The pizza was too hot to  ____ eet handle trak sofa 
She called her husband at his ____ ofise work mohn horse 
The wealthy child attended a private ____ scholl nursery jocke tomorrow 
The crime rate has gone up this ____ yeer month jellow garlic 
Her new shoes were the wrong ____ sise colour croud hormone 
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The lawyer knew that his client was  ____ inosant guilty cemical circus 
The dog chased the cat up the ____ trea street magasin health 
The doctor said that his leg was ____ proken injured naighbor talked 
John must keep his dog on a ____ leache chain paiper money 
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Appendix 4C: Mean Proportion of Taxonomic Choices for Items Experiment 6 
 
 Triads Mean Proportion Taxonomic 
Choice 
  Heavy Load Light Load 
Conflict 
Triads 
Cells 
Orca Whales  → Cod or Cows? 0.12 0.35 
Snails  → Hedgehogs or Octopuses? 0.59 0.76 
Butterflies  → Flowers or Locusts? 0.65 0.88 
Salmon  → Grizzly Bears or Goldfish? 0.59 0.82 
Monkeys  → Peanuts or Seals? 0.47 0.59 
Acorns  → Squirrels or Lychees? 0.59 0.82 
Bananas  → Monkeys or Tulips? 0.53 0.65 
Shepherds  → Sheep or Bus Drivers? 0.82 0.88 
Mice  → Wheat or Goats? 0.35 0.76 
Grass  → Sheep or Palm Trees? 0.65 0.71 
Penguins  → Orca Whales or Chickens? 0.06 0.29 
Ants  → Anteaters or Dragonflies? 0.53 0.76 
Carrots  → Rabbits or Bamboo? 0.29 0.65 
Dolphins  → Cod or Llamas? 0.06 0.29 
Control 
Triads 
Cells 
Orca Whales  → Pigeons or Cows? 
0.88 0.88 
Snails  → Sloths or Octopuses? 0.71 0.82 
Butterflies  → Seaweed or Locusts? 0.94 0.94 
Salmon  → Hedgehogs or Goldfish? 1.00 1.00 
Monkeys  → Almonds or Seals? 0.59 0.53 
Acorns  → Sea Lions or Lychees? 0.94 1.00 
Bananas  → Seals or Tulips? 0.82 1.00 
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Shepherds  → Porpoises or Bus Drivers? 0.94 1.00 
Mice  → Bamboo or Goats? 0.88 0.94 
Grass  → Hyenas or Palm Trees? 0.94 0.88 
Penguins  → Dogs or Chickens? 0.71 0.82 
Ants  → Moose or Dragonflies? 0.88 0.94 
Carrots  → Tigers or Bamboo? 0.88 1.00 
Dolphins  → Parrots or Llamas? 0.79 0.84 
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Appendix 4D: Post-Test Endorsements Experiment 6 
 
 
Proportion who believe 
Categories are Causally 
Related 
Proportion who believe 
Categories are from 
same Taxonomic Group  
Timing Light load Heavy load Light load Heavy load 
Orca & Cod         0.56 1 0.29 0.35 
Snail & Hedgehog        0.76 0.76 0.24 0 
Flower & Butterfly      0.94 0.82 0.12 0 
Salmon & Grizzly Bear 0.94 0.94 0 0 
Monkey & Peanut 0.94 0.94 0.06 0.12 
Acorn & Squirrel        1 0.94 0 0.12 
Banana & Monkey 0.88 1 0 0 
Sheep & Shepherd 0.65 0.71 0.24 0.06 
Mouse & Wheat 0.82 1 0 0 
Grass & Sheep 0.94 0.94 0.06 0 
Penguin & Orca Whale 0.47 0.59 0. 25 0.29 
Ant & Anteater 0.82 1 0.18 0.06 
Carrot & Rabbit 1 0.94 0.12 0.06 
Dolphin & Cod 0.82 0.88 0.29 0.47 
Orca Whale & Cow 0.12 0.06 0.71 0.41 
Snail & Octopus 0.12 0 0.76 0.25 
Butterfly & Locust 0.35 0.29 0.82 0.88 
Salmon & Goldfish 0 0.18 0.94 1 
Monkey & Seal 0.12 0 0.41 0.29 
Acorn & Lychee        0.24 0.06 0.82 0.94 
Banana & Tulip 0.12 0 0.53 0.69 
Shepherd & Bus Driver 0 0.29 0.94 1 
Mouse & Goat 0.12 0.12 0.53 0.47 
Grass & Palm Tree 0.12 0.06 1 1 
Penguin & Chicken 0.12 0 0.59 0.59 
Ant & Dragonfly 0.47 0.24 0.94 0.94 
Carrot & Bamboo 0.06 0.12 0.82 0.82 
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Dolphin & Llama 0 0 0.47 0.41 
Orca Whale & Pigeon 0 0 0 0.06 
Snail & Sloth 0.24 0.24 0.2 0.06 
Butterfly & Seaweed 0.12 0 0.12 0.06 
Salmon & Hedgehog 0 0 0 0 
Monkey & Almond 1 0.71 0.06 0 
Acorn & Sea Lion 0.12 0 0.12 0 
Banana & Seal 0 0 0.12 0 
Shepherd & Porpoise 0.12 0.06 0.56 0.19 
Mouse & Bamboo 0.29 0.12 0 0 
Grass & Hyena 0.53 0.63 0.12 0.12 
Penguin & Dog 0 0 0.06 0.12 
Ant & Moose 0.29 0.24 0 0 
Carrot & Tiger 0.06 0.2 0.12 0 
Dolphin & Parrot 0.12 0 0 0.06 
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Appendix 4E: Mean Proportion of Taxonomic Choices across Individual Items 
 
 Triads Mean Proportion Taxonomic 
Choice 
  Experiment 7 Experiment 8 
Conflict 
Triads 
Cells 
Orca Whales  → Cod or Cows? 0.32 0.34 
Snails  → Hedgehogs or Octopuses? 0.79 0.66 
Butterflies  → Flowers or Locusts? 0.82 0.76 
Salmon  → Grizzly Bears or Goldfish? 0.86 0.92 
Monkeys  → Peanuts or Seals? 0.86 0.78 
Acorns  → Squirrels or Lychees? 0.86 0.86 
Bananas  → Monkeys or Tulips? 0.89 0.80 
Shepherds  → Sheep or Bus Drivers? 0.89 0.86 
Mice  → Wheat or Goats? 0.79 0.88 
Grass  → Sheep or Palm Trees? 0.75 0.84 
Penguins  → Orca Whales or Chickens? 0.21 0.08 
Ants  → Anteaters or Dragonflies? 0.93 0.86 
Carrots  → Rabbits or Bamboo? 0.86 0.84 
Dolphins  → Cod or Llamas? 0.36 0.24 
Control 
Triads 
Cells 
Orca Whales  → Pigeons or Cows? 0.82 0.82 
Snails  → Sloths or Octopuses? 0.96 0.68 
Butterflies  → Seaweed or Locusts? 0.82 0.98 
Salmon  → Hedgehogs or Goldfish? 1.00 1.00 
Monkeys  → Almonds or Seals? 1.00 0.88 
Acorns  → Sea Lions or Lychees? 0.89 1.00 
Bananas  → Seals or Tulips? 0.93 0.98 
Shepherds  → Porpoises or Bus Drivers? 1.00 0.98 
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Mice  → Bamboo or Goats? 0.89 0.92 
Grass  → Hyenas or Palm Trees? 0.96 0.96 
Penguins  → Dogs or Chickens? 0.86 0.76 
Ants  → Moose or Dragonflies? 0.96 0.96 
Carrots  → Tigers or Bamboo? 0.96 0.96 
Dolphins  → Parrots or Llamas? 0.79 0.84 
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Appendix 4F: Post-Test Endorsements Experiment 7 and 8 
 
 
Proportion who believe 
Categories are Causally 
Related 
Proportion who believe 
Categories are from 
same Taxonomic Group  
Timing Expt 7 Expt 8 Expt 7 Expt 8 
Orca & Cod         0.81 0.76 0.33 0.50 
Snail & Hedgehog        0.74 0.66 0.07 .0.20 
Flower & Butterfly      0.81 0.80 0.15 0.04 
Salmon & Grizzly Bear 0.81 0.84 0 0.06 
Monkey & Peanut 0.93 0.94 0 0 
Acorn & Squirrel        0.89 0.96 0.04 0.04 
Banana & Monkey 0.93 0.94 0.04 0 
Sheep & Shepherd 0.85 0.70 0.30 0.18 
Mouse & Wheat 0.89 0.92 0 0.02 
Grass & Sheep 0.93 1 0 0.02 
Penguin & Orca Whale 0.67 0.58 0.56 0.46 
Ant & Anteater 0.93 0.94 0.04 0.14 
Carrot & Rabbit 0.93 0.92 0 0.02 
Dolphin & Cod 0.74 0.76 0.33 0.52 
Orca Whale & Cow 0.11 0 0.67 0.54 
Snail & Octopus 0.11 0.1 0.54 0.53 
Butterfly & Locust 0.41 0.20 0.93 0.90 
Salmon & Goldfish 0.26 0.28 1 0.96 
Monkey & Seal 0.07 0.02 0.89 0.50 
Acorn & Lychee        0.30 0.26 0.74 0.90 
Banana & Tulip 0.11 0.02 0.67 0.76 
Shepherd & Bus Driver 0.19 0.22 1 0.98 
Mouse & Goat 0.12 0.12 0.44 0.70 
Grass & Palm Tree 0.19 0.06 0.89 0.94 
Penguin & Chicken 0.04 0.02 0.78 0.62 
Ant & Dragonfly 0.30 0.29 0.81 0.82 
Carrot & Bamboo 0.15 0.12 0.74 0.86 
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Dolphin & Llama 0.04 0 0.52 0.46 
Orca Whale & Pigeon 0.08 0.04 0..07 0.08 
Snail & Sloth 0.35 0.27 0.15 0.20 
Butterfly & Seaweed 0.07 0.04 0 0 
Salmon & Hedgehog 0.07 0 0.04 0.02 
Monkey & Almond 0.74 0.76 0 0 
Acorn & Sea Lion 0.07 0.04 0 0 
Banana & Seal 0 0 0 0.02 
Shepherd & Porpoise 0.12 0.06 0.36 0.27 
Mouse & Bamboo 0.27 0.18 0 0 
Grass & Hyena 0.50 0.56 0 0 
Penguin & Dog 0.15 0 0.22 0.24 
Ant & Moose 0.22 0.14 0.07 0.04 
Carrot & Tiger 0.04 0.04 0 0 
Dolphin & Parrot 0.04 0 0.04 0.08 
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Appendix 5 
Appendix 5A: Association Ratings Premise Categories in Medin et al. (2003) 
 
 Relation   Category Pair Strength of Association 
 
Property 
Reinforcement 
Diverse 
Skunks & Stink Bugs 5.1 
 Chimpanzees & Dolphins 4.1 
 Bats & Robins 4.9 
 Camels & Desert Rats 5.9 
 Pigs & Chickens 4.7 
 Penguins & Polar Bears 5.9 
 Kangaroos & Frogs 2.4 
 
Non-diverse 
 Penguins & Eagles 5.3 
  Robins & Iguanas 2.3 
  Pigs & Whales 3.2 
  Cats & Rhinos 3.0 
  Penguins & Frogs 3.1 
  Koalas & Wolves 3.6 
  Polar Bears & Antelopes 3.6 
  Horses & Ants 2.5 
  Kangaroos & Elephants 4.1 
  Rabbits & Zebras 3.0 
  Sparrows & Dogs 3.1 
  Bats & Elephants 2.4 
  Fleas & Butterflies 4.5 
  Camels & Rhinos 4.3 
  Chimpanzees & Cows 3.1 
  Skunks & Deer 3.6 
 
Causal 
Diverse 
 Rabbits & Carrots 6.8 
  Robins & Worms 6.1 
  Fleas & Dogs 5.8 
  Horses & Grass 6.5 
  Cats & Sparrows 4.9 
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  Rabbits & Lettuce 6.9 
  Koalas & Gum Trees 5.6 
  Sparrows & Seeds 6.0 
 
